


1992

National Defense Report

Republic of China





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National Defense Report Republic of China



Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd.
• Taipei •

1992 National Defense Report
Republic of China

Translated from its Chinese Version by:
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Message of the Minister of National Defense

As modern national defense is guardianship for our country's people, it must achieve its strength through the unified support of the public. The goal of national security is thus ensured by bringing this integral force to realization. Thus, building a consensus among the people through mutual understanding is essential in gaining support and, in turn, making progress towards national defense measures. Clearly recognizing the objective of modern national defense as such, President Lee Teng-hui declared in 1990 after taking office as eighth president of the ROC his hopes to have a "National Defense Report" published and made public within two years. Compilation of extensive research was then initiated by the Ministry of Defense at the instruction of Premier Hau Pei-tsun. The resulting documentation constitutes the organized efforts and careful preparation of almost a year before the task of publishing the Report was fulfilled. The contents of the Report, limited to the scope of national military strategy, serves broadly to inform its readers of recent evolution of military policy, indicating the state of defense affairs implementation over the previous year (1991) and the direction of future development. As further preface to the Report, I would like to make several remarks below, relating our country's modern national defense to its historical beginnings.

Before reporting on the current situation of national defense, it is helpful to first look back upon the circumstances surrounding Taiwan in 1949, when serious military upsets on mainland battlefields were suffered. The impact of such crises was deep:

the seat of our central government was forced to move from Nanking, the home of the capital at that time, to Taipei, Taiwan.

Despite ravaging assault and a dismal state of warfare, we (the Republic) were successful in deterring the Chicom's troops from making further transgressions, owing to two victorious battles in Kuningtou, Kinmen, and in Tengpu, the Choushan Islands. Based on a comprehensive assessment of the military's stance in light of the circumstances, our government made the strategic decision to transfer defense measures from Hainan and the Choushan Islands so that military strength could be concentrated on ensuring the security of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, which was to become the bastion of national recovery. Military aid for the defense of Taiwan came from the United States in 1950 with the out-break of the Korean War, in support of its overall interests in the Asian-Pacific Region. In this comparatively peaceful and stable period, the ROC Armed Forces could undertake a plan for reorganizing and growth by restructuring and stream-lining personnel, eliminating unnecessary designations while renewing equipment and weaponry and fortifying of troops. The foundation for the development of today's ROC Armed Forces had thus been established. Although several set-backs were incurred during this period, including the Kinmen bombardment of 1958, withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971 and severance of diplomatic ties with the United States, the role of solid military strength in safe-guarding national security holds immeasurable importance in the country's great progress in economic growth and social prosperity in a reasonably stable environment.

In retrospect, radical changes were experienced world-wide over the past year. Almost overnight the "Soviet Union" had become dissolved into an obsolete historical term under the

multi-pressures of democracy, economics and national consciousness. The newly-created "Commonwealth of Independent States" are still beset with worrisome domestic problems. What Western nations are particularly concerned about is the dispersal of massive quantities of nuclear weapons to each of the Independent States, which will inevitably affect the safety of the international community.

On May 1, 1991, President Lee Teng-hui internally declared the abolition of the 43-year old Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion and thereby terminated the National Mobilization Period, demonstrating his resolution to implement constitutional reform. To this end, our government has expressed its position on the issue of national unification as one to be solved gradually under the principles of peacefulness, rationality, equality and mutual benefit. Conversely, the Chicoms have yet to offer any definite response indicating goodwill. Instead, there is continued resistance on their part towards world trends of democracy, and stubborn perseverance in carrying on the movement opposing "peaceful evolution" accompanied by the increasing threats of military force imposed upon us. Confronted by the Chicom's intransigent orientation as such, our government seeks a pragmatic solution: while attempting to establish order in cross-Straits interchange, the ROC government will require a backing of economic strength to overcome political obstacles. We firmly believe that it is only with this particular strength that we can continue steady development within changing world conditions.

The foremost purpose of military build-up is to ensure national security. Facing Chicom's military threats, the ROC has no

other choice but to bear the burden of an expenditure which corresponds to the need for national protection. At the same time, the government must devote resources to the country's cultural and economic development as well as its social welfare. With these considerations, large increases in the defense budget are unlikely to be granted over the coming years. While the rational concept of our military build-up does not carry the intention of engaging in quantitative competition with the enemy, its objective is to work towards a high-quality, high-technology military force strong enough to deter the enemy from invading. Anticipatory in nature, the work of military build-up will take time to gradually achieve its aim. The ROC Armed Forces is a well-disciplined and well-organized group with a strong tradition. We firmly believe that, with our determination and willpower, and on the premise of harmony and stability, the ideal goal of our military modernization and institutionalization can certainly be achieved.

In compiling the Report, we made extensive reference to the form and the content of equivalent documents produced by other countries, and also consulted a number of renowned scholars. In view of our unique situation, the safe-guarding of our national security and other concerns was foremost in mind when selecting the materials included in this Report.

In conclusion, it is our hope that this Report serves the dual purpose of updating and making public a census of our current overall military strength, and thus gaining the knowledgeable support of our people for our defense policy.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Chen Li-An". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Chen" and last name "Li-An" clearly distinguishable.

Chen Li-An, Ph.D.

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PART ONE
MILITARY SITUATION

Summary

1. With the U.S.-Soviet detente and the end of the Cold War era, the bipolar confrontation shaped after the Second World War has thus broken down and a new model of organic competition of regional economic cooperation has been developed. Owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States now dominates the new international order.
2. In the Middle East, the goal of peacefully settling the Arab-Israeli long-term territorial dispute has not been reached, and unpredictable variables still exist.
3. In Europe, ideological barriers have weakened in the wake of German unification and the breaking up of the Warsaw Pact; hence the large-scale war is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Owing to the rise of nationalism, however, regional conflicts may possibly occur. In Western Europe, NATO is bound to play an even more important defense role.
4. The military situation in our neighboring areas hasn't yet been affected too much by the tide of detente. To cope with the reduction in influence of both the U.S. and Russia, countries in the region are competitively developing their own defense; and Japan, with its superior national strength, seems the most ambitious in this respect. Gene-

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rally speaking, the Chinese Communists and North Korea are the real source of instability in this region.

5. With a total strength of some 4.7-million soldiers, the Chinese Communists' armed forces are actively pushing forward their military modernization.

Chapter 1

Current Global Military Situation

I. Outline of Military Situation in Cold War Era

Shortly after the end of World War II in 1945, a global military confrontation between East and West blocs was gradually formed, with the Soviet Union and the United States being in the leading position of each side. Owing to the complete differences in their ideologies, political convictions, and economic systems, the two sides, in addition to devoting themselves to the conventional and nuclear arms race, concluded respectively in the militarily sensitive European theater the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, opposing each other. While tensions have long existed between them, large-scale armed conflicts have also been restrained effectively.

On the other hand, a great many countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central and South America won their liberation from their previous colonial suzerains and became independent during the post-war era. Nevertheless, many political and/or territorial issues left over from colonial days still bring about unceasing disputes and conflicts among them. Basically, most of these countries have joined either the U.S. or the Soviet camp and signed bilateral defense treaties with one of them. Because of their immaturity, most of these countries tend

to be agitated by various kinds of domestic or foreign factors and are often on the verge of conflicts. Thus, tension is high almost everywhere.

II. Current U.S.-Soviet Military Situation

The End of the Cold War Era

In view of the basic differences in their political and economic systems as well as ideologies, the United States and the Soviet Union had long been antagonistic to each other. In retrospect, issues such as the first Berlin Crisis in 1948, the Korean War (1950-53), the second Berlin Crisis (1958), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1965-73), and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, all led to a high state of tension in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Drawing a lesson from the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union began to strengthen its armed forces markedly in the mid-1960s by accumulating a large amount of conventional as well as nuclear weapons, and using them as bargaining chips to enlarge its political influence in the world. In dealing with the situation as such, the United States also strengthened its strategy of deterrence vigorously. Later on, however, each of the two felt that, should such an acute competition last indefinitely, either a nuclear war would eventually break out or both of them would be bogged down in an endless arms race. Thus Washington and Moscow opened formal dialogues and, accordingly, signed an agreement in 1971 to minimize the possibility of nuclear war; concluded a treaty right after the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972; adopted the declaration of Helsinki --

the "Final Act" -- issued in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975; reached the SALT II agreement in 1979; concluded the Treaty of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in 1987. One year later, representatives from both sides negotiated withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and held dialogues on arms control, disarmament, and some other regional issues. In 1989, U.S. president George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev held a summit meeting on Malta, in which the two leaders, agreeing on all matters of substance, looked forward to a peacefully and freely developed Europe, and agreed to relax the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In July 1991, another U.S.-Soviet agreement for reducing one-third of their strategic arms was signed.

Furthermore, in September, President Bush proclaimed another arms reduction program, and a similar response from Moscow came soon afterwards. Such an exchange of goodwill and sincerity not only ended the half-century long period of military confrontation, but also led the whole world gradually into a new era of economic cooperation and peaceful competition.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union

Right after assuming power in 1985, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev admitted in public that, under the centralized administration system, the Soviet economy had long been in a state of stagnation. The economic growth rate from 1980 to 1985 was zero. A heavy defense burden had brought about a more-than-ten-percent deficit in the national budget, foreign exchange reserves had been falling for several years, productive forces could hardly be put to use for lack of modern technology of production, and the poor agricultural output hadn't im-

proved for years. Facing such a serious situation, Gorbachev had no other choice but to make vigorous efforts to turn the tide. First of all, in foreign affairs, he put forward the so-called "New Thinking," in which the following main concepts, among others, were included: (1) In this nuclear age, countries for their own survival are even more interdependent than ever; (2) Big countries should observe the principles of relative equality and mutual safety, and lower military confrontation and competition; (3) National security and international security can never be separated; and (4) In solving international problems, one should take military, political, economic and human factors into consideration. Under the direction of this "New Thinking," the Soviet Union has had a series of summit meetings with the United States, signed treaties for reducing nuclear arms, withdrawn troops from Cuba, Afghanistan and Angola, resumed its normalization of relations with Communist China, and gradually ended the era of Cold War confrontation. Domestically, to pursue political and social renovation, Gorbachev called for economic reform or *perestroika*, reevaluating the functions of the state-owned enterprises, loosening controls over the economy, carrying out "democratization" and "openness of information," etc. As the boldest attempt since the founding of the Soviet Union, these measures aimed at extricating the nation from its predicament and creating new hope. However, owing to the insufficiency of consumer goods, the increasingly poor economy, and the rise of national consciousness among various republics in the Union, Gorbachev's achievements in foreign affairs did very little toward solving the internal problems. After the conservatives' miscarried coup in August 1991, the internal changes as a whole became even faster and violent. First came the collapse of

the communist system, then the three Baltic republics declared their independence; and then, eleven of the remaining twelve republics (except Georgia which was in a civil war) formed a Commonwealth of Independent States in December. Hence the original "Soviet Union" has thus become an historical term. Nevertheless, the newly formed Commonwealth cannot effectively overcome so many difficulties right away; its future development will thus be full of unstable variables. No one can affirmatively predict if or how long the Commonwealth will survive. In addition, while the republics have become independent one after another, there hasn't yet been a reliable and unified means of control to handle such a huge amount of nuclear weapons which had previously been deployed by the Soviet Union authorities widely all over the Eurasian continent; so Western countries feel anxious about their safety.

U.S. Strategic Concept and Direction of Its Military Outfit

Dramatic and radical changes occurred in the Soviet Union. They have transformed the structure of international strategy from a state of U.S.-Soviet bipolar contention into a unitary system dominated by the United States. At the same time, however, the influences of West Europe and Japan in the world political arena have been rapidly enlarged and strengthened. Generally speaking, Washington's global strategic deployment will unlikely change too much in the next few years. As the leader of the free world, the United States will urge the build-up of a new international order. The current U.S. strategic concept and the direction of its military outfit can be sketched as follows:

(1) With the end of the Cold War, collapse of the communist sys-

tem and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the possibility of an overall U.S.-Soviet military confrontation has certainly been brought down. Although it seems that an opportune moment of world peace is emerging, crises are still latent here and there. In the past, the United States had only one hegemony, i.e., the Soviet Union, to cope with, while at present, she has to pay close attention to some other ambitious "sub-hegemonies." At this moment, there is no indication that Washington will significantly reduce its armaments.

- (2) In the foreseeable future, the most serious military threat will possibly be regional conflicts. Although sufficient warning time is necessary in coping with the threat, defense industry is basically one of the most important assets to meet the operational requirements. Reduction of the military budget should therefore be evaluated according to the actual situation. They must not be hoodwinked by shortsighted interests.
- (3) The quality of ground, air and naval forces must be maintained at a high level so that they can fulfill their operational missions. Hence the military budget should be focused on improving the quality of military personnel and on strengthening the technological superiority.
- (4) To provide for the future, the U.S. armed forces must have a concept of joint operations. Each and every armed service should possess the capabilities for diversified operations, strengthen the ability of coordinating and organizing the task forces, and carry out solid training of special operation forces.

III. Current Military Situation in Europe

Ever since the end of World War II, Europe has become a typical area of long-term confrontation between the East and the West camps. Respectively having NATO and the Warsaw Pact as their cores, the two sides erected long and strong linkups with large-scale armed strength along the line drawn from the north of Norway to the east of Turkey on the verge of igniting a world war at all times. Generally speaking, the Warsaw Pact retains a more-than-twofold superiority over NATO in terms of conventional armed forces and non-strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, the fact that Soviet and American ground-based intermediate range missiles were eliminated after the INF Treaty became effective in 1988 not only heightened the Soviet proportion in the field of conventional fighting capability, but also highlighted its superiority in short-range nuclear forces (SNF). Therefore, NATO had been working toward the modernization of military technology long before 1990, so as to raise the fighting capability of its conventional weapons and to strengthen the reliability of its strategy of flexible response.

However, after the tide of democratization in Eastern Europe as well as the unification of Germany in October 1990, great changes have taken place within the basic structure of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The military alliance of the Warsaw Pact was disbanded in July 1990, while the future orientation of NATO has not been determined yet. Some of NATO's member states have started reducing their armed forces. Germany and France plan to establish an exclusive European military strength; but the United States disagrees with this, hoping that NATO will survive so as to maintain its influence over West European affairs. In view of the fact that the member states of the European Community (EC) feel incapable of arbi-

trating the Yugoslav civil war, it is believed that the United States will still possess a say over European affairs in the foreseeable future.

IV. Situation in the Middle East after the Gulf War

The Middle East, especially the areas around the Persian Gulf, possesses more than two-thirds of the world's oil reserves and has more than a quarter of the world's oil output. Most major countries in the free world depend upon this region to supply a considerable amount of their oil. Therefore, maintaining peace and security in this region is vital to the economic and political well-being of the entire world. Unfortunately, however, since most countries in this region achieved independence from their old colonial suzerains after World War II, various territorial, national and religious disputes still exist among them. In recent years, countries in this region, by wielding their oil profits, have either developed or purchased ballistic missiles as well as nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems, thus making the region even more unstable.

Table 1—1 Rate of Major Countries' Dependence on Importation of Crude Oil from Strait of Hormuz

Countries	Import (10,000 bar./day)	Rate of Dependence (%)
U.S.	121	21
U.K.	14	18
France	26	18
W.Germany	15	11
Italy	36	24
Japan	177	53

Sources : OECD Quality Oil/Energy Balance 1988

Major conflicts in this region since the end of the World War II include four Arab-Israeli Wars from 1948 to 1973, and the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. Basically, this region still suffers from the nightmare of the two superpowers' striving for strategic interests.

In August 1990, Iraq invaded, occupied and illegally annexed Kuwait. Under the overwhelming support from the United Nations, the United States called on a number of countries having common interests in the region to dispatch troops to rescue Kuwait. After a long period of fierce bombing and a rapid ground attack in January 1991, a cease-fire agreement was made in February. While Iraq has already lost her ability to influence the situation in the Middle East, Western nations still feel suspicious of her attempt to keep on developing nuclear weapons. The United States, on the other hand, has obviously become the foremost influential power toward the politics in the region. For peace in the Middle East, Washington did bring about the peace conference in Madrid, Spain, in October 1991, but it ended without any positive achievements, owing to unsolvable territorial disputes among Israel, the PLO and Syria. Although Washington has kept on expediting the peace talks, there are still dangers and difficulties on the road to success.

V. Prospects

Viewing the various evolutions in East-West relations in recent years, one can find that a trend of detente has obviously developed step by step among nations; but political and economic conflicts still exist among some of them. While the rules have changed, games are still going on. From now on, regional

confrontation based on economic competition will gradually be formed, and limited wars may possibly break out at any time. We hereby observe the following two points:

1. Enormous and rapid changes have occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which may well affect the adjustment of regional organizations and deployment of military strategies all over the world. The United States and the Soviet Union have reached a consensus over the reduction of their conventional armed forces; and a further agreement on cutting nuclear weapons has also been signed. Facing the rapidly changing situations in the Communist world, however, countries in the free world haven't worked out an integrated countermeasure yet, and the basic problems still exist. For example, in examining and verifying the FY 1991 defense budget request, the U.S. Congress did express its concern over the lack of a new strategy. In short, before the changing situations in the Communist world settle down, factors of uncertainty will still remain within the global military environment. Such a situation will make both sides hold back their sincerity on the way toward the goal of reconciliation. Thus, while the pace of the arms race has slowed down because of detente between East and West, it will unlikely be stopped. Therefore, regional security and national border defense will become the focal points in future military strategy.
2. Disarmament in Europe doesn't necessarily mean there has already been a reconciliation in Asia. Disarmament in Europe has been a gradually advanced process on a systematically regulated course, but such a pattern actual-

ly does not exist in Asia. Both the United States and the Soviet Union built up their relations of military cooperation with Asian countries on an individual basis. Being affected by the disarmament in Europe and by the national policies of different countries in the area, the United States and Soviet Union have withdrawn their military forces from Asia. However, this doesn't mean that the overall military strength of Asia will be weakened. In terms of considering the global strategy, Asia possesses almost equal importance with Europe. So the future trends of Asia as a whole are closely related with big powers' interests and the worldwide balance of power. Therefore, almost all Asian countries are positively trying to increase their defense budget request and promote their military modernization, so as to fill up the defense vacuums left over by the U.S. and Soviet withdrawals.

In short, viewing the global military environment in the foreseeable future, we can say that, with the relaxation of the East-West confrontation, large-scale conflicts are unlikely; but limited regional war, on the other hand, may possibly break out at any time. In such an age of hopes and crises, as well as war and peace, coexisting side by side, numerous variables are still prevailing here and there. Under these circumstances, it appears even more important for a country to maintain an appropriate amount of self-defense strength to guarantee its national security.



Chapter 2

Military Situation in Neighboring Regions

I. Military Environment

Geographic Features

The territories under the control of the ROC government at present include: Taiwan and Penghu Islands; Kinmen, Matsu, Tungyin, Wuchiu, Tungsha, and Nansha Islands (Chart 1-1). Taiwan proper is a mountainous island located off the eastern coast of Asia in the Western Pacific. Roughly shaped like a tobacco leaf, the island of Taiwan is the largest body of land between Japan and the Philippines.

Also known as Pescadores, the Penghu Islands consist of 64 islets situated in the Taiwan Straits, midway between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan proper. Forming a natural demarcation between the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the Penghu Islands provide a natural defense for Taiwan. In the past, they were a key stop for ships sailing in the Far East and crossing the Pacific.

The Kinmen (Quemoy) Islands consist of 12 islets off the southeastern coast of Fukien Province. Covering an area of some 150 square kilometers, Kinmen holds a key position in the Taiwan Straits that blocks the mouth of Amoy Bay of Fukien Province and protects Taiwan and Penghu.

The Matsu Islands consist of 19 islets with a total area of only 28.8 square kilometers. Situated outside the mouth of the Min River of Fukien Province, Matsu forms the northern anchor of the offshore defense line commanding the river.


Tungsha, also known as the Pratas Islands, is a coral reef archipelago with a land area of 8.5 square kilometers located in the northeast corner of the South China Sea. Nansha, also known as the Spratly Islands, consists of 104 islets, reefs, cays and banks. Located in the southern part of the South China Sea, the area containing the islands stretches 810 kilometers from north to south and 900 kilometers from east to west. These two coral reef archipelagoes are of strategic importance not only because of their location, but also because of their abundant mineral and petroleum resources.

As far as geopolitics is concerned, whether one considers the Theory of Sea Power or the Theory of Land Power, geographic position is doubtless critical.

Containing Japan's External Economic Activities

Taiwan plays the role of a shield for protecting Japan's southward safe sea-lane as well as its strategic flank. Some ninety percent of Japan's petroleum imports and sixty percent of its ordinary imports come from those countries located to the south and the west of Japan, and therefore have to pass either the Taiwan Straits or the Bashi Channel. Such economic and geographic factors made the former Japanese prime minister Eisaku Sato publicly admit in 1969 in the Joint Communiqué signed with the then U.S. President Richard Nixon that the security of Taiwan is directly related to the security of Japan.

Chart 1—1 Territory Under ROC Sovereignty



Containing the Expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet

At present, the main force of the Pacific Fleet of the Soviet Navy is deployed in Vladivostok and Cam Ranh Bay respectively. In joining these two groups of naval strength, whether going southward into the Indian Ocean or turning eastward into the Pacific Ocean, they will all be contained by the Taiwan Straits. So long as the Free World effectively controls the Taiwan Straits, those two Soviet naval forces can never be assembled easily.

II. Northeast Asia

The area of Northeast Asia mainly includes Japan and the Korean Peninsula. It seems that the reality of long-term confrontation in this area hasn't been changed by the thawing of tensions and the detente between East and West in the past couple of years. Although both North and South Korea have proposed to discuss disarmament, no action has been taken yet. Japan, on the other hand, has been working for improving her armaments in recent years so as to obtain the initiative of defense in her own hands, and thus has added new variables in the stability of the area. In terms of the overall strategic system, both the United States and the Soviet Union have long been the main participants in peace and conflicts in this area.

Japan

Article 9 of Japan's post-War Constitution stipulates that she will never, ever resort to military power as an instrument to solve international disputes. To abide by this stipulation, she will not possess any sort of regular army, or any amount of military power which would be enough to stir up a war. For this reason, Japan has long been relying upon the U.S. commitment to its defense and security, sparing no effort to develop its economy and, therefore, has become an economic giant in today's world. Since 1972, however, Japan ambitiously determined to become a political giant too, and has vigorously built up and reorganized its armaments. According to its 1991 Defense White Paper, Japan has a strength of some 245,000 military personnel, 1,200 light and heavy tanks, 15 submarines, 64 destroyers and frigates, and 362 combat aircraft, composing a considerable amount of fighting capacity. In general, Japan's defense expenditures have


continued to increase in real terms. Its defense budget of FY 1989 was \$31.04 billion (the fifth largest in the world) which, rising by some 5.9% annually, accounts for 1.006% of its GNP of the year (the fourth consecutive year to exceed 1% of the GNP), or 6.49% of its government budget as a whole. In FY 1990, increasing by another 6%, its defense expenditure exceeded \$33 billion. Considering such an abundant financial strength combined with such an advanced technology, no one can underestimate Japan's potentiality in carrying out its defense modernization. During the Gulf War period, Japan was longing most ardently to dispatch troops to the Middle East on the ground of protecting her countrymen there, defending her national interests, and safeguarding the high seas security. Although under great pressure from domestic oppositionists, the desire was halted eventually and replaced by a symbolic action, the government of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is still intending to break through the constitutional restriction on belligerence. In December 1991, Japan's House of Representatives passed the PKO act, which allows the government to dispatch troops abroad to take part in United Nations' peacekeeping missions. This movement has already made quite a few Asian nations worry about the revival of its militarism.

Korean Peninsula

Divided into North and South Korea by the narrow band of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) roughly on the 38th parallel, the Peninsula has long been in an atmosphere of tension (Chart 1-2). Currently, armed forces of the two sides in this area is altogether over 1.46 million, in which the strength of North Korea is defi-

nitely bigger than that of South Korea whether in terms of the number of tanks (3,500 : 1,700), submarines (21 : 3), fighters (770 : 390), or personnel (840,000 : 620,000). More notably, North Korea has been vigorously developing missiles and nuclear weapons for years and with considerable achievements which, among others, have added additional variables to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Chart 1-2 Confrontation between ROK & DPPK on Korean Peninsula



Source : Japanese Defense White Paper, 1990

Influenced by the new trend of international detente, South Korea's President Roh Tae Woo, right after taking office in 1988, took the initiative and launched his northward policy.

The two sides have so far held four summit talks. Under the manipulation of the four major powers with an active interest in the Korean Peninsula — the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and Communist China — both North and South entered the United Nations as member states simultaneously in the fall of 1991, and signed a bilateral nonaggression treaty in December the same year. However, in addition to the fact that the disparity of living standards between the two sides is still too big, South Korea doesn't think the experience of Germany's unification can be easily transplanted to the soil of the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea is still not willing to give up its unyielding ideology of unifying the nation on its own terms. Under these circumstances, the way to peaceful unification seems still long.

Hence, both sides are positively promoting their armaments by increasing military expenditures.

The U.S. and Soviet Interests and Deployment in the Area

In the period of U.S.-Soviet global confrontation, the importance of Northeast Asia has long been second only to that of Europe. The only difference is that, while there are treaties of bilateral alliance, there hasn't been any bipolar alliance system formed in the area. To protect the security of the nations on its west flank and to maintain the prosperity of its largest trade-partnership area in the world, the United States has long made great efforts. US-ROK relations have been friendly since the mutual security treaty was signed and ratified in 1953, after the conclusion of the Korean War; and the U.S. military command was thus established. At present, there are about 43,000 American soldiers

stationed in South Korea, and the annual joint military exercises called "Team Spirit" still keep going on. Based on an overall consideration, however, the United States has decided to withdraw its troops, as well as the strategic nuclear weapons, from the ROK step by step, reducing the amount of that strength down to some 30,000 by 1995.


The United States and Japan also signed a Mutual Security Treaty in 1960. At present, some fifty thousand odd American military personnel are stationed in Japan, including some 2,100 Army, 7,400 Navy, 24,900 Marine Corps and 16,300 Air Force officers and men (Chart 1-3). Although the Japanese government provides an amount of \$2 billion to \$2.5 billion every year to support the U.S. military expenditure, withdrawing American troops from Japan has already been a fixed policy, in the hope that Japan could rebuild its armaments so as to lighten the burden on the U.S. in conventional forces.

In order to secure its interests in the Pacific region and to extend its oriental defense line, the Soviet Union has a huge force stationed in the Far East (Chart 1-4). As to the long-term Soviet-Japanese dispute over the sovereignty of the four islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu in the Southern Kurile chain off Hokkaido, although the Japanese government has expressed its willingness to offer a considerable amount of economic aid as an enticement, bilateral negotiations have been held for four times, and even Gorbachev personally paid a historic visit to Tokyo, the issue has not been solved in substance. Moscow withdrew as many as 120,000 troops from those islands in 1989, but in Japan's position, since sixty percent of the Soviet Far East military forces and ninety percent of its bombers are deployed in the Okhotsk Sea, the Kurile Islands and the

Kamchatka Peninsula, the threat has not been reduced.


The Soviet Union and North Korea signed a bilateral treaty of mutual defense in 1960, and Moscow offered large scale military aid to Pyongyang during the past four decades. At present, however, with its domestic situation having dramatically changed, the newly shaped Independent Commonwealth, on the one hand, is going to establish relations with South Korea for economic support; and on the other hand, has stopped aiding North Korea , and takes a conciliatory attitude toward detente between the two Koreas.

Chart 1-3-1 Deployment of U.S. Forces in Japan




Source : Japanese Defense White Paper, 1990

Chart 1-3-2 Deployment of U.S. Forces in Ryukyu



Sources : Japanese Defense White Paper, 1990

Chart 1-4 Soviet Military Deployment Near Japan



III. Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia consists of two parts: mainland and insular (largely the island area). The mainland part is composed of the nations of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea (Cambodia), and Vietnam. Insular Southeast Asia consists of the Malay Peninsula and the many islands that make up the nations of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

Indonesia

Indonesia is the largest country, both in area and population, in Southeast Asia. It consists of 13,677 islands that cover some

1,920,000 square kilometers of land along the equator between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Thus, its geographic position is strategically critical. With a population of more than 150 million, Indonesia ranks the world's fifth most populous country. So far as the military force is concerned, Indonesia possesses the strongest armed forces among the ASEAN nations. The total Indonesian Armed Forces amounts to 283,000 men, of them 215,000 are in the Army (having 10 military regions under its command), 43,000 in the Navy, and 25,000 in the Air Force.

Thailand

Thailand is the second largest military power among the ASEAN member states; and its geopolitical location is of vital importance to the safety of Southeast Asia as a whole. It possesses a military strength of 280,000 men, of which 190,000 are in the Army (divided into four regional commands), 50,000 in the Navy, and some 40,000 in the Air Force.

Malaysia


Geographically speaking, Malaysia links up Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore. The total strength of its Armed Forces amounts to 120 thousand odd men, of which more than 90 thousand are in the Army (including a regional security command, 9 infantry brigades, a special service regiment composed of 3 battalions, and a divisional reserve command), 12,500 in the Navy, and 12,000 in the Air Force.

The Philippines

Owing to its historical background, the Philippines has a heritage that is a unique blend of the Malaysian, Spanish, and American

cultures. It possesses a military strength of some 108,000 men in total, of which 80,000 are in the Army (divided into 6 regional joint commands), 25,000 in the Navy (including 8,000 marines and 2,000 coastguard personnel), and 16,000 in the Air Force.

Chart 1—5 Map of Southeast Asia



Notes : ⊕ Member of Association of Southeast Asia Nations.

Singapore

Singapore, a city-state which occupies a tiny island off the tip of the Malay Peninsula, faces the Strait of Malacca — the gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and the most convenient water route between Europe and the Far East. It has

a military strength of 55,500 men in total, of which 45,000 are in the Army, 4,500 in the Navy, and 6,000 in the Air Force.

Vietnam

Vietnam is not a member state of the ASEAN, but has the largest military power among the Southeast Asian countries. Its Armed Forces amount to 1,050,000 men, of which almost one million are in the Army, 36,000 in the Navy, and 12,000 in the Air Force.

U.S. and Soviet Inclinations in the Region

United States

Entirely withdrawing its officers and men from Clark Air Base in November 1991 and from Subic Naval Base by the end of 1992, the United States is obliged to lose an important strategic stronghold for safeguarding the security of sea-lanes between the West Pacific and Indian Oceans. To fill up such a vacancy of power in the region, therefore, the United States has been actively seeking new advanced bases in ASEAN nations, reached an agreement in this respect with Singapore, and is negotiating with Indonesia and Malaysia. In addition, it has stockpiled large quantities of war preparedness materials in Thailand, and keeps on strengthening relations with the friendly nations in the region.

Soviet Union

Since the end of 1989, the Soviet Union has been, step by step, withdrawing part of its troops stationed in Vietnam. In January

1990, Hanoi was notified that Moscow was about to reduce its military aid by one third from 1991, and to withdraw all of the medium-range Tu-16 Badger bombers stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. At present, the Soviet military strength stationed in Cam Ranh Bay are: 20 odd submarines as well as maintenance and logistics craft; 3 Tu-95 Bear, 16 Tu-16G Badger, and 20 MiG-23 aircraft; more than 7,000 marines, and several hundred military advisors. In June 1991, the Soviet Navy stated that the USSR was to keep on using Cam Ranh Bay as a stronghold for supporting its navy in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Ever since the abortive coup of August 1991, few significant changes have been made in Soviet Asian-Pacific policy.

Generally speaking, in the past the ASEAN nations mostly used their military strength in maintaining internal security. In recent years, however, owing to the transformation in both global and regional strategies, ASEAN nations (except for the Philippines) have made some adjustments in their defense policy by moving the focal point from maintaining internal security to safeguarding the peripheral economic waters. In addition, they prepared to set up a security system to maintain safety and stability in the region. While Vietnam's military expansion had once caused regional instability, with the Cambodia issue gradually being resolved and with Vietnam's adopting reforms and an open policy, the threat of Vietnam toward ASEAN nations has been decreasing greatly. Currently, ASEAN lays stress on the dispute over the sovereignty in the South China Sea, believing that that issue is indeed a potential threat toward the security of Southeast Asia.

Chapter 3

Chicom's Military Situation

I. Overall Assessment of Chicom's Military Strength

Military Thought


1. Concept of War

The Chinese Communists' (Chicom's) concept of war is based on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's military thought, holding that "war is the supreme form of class struggle," and is a kind of "politics with bloodshed;" the goal of war is "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy;" and "only by the gun-barrel can the entire world be rebuilt." They emphasize the infinity of war and the concept of people's war, believing that the deepest root of the war potentiality is actually preserved among the people.

2. Idea of Army Building

The Chicom's thinking on army building has long adhered to Mao's basic rationale of establishing the "people's armed troops" according to the principle of "guiding the army with the party." Even during the "ten-year reform," when vigorously pursuing the military modernization, they didn't abandon this primitive origin.

To this day, therefore, the Chicoms still insist on following the party's lead, on setting up an armed strength of "three-in-one" -- the people's liberation army, the armed police and the people's militia -- and on establishing the "modernized, regularized and revolutionized" army, as the basic principle of their army building.



The Chicoms' "people's army".

3. Thinking on the Use of Military Forces

Right after the war to "teach the Vietnamese a lesson," the Chicoms felt that their backward military was apparently not enough to meet the requirements of modernized

warfare and so they were longing to reform. In 1985, the Chicoms held the "Military Affairs Commission's Enlarged Conference" to examine the military situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and concluded that there wouldn't be a large-scale Sino-Russian War within 25 years. Thus, they made a decision to "reform the system; simplify and reorganize the army," and to transform the "state of facing-war" for "fighting early, fighting forcefully, and fighting in a nuclear war," into the peacetime construction track; and then determined their current strategic principle of "active defense" based on the international situation, external threats and geopolitical features, asking for setting up an armed strength which can provide a "fast and mobile" striking force, so as to meet the unexpected "partial war," and to create a favorable posture for large-scale war in the future.

Organizational System

The Chicoms' supreme institute for military command and decision making is "the CCP's Central Military Committee" which consists of a chairman, one to two vice-chairmen, a secretary-general, one to three deputy-secretaries-general, and a certain number of committee members. Selected by the Central Committee of the CCP, they execute the day-to-day work. In 1982, in an attempt to create a false impression of nationalization of the armed forces, the Chicoms supplemented in their Constitution the "State Military Committee" with its members being elected by the "National People's Congress." During the "ten-year reform," however, these two military committees were actu-

ally "two signboards with one set of personnel," i.e., all the committee members as well as the staff members of the two were the same people with the same titles. In the reshuffle of personnel, however, there emerged some new changes. Whether these two institutes will be separated in the days to come is yet to be observed. Under the State Council there is the "Ministry of National Defense," but at present, the latter can only deal with day-to-day military administration affairs, playing a connecting role between the State Council and the Military Committee and having no real power for commanding the Armed Forces, which belongs to the Central Military Committee. The Central Military Committee has three staff units under its command: General Staff Department, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department. And it also directly commands seven Great (or First-level) Military Regions; Navy; Air Force; Second Artillery Headquarters (strategic missile force); all the Military Committee's directly subordinate troops; military academies, institutes and schools of various levels; Commission for National Defense Science & Technology; Commission for National Defense Industries; National Defense University; and Academies of Military Science. The Chicom's "Military Regions" fall into three levels: Great (or First-level) Military Regions, Provincial-level Military Regions, and Military Sub-regions. The First-level Military Regions are mainly Army units, but under the concept of "Combined Operation," Naval, Air Force, and various kinds of special troops are also attached to them. The First-level Military Regions directly command those subordinate group armies, provincial military regions (including garrison commands), etc. As the largest operational units, the group armies are the main body of the Chicom's regular army.

Situation & Deployment of Chicom Armed Forces

1. Situation of Armed Forces:

According to the Chicom's "Military Service Law," the Armed Forces are composed of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Armed Police, and the People's Militia.

At present, there are more than three million men in the PLA, one million-odd in the Armed Police, and seven hundred thousand-odd Militia, totaling more than 4.7 million officers and men.

a. Army:

Current strength is about 2.2 million men, in the seven Great Military Regions, and organized into 24 group armies, under which there are quite a few combat units including more than eighty infantry divisions, twenty-odd tank divisions (brigades), thirty-odd artillery divisions (brigades), and some other combat support and service support troops.



Chicom T-69 MBTs.

Main equipment includes: Some 12,000 main battle tanks (MBT) and armored vehicles of various types, mainly T-59 II and T-69 MBTs; some 15,000 pieces of towed artillery, partly equipped with tactical surface-to-surface missiles (SSM).

b. Navy:


Some 360,000 men (including Coast Guard, Marines and Naval Air Forces) were organized into North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets, as well as into submarine, coast defense, and naval air units. There are more than one hundred submarines (including Xia-class SSBN and Han-class SSN), 50-odd principal surface combat ships, 200-odd missile craft, 50-odd amphibious ships, and 100-odd support and miscellaneous ships; a marine brigade (naval infantry) and almost one thousand shore-based combat aircraft attached to the Naval Air Force.



Chicom destroyers and frigates.

c. Air Force:

Some 380,000 men (including strategic forces and air defense personnel), were organized into 50-odd air combat divisions (mainly J-type fighters divisions). Main operational aircraft include: Some 4,000 J-type fighters; 500-odd bombers (some may be nuclear-capable); 500-odd transport aircraft; some 400 helicopters and other types of aircraft. Totally, more than 6,000 aircraft of various types.



Chicom "Hong-6" bombers.

d. Second Artillery (Strategic Missile Forces):

Current strength is about 100,000 soldiers, organized into several corps-level units. Missiles mainly include: Dongfeng-5 (CSS-4), Dongfeng-4 (CSS-3), Dongfeng-3 (CSS-2), about 100 pieces in total. Their Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) missiles have already been retired.



Chicom "Red Flag-2" anti-aircraft missiles.

2. Deployment


The Chicom's military forces were deployed in accordance with the principle of "active defense," considering the geopolitical features of the Chinese mainland and the threats from their imagined enemy. With the seven Great Military Regions as the mainbody, combined with the Naval, Air Force, and Second Artillery units within the Regions, they worked out the concept of "Theater Strategy" by deploying the Strategic Reserve in the vicinity of municipal Beijing, with the rest deployed in the North, Southeast and Southwest Fronts, so as to carry out their overall defense.

a. Ground Forces:

Some 1.1 million soldiers, most of whom are hard-picked troops, are deployed in the northern part of

the Chinese mainland (including Shenyang, Beijing, and Lanzhou Military Regions), mainly for defending against the Russians; 310,000-odd men deployed in the southeast area (the entire Nanjing Military Region) are primarily for countering the ROC; 400,000-odd men deployed in the southwest area (including Guangzhou and Chengdu Military Regions) are mainly for defending against Vietnam and India; and the remaining 250,000-odd soldiers deployed in the central area (the entire Jinan Military Region) are the Chicoms' Strategic Reserve.

Chart 1—6 Chicoms' First-level Military Regions (MR)



b. Navy:

North Sea Fleet -- Coastal defense from Korean border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang, i.e., the Bohai Sea and the Yellow Sea; with Luda (Lushun, i.e., Port Arthur, and Dalian), Huludao, Weihai, Qingdao, etc., as major bases; and some 900 ships of various types (mainly patrol and coastal combat ships, and submarines) deployed respectively.

East Sea Fleet -- Coastal defense from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan (the Taiwan Straits); with Shanghai, Dinghai, Sandu, and Fuzhou as major bases; and some 900 ships of various types (mainly patrol speedboats) deployed.

South Sea Fleet -- Coastal defense from Dongshan to Vietnam border, i.e., the South China Sea; with Guangzhou, Shantou, Huangpu, Zhanjiang, and Yulin as major bases; and some 700 ships of various types (mainly mid-class landing ships) deployed.

c. Air Force:

The overall deployment still gives priority to the defense against the Russians, then against us, and then, the Vietnamese. As for the Sino-Indian border, only a small amount of strength has been deployed owing to the lack of air bases around the region.

(1) Strength for Countering the Russians --With the 3,000-odd combat aircraft in Shenyang, Beijing and Lanzhou Military Regions as the main force, and with those in Jinan Military Region as reserve. Types of the aircraft mainly include: H-5 (Il-28), H-6 (Tu-6), J-7 (MiG-21), J-8 (Sov Ye-

142), Q-5 (Phantom or MiG-19), etc.

(2) Strength for Countering the Vietnamese --The Chengdu and Guangzhou Military Regions exert two-pronged pressure upon Vietnam. Constantly some 500 combat aircraft are deployed within the area 300 nautical miles from Hanoi, and the more advanced J-7s are deployed at the front.

(3) Deployment Aiming at the Taiwan Straits -- Combat aircraft are deployed on the principle of "having the small portion stationed at the front, the large portion kept mobile."

At present, within the area 250 nautical miles from Taiwan, there are as many as 13 jet air bases, with a capacity of more than one thousand combat aircraft. As the Chicom's are now conducting a "united front" ploy on us, only 200-odd aircraft, mainly J-6s, have been deployed in some of these bases. In the area 250 to 500 nautical miles from Taiwan, they have more than twenty jet air bases deployed with 1,500-odd combat aircraft of various types which can be shifted overnight into the area 250 nautical miles from us to support their operations.

d. Second Artillery:

The Second Artillery Headquarters is located in Beijing. The strategic missile silos are scattered over a wide area, with their long-range and international ballistic missiles (ICBMs) aimed at objectives in Siberia, East Asia and Western Europe. Although they are currently deployed mainly for attacking the

Soviet Union, the range of all of them can blanket the entire island of Taiwan.

General Situation of Military Modernization

The Chicom's military modernization has made a great deal of progress ever since they started undertaking it vigorously. Recently, even taking the Gulf War as an excuse, they have speeded up the pace of defense and army build-up, including: Kept on increasing military expenditure, developing science and technology, researching and discussing tactics, enlarging the scope of exercises and training, renewing equipment, and searching for more opportunities for military cooperation with other nations. All these not only constitute a serious threat toward us, but will stimulate neighboring nations to get into further arms race. Their actions can be summarized as follows:

1. Adjusting Strategic Thinking: Defining the current strategic aims of "active defense," setting up a rapid strike force to cope with "regional conflicts."
2. Carrying out Reduction and Reorganization: Changing the original 11 Great Military Regions into 7 Great Military Regions, cutting down the armed forces by one million men, and establishing the National Defense University so as to strengthen strategic education.
3. Restoring Military Ranks: Officers' ranks have been divided into eleven grades, and those of the NCOs and privates into three grades according to the character of the service.
4. Promulgating the Regulations of Military Service, Carrying out the Policy of Improving Cadres' Quality:

Stipulating that military administration should be the responsibility of the political institutes; establishing the service system for soldiers.

5. Trying out Civil Official System: Titles and ranks of the civil officials in the army are to be the same as those of the state cadres. Should an officer be transferred to one of those posts, his military status can still be reserved.
6. Readjusting the Structure of Military Strength: The Army accounts for 72.4% of the total military strength; the Navy makes up 11.8% of the total; the Air Force, 12.5%; and the Second Artillery, 3.3%. The ratio of officers to men has been raised from the original 1 : 3.35 to 1 : 4.8, and is still under adjustment.
7. Renewing Weaponry Systems: To keep on developing nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, Q-5 ground-attack fighters (FGAs), J-8 fighters, helicopters, T-80 main battle tanks (MBTs), etc.; engaging in military science-and-technology cooperation with, and purchasing military materials from, other nations.
8. Strengthening Maneuvers and Training: Raising the level of maneuver and training throughout the Armed Forces, i.e., conducting combined arms exercises and/or joint operation maneuvers from the level of Division to that of Group Army, or even to that of inter-"Military Regions," and revising various related doctrines.
9. Organizing and Training a Rapid Strike Force: To cope with unexpected events such as border conflicts, disputes over sovereignty of islets in the South China Sea, and riots and/or insurrections, a rapid strike force of some 35,000 men has been established.

10. Establishing Educational Systems: National Defense University (NDU), a strategic-level oriented institute, has been set up. To carry out the issuing of academic (Master's and Doctor's) degrees, the NDU enrolls its students mainly from high ranking cadres of the party, government and military; the first batch of 30 students graduated in July 1990.
11. Strengthening the Reserve Force: To reach the goal of rapid mobilization, a joint mobilization system of reserve troops and militia has been set up -- with district, village and town as the basic units.

One of the most difficult problems the Chicom's are faced with at present is the insufficiency of funds (see Chart 1-2). The "visible military expenditure" in 1988 was some \$5.8 billion. Although it increased by 15.46% in 1990 comparing to the previous year, it was actually inadequate to meet their subjective demands. To collect their assets, the following measures have been taken:

- a. Continue reducing the number of military personnel;
- b. Simplify and merge the factories of war production;
- c. Conceal a certain amount of military expenditures in nonmilitary budget;
- d. Enlarge the scope and quantity of military sales: Ever since 1982, profits of more than \$1 billion per year have been made from military sales; and sales have been booming since the Gulf War. Still unsatisfied, however, the military authorities in Beijing determined in an enlarged secret meeting held by the Central Military Committee in January 1991 that, within the decade at least 10% annual growth on military expenditures has

to be made. Matched with objective factors of various kinds, the progress of Chicom's military modernization will likely accelerate.

Table 1-2 Statistics on the Chicoms' Defense Expenditures (1980-1991)

Amount (RMB 100 million yuan)		Year											
		1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Category													
Defense Expenditures	Total	193.8	168	176.4	177.1	180.7	191.5	200.7	209.8	218	251.5	290.3	325.1
	As Percent of Budget (%)	15.98	15.1	15.3	13.7	11.9	10.5	8.8	8.6	8.17	8.34	8.55	9.10
	Rise or Drop in Percent (%)		-13.4	-0.3	0.4	2.03	5.97	4.84	4.42	3.98	15.37	15.46	12
Notes	*US\$ 1.00 : 3.322 yuan (1987/88) : 3.765 yuan (1989) **Data for 1991 are estimated values.												

Sources : Official Chicom statistics publications.

II. Chicom's Military Environment

The Chicoms and the United States

Ever since the normalization of relations between Communist China and the United States in 1979, military exchanges between the two sides have been gradually promoted; and the United States has indeed offered a great deal of assistance to the Chicoms in their military modernization. Affected by the Tiananmen Square Massacre on June 4, 1989, however, relations

between the two sides rapidly declined to a low ebb. Meanwhile, owing to the end of the East-West Cold War, the U.S. decision makers no longer consider the Chicoms as a counterbalance in dealing with the Soviet Union; on the contrary, they consider it one of the potential sources of instability in Asia. In addition, Taiwan's economic position in the world has gone steadily up; while the Chicoms are still suppressing human rights in the mainland. Thus, in the foreseeable future, relations between the United States and the Chicoms will unlikely ever be so close as what they used to be.

The Chicoms and the Soviet Union

Having been separated for three decades, the Chicoms and the Soviet Union eventually held a summit meeting for the first time in 1989. After the two Chicom leaders, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin, visited the Soviet Union, military personnel of both sides also paid friendly visits to each other in succession; thus the relations between the two sides have improved greatly. The Soviet Union initially withdrew their troops stationed in Outer Mongolia by 75 percent, and was to withdraw as many as 120,000 soldiers stationed along the Sino-Russian border. Since the boundary disputes haven't yet been solved completely, the basic state of confrontation still exists. Although the Chicoms have more troops deployed in the region, the Soviet Union still has a superiority over the Chicoms by a two-to-one margin in terms of overall combat strength.

The Chicoms and Japan

To speed up the pace of its economic modernization, the Chicoms

are urgently in need of the help of Japan's advanced high tech and enormous financial capacity, but at the same time, they are deeply worried about Japan's recent ambitious strengthening of its armaments. Along with Japan's increasingly obvious desire to play the role of world political power, the Chicoms' misgivings about Japan's actions will increase, and frictions over interests between the two sides are possibly to increase too.

The Chicoms and the Korean Peninsula

Relations between the two Korean states have, at least formally, improved a lot after four summit talks. On the other hand, to protect its own strategic interests, the Chicoms will certainly keep on giving support to North Korea. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, both the Chicoms and North Korea, based on a consideration of sharing a common lot, will doubtlessly strengthen their relations. In considering the real interests, North Korea temporarily abandoned its hard-line position, based on a prerequisite of "motherland unification," and agreed to join the United Nations together with South Korea. Such a new trend will possibly impel the Chicoms, the U.S., Russia and Japan to give the two Koreas cross recognition in a few years. Nevertheless, the long-term military confrontation between North and South Korea will unlikely change very much in the foreseeable future.

The Chicoms and Indochina

In 1979, owing to a conflict of interests in Indochina, relations between the Chicoms and Vietnam broke down, and both sides declared war on each other; and tensions between them have

thus existed ever since. Affected by the recent changes in the Soviet Union, however, both the Chicoms and Vietnam have been intensifying their efforts to normalize relations by exchanging visits of high-ranking officials. Meanwhile, the fact that the recent situation in Cambodia turned out well also shows that Sino-Vietnamese relations have improved greatly. But since the Russians still have a considerable amount of military strength stationed in their Naval and Air Force bases in Cam Ranh Bay, the Chicoms still feel uneasy in facing Indochina.

The Chicoms and ASEAN Members

In 1990, right after resuming (establishing) diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore, Beijing began vigorously developing its political and economic relations with ASEAN countries. But owing to the fact that the Chicoms had in the past instigated quite a few subversive activities within these countries, unfavorable impressions remain fresh in their memories. At present, therefore, the Chicoms have temporarily laid aside the issue of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and, at the same time, have taken part in the international seminar on the South China Sea issues convened by Indonesia, reiterating its stand of peaceful settlement of international disputes, in an attempt to create more friendship.

PART TWO
DEFENSE POLICY

Summary

1. National security is the foundation of all construction works; without national security, we have nothing. Under the stipulations of the ROC Constitution, our national security work at present puts emphasis on maintaining and safeguarding our territorial integrity, sovereign authority, economic prosperity, and social stability in the Taiwan-Penghu-Kinmen-Matsu area.
2. The most serious threat to our national security at present is still the Chicoms' use of force against Taiwan. One of the most favorable pretexts and opportune moments for the Chicoms to invade Taiwan by force is whenever Taiwan is approaching "independence," which will impose immediate and obvious dangers upon us.
3. The issue of national defense is not restricted to the military alone. Therefore, its organization should be drawn up in accordance with the system of constitutional government. As for the making of the National Defense Law, the work will not be started until the completion of the National Assembly's revising the Constitution. The main consideration of that work focuses on a rationale that let the consultative and directive bodies of defense policy making be brought into its upper strata; and that, under the supervision of public opinion, let a much closer and smoother coordination between the military adminis-

tration system and the military command system be reached, so as to effectively cope with challenges of various kinds.

4. With the foremost mission of safeguarding the national security pursuant to the ROC Constitution, our Armed Forces have made every endeavor to fulfill the requirements of defense operations by means of: building up the defense capability in the air, on the sea and on the ground; actively developing defense technology; renewing weaponry and equipment systems; implementing the "elite troop" policy; practicing mobilization programs, etc., so as to set up a military force strong and staunch enough to deter the enemy from making invasion.

Chapter 1

National Security

National security is the foremost objective of any state and/or regime, because it is the foundation of all construction works. President Lee Teng-hui has pointed out that "Without national security, we have nothing."



President Lee Teng-hui inspects the ROC Armed Forces troops at the National Day parade.

I. National Interests and National Security Objectives

National Interests

Referring to the "national interests," one has to take into consideration the four basic elements which constitute a nation, i.e., territory, sovereignty, government and people's security.

The national interests of the ROC on Taiwan today should therefore include:

- (1) Under the stipulation of the ROC Constitution, to safeguard all rights and interests to reach the goal of national unification;
- (2) To ensure our territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (3) To protect people's rights of security from invasion, and
- (4) To maintain economic prosperity and social stability.



Our M48H MBTs in the National Day parade.

Objective of National Security

The main objective of national security is to protect the national interests from being violated and threatened. In the process of pursuing national interests, it is impossible for any given country to obtain absolute safety, because if one country once obtained absolute safety, then the other countries around it would comparatively have a feeling of absolute unsafety. In such an interaction of relative security, to recognize the existence of threats is one of the most basic conditions for guarding national security. At present, the main threats that we are confronted with include:

- (1) The Chicom's use of force against Taiwan;
- (2) Territorial split;
- (3) Social upheaval, and
- (4) Regional conflicts.

In view of the real situation, however, the most direct and most serious threat that would endanger our existence at present is still the Chicom's use of force against Taiwan. Therefore, to resist such a threat and protect national security has become the most critical task of our current national defense.

II. The Chicom Threat

Intention of Invading Taiwan

Ever since the year 1949, Chicom's threat of invading the Taiwan area has always been present. The Battle of Kunintou Beach, Kinmen Island, in October 1949, the Campaign of I-chiang Shan Island in the spring of 1955, and the August 23rd Bombardment of Kinmen in 1958, were all apparent armed attacks. Owing to the courageous and furious resistance of our of-

ficers and men, however, the Chicoms never achieved any success and thus the foundation of long-term stability as well as today's wealthy and prosperous society in the Taiwan area has been laid down.

Nevertheless, the Chicoms have never abandoned their intention of invading Taiwan; and even now, when we have already terminated the "Period of Mobilization for Suppressing Communist Rebellion," and expressed our sincere intention of settling the issue of national unification without using force, the Chicoms have not made any goodwill response, and have not excluded the possibility of attacking Taiwan by military strength. Owing to the rapid changes both subjectively inside the Chinese mainland and objectively in the international situation, the Chicoms have altered the strategy toward us by strengthening their "united front" tactics. On the one hand, they intend softening us by means of such nonmilitary tactics as "one country two systems," "KMT-CCP negotiation," "economic investment," "direct commercial, mailing and navigation exchanges," etc.; on the other hand, however, they resort to every conceivable means to suppress us and isolate us in the international community. In addition, they not only have long been refusing to recognize us as a political entity, but also inciting their operational staff department to draw up various operational plans of "liberating Taiwan" and put them into practical maneuvers to threaten Taiwan's stability. Such double-faced tactics tell us that the Chicoms' intention of invading us hasn't changed in an already relaxed world situation.

Opportune Moment for Invading Taiwan

From the speeches delivered by the Chicoms' leadership group in recent years, we can sum up as many as six different situations that the Chicoms would take as pretexts and/or opportune moments for the invasion of Taiwan:

- a. If and when the island declares itself "independent;"
- b. If and when an internal upheaval occurs on the island;
- c. If and when the ROC Armed Forces on Taiwan become comparatively weak;
- d. If and when any foreign power interferes in Taiwan's internal affairs;
- e. If and when we protractedly refuse to talk with them about the issue of unification, and
- f. If and when we develop nuclear weapons.

Among these circumstances, the most likely one under which the Chicoms would invade is if and when Taiwan declares itself independent; and that is also the most dangerous one to Taiwan. Based on both historic and national sentiments, and concerns that "Taiwan independence" would encourage a consciousness of separatism among the people in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, the Chicoms' leaders of all levels cannot tolerate the realization of "an independent Taiwan separated from China." Besides, using force under the pretext of striking against "Taiwan independence" can reasonably arouse nationalism among the masses on the Chinese mainland and, thus, can be justified. At the same time, "Taiwan independence" will doubtlessly cause internal upheavals on the island and thereby weaken the ROC's strength for defense. In history, it has been extremely seldom that a government with internal upheavals can successfully repulse a formidable enemy's invasion. Being influ-

enced by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the Chicom leaders, on the one hand, have set "anti-capitalist peaceful evolution" as one of the foremost tasks at present; and on the other hand, will possibly take a rash and unreasoned action under the pretext of putting down the turmoil of "Taiwan independence," to improve their isolated plight among the nations of the world. In addition, Deng Xiaoping's health can also be taken as a dangerous and noteworthy variable, because Deng has repeatedly claimed that he anxiously longed for achieving the aspiration to unify China before his death.

Possible Actions of Invading Taiwan

In a broad sense, the actions that the Chicoms may take for invading Taiwan can be divided into nonmilitary and military ones. Nonmilitary action, as a matter of fact, has been unceasingly under way for quite a long period. By means of menace and lure alternately, they have long been attempting to reach the goal of seizing Taiwan. Generally speaking, the following methods have often gone together:

- a. Instigate internal subversion to arouse social turmoil and, then, take other concerted actions to win advantages in the chaos;
- b. strengthen the means of not only isolating us but also dwarfing us in international community;
- c. lure Taiwan's businessmen to invest capital in the mainland step by step and, after being accumulated to a considerable amount, make use of it as a means of influencing our policy;
- d. lower the tension of confrontation between the two sides

by enticing us to start negotiations with them, and then relax and even collapse our alertness psychologically.

As for possible military actions, the Chicoms have all along been studying and continuously drilling. Furthermore, right after the Gulf War, they even made quite a few revisions in accordance with the status quo. For instance, they intend to:

- a. seize the offshore islands, such as Kinmen and Matsu, by means of armed assaults;
- b. besiege Taiwan by using naval and air forces to carry out long-term blockade;
- c. bomb and paralyze Taiwan with bombers, missiles and even tactical nuclear weapons;
- d. seize Taiwan by large-scale regular and irregular landing forces.

The above military actions can be taken either individually or jointly. As for how to wield them, however, it depends on the developments of subjective and objective circumstances.

Capabilities of Invading Taiwan

Strategically, in evaluating the enemy, one should judge from their capability rather than the possibility of their intention. Ever since the Chicoms started carrying out their "defense modernization" policy in late 1970s, the combat strength of their Armed Forces has been increased greatly. Especially with the tensions of both Sino-Russian and Sino-Vietnamese confrontations relaxed, it is apparently favorable for the Chicoms to move more military strength from those two frontiers to the area in front of us, thus adding to their ability of

invading Taiwan. The reason that the Chicombs haven't yet taken any action against us, however, is not only that they might think the risk is still too high, but that they suppose the current political circumstances aren't really ideal yet.



Chicom landing ships.

Possible International Response

In spite of the fact that the new international order has gradually been formed and international morality is also valued highly, the principle of safeguarding one's own interests first in dealing with international affairs is still unchanged among nations. To the dispute between two sides of the Taiwan Strait, most countries in the world hold that it is part of China's internal affairs and should be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves. All three key documents signed by the U.S. and the Chicom regime -- The Shanghai Communique (1972), Joint

Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (1978), and Joint Communique of August 17 (1982) — have also emphasized this stand. Hence, if the Chicoms violate this agreement, the United States will apparently, in view of the spirit of "the Taiwan Relations Act," weigh up the Chicom's threat toward Taiwan and the injuries it would impose on the U.S. interests, and adopt proper measures.

Secondly, since Japan maintains very close economic and trade relations with us, a stable and prosperous Taiwan will certainly be in accord with Japan's economic interests. Meanwhile, with the strategic location of the Taiwan Straits being closely related to the lifeline of Japan's economy and trade, Japan is certainly unwilling to see any kind of war or even chaos occur in this area.

Since Japan is the most important U.S. ally in Asia, Tokyo's attitude will inevitably influence Washington's decision of what action it would take if and when Taiwan is invaded by the Chicoms.



Chicom amphibious vehicles in a landing exercise.

South Korea at present is eager to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Chicoms. No matter how well and to what extent relations between the two are developed in the future, there are still a great many common interests existing in ROC-ROK relations. Given the traditional ROC-ROK friendship, it is believed that the ROK is unwilling to see the ROC invaded.

With the Taiwan capital invested in Southeast Asian countries being increased rapidly in recent years, relations between the countries in this area and us have become closer than ever; and since most of the Southeast Asian countries had in the past suffered greatly from Communist rebellion and/or subversion, almost all of them would think that a stable and firm Taiwan contributes to their economic development. Thus, they would naturally feel frightened and restless when thinking of the possible chaos caused by the Chicoms invading Taiwan, and should appeal to the U.S. to prevent the Chicoms from using force against Taiwan.

Since those freedom-loving and democratic countries in Western Europe also have increasingly close economic and trade ties with the ROC, it is believed that they will not sit by and remain indifferent toward Chicoms' using force against such a democratic and prosperous ROC, and instead, they will cooperate with the U.S. in adopting measures necessary to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan area.

Generally speaking, the international response to the Chicoms' invading Taiwan is that most countries in the world are unwilling that it occur. But should one day the Chicoms outrageously take rash action without thinking of any serious consequence, and rapidly settle the war situation, then it will probably be the case that they would accept the fact of Chicoms'

occupying Taiwan. Hence, the essential way to maintain Taiwan's security and stability is to build up its own strength to resist the Chicom threat.

Chapter 2

National Defense Organization

"National Defense Organization" refers to all the systems, organs and institutions, centering upon military affairs, from the phase of decision making to that of implementing, established under the coordination of national strength as a whole for the purpose of protecting national security. Owing to the diversities of historical background and political system, national defense organizations are different from country to country. Generally speaking, however, to establish a sound, effective, legal and rational defense organization is a common and basic requirement for all the modern countries in the world.

I. Situation of Our Defense Organization

Organization Outline

The current defense organization of the ROC was established in the light of the "Organization Law of the MND" and "Organization Law of the General Staff Headquarters, MND" which were enacted on the basis of Article 36 of the Constitution stipulating that "the President shall have the supreme command of the land, sea and air forces of the whole country," and Article 3 of the Organization Law of the Executive Yuan stipulating

that "the Executive Yuan shall have ... Ministry of National Defense." According to the "Organization Law of the MND," the Ministry of National Defense shall be in charge of the defense affairs of the whole country, and the Minister shall be a civilian. Within the Ministry of National Defense is the General Staff Headquarters, under which are the various services including the Army, Navy, Air Force, Combined Services Force (CSF), Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters, Armed Forces Police Command as well as Taiwan Corps Control Area Command. According to the "Organization Law of the General Staff Headquarters, MND," being in charge of the military affairs of the whole country, the General Staff Headquarters shall have a Chief of the General Staff who acts, in the command system, as chief of staff to the President for operational matters; while in the administrative system, as chief of staff to the Minister of National Defense.

Organization of the MND

According to the Article 4 of the "Organization Law of the MND," the Ministry itself shall have a Minister's Office, Manpower Department, Material Department, Legal Department, Bureau of the Controller, and Judge Advocates Bureau; they are respectively in charge of such administrative business as: drawing up military policy; programming and ratifying the armed forces personnel policy, military service and mobilization system; planning and checking the overall policy and regulations of military supplies and materials; research and development of military science and technology; drawing up the defense budget; drafting and supervising the laws and

regulations concerning national defense; military tribunal and military laws, etc.

Organization of the General Staff Headquarters, MND

According to Article 3 of the "Organization Law of the General Staff Headquarters, MND," the General Staff of the MND shall have: Office of the Chief of General Staff; Department of Joint Operations & Training; General Political Warfare Department; Offices of DCGS/PERS, DCGS/INTEL, DCGS/OPNS, DCGS/LOGS, and DCGS/PLN; Bureau of Communications & Electronics; Military History and Translation Bureau; Military Medical Bureau; General Affairs Bureau, etc.; they are respectively in charge of planning and supervising such professional affairs as: Joint operations; political warfare; personnel service, military intelligence; operation, education and training; logistical preparations; strategic planning; organization & equipment; communication & electronic warfare; medical services, etc.

Organization of Various General Headquarters

Army:

The Army General Headquarters is in charge of the general affairs of the army as a whole. It is responsible for developing and maintaining the army's combat power, commanding and supervising all subordinate troops and units, so as to safeguard national security. The Headquarters shall have: Secretariate of the C-in-C; Operations, Research and Supervisory Committee; Political Warfare Department; Offices of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and

Comptroller; Office of Judge Advocate; General Affairs Division; and Welfare Department. Under its command are: Army Logistics Command; Army Commands; Airborne and Special Operations Command; and the directly subordinate troops, within the framework ranging from the level of Army -- Division -- Brigade -- Battalion -- Company, to that of Platoon.

Navy:

The Navy General Headquarters is in charge of the general affairs of the navy as a whole. It is responsible for developing and maintaining the navy's combat power, commanding and supervising all the subordinate fleets as well as the subordinate units on the ground, so as to safeguard national security. The Headquarters shall have: Executive Office of C-in-C; Operations Planning Committee; Department of Political Warfare; Office of Inspector General; Bureaus of Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Comptroller; Departments of Communications and Electronics, Weaponary, Medicine, Judge Advocate, and Service. Under its command are: Naval Fleet Command; Marine Corps Headquarters; Navy Logistics Command; Headquarters of Naval Area Command; Area Service Office; Naval Base Command; Bureau of Maritime Survey; and the direct subordinate troops which are divided into Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy troops are set up into levels of Naval Fleet Command -- Fleet -- Group -- Ship; while the Marine Corps ones range from Marine Corps Headquarters -- Marine Division -- Regiment -- Battalion -- Company -- Platoon.

Air Force:

The Air Force General Headquarters is in charge of the general affairs of the air force as a whole. It is responsible for developing and maintaining the Air Force's combat power, commanding and supervising all the subordinate troops and units, so as to safeguard national security. The Headquarters shall have: C-in-C Administration Office; Political Warfare Department; Office of Inspector General; Directorates of Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Comptroller; Divisions of Communication & Electronics, Surgeon, Judge Advocate, General Affairs, and Welfare Service. Under its command are: Air Force Operations Command; Air Force Logistics Command; Air Defense Artillery Command; and various tactical Wings which are within a framework ranging from the level of Operation Command -- Wing -- Group -- Squadron, to that of Flight.

CSF General Headquarters:

The Combined Service Force (CSF) General Headquarters is in charge of production and manufacture of ordnance, quartermaster, military maps, communications equipment, etc., for the ROC Armed Forces; as well as support and services commonly needed by every Service of the Armed Forces such as finance, survey, engineering, rear echelon administration, purchase and procurement, armament appraisal and testing, and foreign affairs. The Headquarters shall have: Secretariate of the C-in-C; Research and Inspection Committee; Political Warfare Department; Divisions of Personnel, Logistics, Planning, Comptroller,

Ordnance Production, Finance, Survey, Engineering, Materials, and Rear Echelon Administration Service; Departments of Judge Advocate, General Affairs, Welfare Service, Quartermaster Production, Armament Appraisal and Test, and Foreign Affairs. Under its command are: factories of ordnance, survey and military maps, optical instruments, military supplies; as well as other support units and service troops.


Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters:

Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters (TGGH), concurrently Taiwan Corps Control Area Command, is in charge of such missions as garrison, public security, mobilization, reservists management, etc. The Headquarters shall have: Secretariate of the C-in-C; Garrison Research Committee; Political Warfare Department; Departments of Personnel, Internal Security, Garrison, Logistics, Comptroller, Judge Advocate, Reservists Management, Mobilization, General Affairs, Welfare, etc. Under its command are: Area Garrison Commands (concurrently Division Control Area Commands) -- Local Garrison Commands (concurrently Regimental Control Commands).

Armed Forces Police:

Armed Forces Police Command is in charge of the military police affairs throughout the country. It commands all the local military police units as well as coordinates and supervises all those military police detached to various services of the Armed Forces, carries out security guard service, performs the duties of military law (judicial) police

service, preserves military discipline, assists the work of public security, supports military operations, so as to safeguard national security. The Command shall have: Department of Political Warfare; Offices of Personnel, Intelligence, Police Affairs, Logistics, Planning, Comptroller, Judge Advocate, General Affairs, etc. Under its command are: Military Police Commands, Military Police Training Center, Investigation Section, and those directly subordinate troops which are in a framework ranging from the level of Military Police Command -- Battalion -- Company, to that of Military Police Platoon.



A glance at our soldiers in the National Day parade.

II. National Defense and General Mobilization

Modern national defense is the entire people's defense, everyone should take responsibility for it. Build-up of such a consensus has become one of the urgent matters in our current defense construction. General mobilization is a matter of vital importance to the country; it includes a series of measures and actions adopted by the government for utilizing the nation's manpower and material resources, and strengthening the defense strength, so as to resist aggression and safeguard national security. It is mainly for supporting military operations and, at the same time, takes account of maintaining people's livelihood. In realizing the ideals of ensuring national security and protecting people's happiness, therefore, national defense and general mobilization are closely related to each other.

Classification of General Mobilization

The work of general mobilization has a very wide scope and can be divided into "all-out mobilization," "military mobilization" and "war-area mobilization." The official functions of general mobilization, i.e., the work of the all-out mobilization, in the bastion of our national recovery was started along with the founding of the National General Mobilization Committee, National Security Council, which was dissolved in 1972; the functions were transferred to the MND, where they remain to the present. The implementation of the overall mobilization has been practised through the "direction system of mobilization planning" by strengthening the combat readiness year by year. The direction system of mobilization planning has been divided

into three levels: "guiding principle," "programme" and "classified planning;" each of the three shall be reviewed once a year according to the performance of the previous year, and thus all the programmes and plans for the next fiscal year can be completed in advance. At present, except for the "guiding principles" which have been drawn up by the MND, all the mobilization projects and classified mobilization plans at the other two levels are drafted and carried out respectively by the concerned Departments and/or Councils in the Central Government as well as by the provincial and municipal administrations. Their contents can be divided into five mobilization items:

1. **Manpower Mobilization:** The first and foremost mission is to provide sufficient manpower for military operations and, at the same time, to give consideration to the maintenance of production, communication, education and wartime administration in the bastion. In wartime, however, a large amount of young people, who would otherwise be the main labor force in various callings, must be enlisted in the army. Thus the government should draw up some plans and make some practical arrangements in advance by adopting such measures as manpower coordination, replenishment, reserve training, and control, and then can meet the requirements of overall mobilization.
2. **Materials Mobilization:** It is mainly to draw up the overall planning for procuring and utilizing the essential materials needed by soldiers and civilians alike in wartime, so as to support military operations. In peacetime, efforts are made to strengthen the survey of materials, reserve and effectively control all the available material stocks;

while in wartime, to carry out necessary control, overall distribution, and requisition.

3. Finance and Economics Mobilization: On the principle of supporting the military operations on the one hand, and maintaining people's livelihood on the other, to make effective use of the nation's financial resources and industrial strength by way of unified planning and allocating. In order to meet the requirements of offensive and defensive combat readiness, in concert with the projects of national defense industrial development, and to move toward the goal of self-reliant army building, the priority will be given to the work of actively promoting civilian-run industry, science and technology, so as to support the development of military supplies industry.
4. Communication Mobilization: The purposes are, in peacetime, to reliably keep informed about the nation's non-military transportation and communication capacity; and in wartime, not only to effectively support the military operations by means of carrying out the policy of "allocating transportation" and "controlling communication," but also to support the administrative system through effective channels, so as to keep informed of the overall situation.
5. Spiritual Mobilization: On the principle of cultivating invisible combat power and inspiring the whole nation's spiritual aspirations, the emphases are put on the mission of arousing a consciousness of being vigilant and suffering distress, and a constancy of being loyal to the country, so as to achieve the goal of establishing a de-

mocratic, free and equitably prosperous China.

Organization System

1. Joint Conference of National General Mobilization

Taking over the official function of national general mobilization, the MND has become an organ for planning and conducting, and thus shall, jointly with other government organizations concerned, convene "Joint Conferences of National General Mobilization." Under the direction and supervision of the Minister of the MND and presided over by the Vice Minister of the MND, the Joint Conference shall be attended by: vice ministers in charge of the mobilization affairs in the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Economic Affairs, and Communications; Chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Economic Mobilization Committee; Secretaries-General of the city governments of Taipei and Kaohsiung; Deputy-Chief of the General Staff, Vice Minister, and director of the department in charge of mobilization affairs, as well as the director of the Synthesis Operation Office of General Mobilization, MND; and the Deputy Commander of Taiwan Corps Control Area Command. Being functionally organized within the MND, the said Synthesis Operation Office of General Mobilization actually plays the role of secretariat and deals with daily routine.

2. Mobilization Organs at Various Levels

The competent authorities responsible for the general mobilization projects are: In the central government,

Ministry of Interior -- manpower; Ministry of Economic Affairs -- materials and economic resources; Ministry of Finance -- financial support; Ministry of Communications -- transportation and communication; while at the local government level, Taiwan provincial government as well as the special municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung all have "Report Meeting of General Mobilization Affairs;" and all the other cities and counties (*hsien*) under the provincial government have "Report Meeting of Mobilization Affairs." Deputy ministers in charge of mobilization affairs in those Departments involved, secretaries-general of the special municipalities and the heads of provincial units as well as counties and cities, shall concurrently be the conveners; and under each of them there is an executive secretary (also a concurrent post). In the provincial government there is an economic mobilization committee which has a mobilization section with a chief and 3-5 assistants; while in each of the two special municipalities, a "mobilization planning office" with a director and 3-5 assistants have been organized under the secretariate.

Contingency Measures

To consolidate the operational front and conduct a total war, it has been approved that two items for implementing mobilization work be pushed forward through the channels of "report meeting of general mobilization administration" and "report meeting of general mobilization coordination."

1. Contingency Maneuvers in Metropolises:

Positively develop the "metropolitan synthetic contingency plans for the two special municipalities (Taipei and Kaohsiung) and the 21 counties and cities in the Taiwan area," and have it exercised and drilled: A large-scale maneuver, dubbed "Tong-teh," was respectively completed in 23 counties and cities in the Taiwan area by the end of 1986. According to the general review made after the maneuver, it was affirmed that the maneuver afforded the local governments the valuable experience of knowing how to give full play to administrative efficacy by way of utilizing the overall strength and how to assume the responsibility of taking contingency measures, which has laid a foundation for supporting military operations as well as preventing and coping with natural disasters by means of mobilizing manpower and material resources. In addition, the maneuver plays a positive role in building up a consciousness of suffering distress in the nation. Having reached an agreement with the Taiwan provincial government in early 1987, the MND successively carried out another two follow-up maneuvers: one was the provincial production enterprises safety maneuver; the other, grass-roots units (villages and towns) contingency maneuver, which continued until 1992.

2. Improving Total War Preparedness:

In early 1983, the work of "all-people joint operation" was turned over to the administration system and brought into the functional channel of national general mobilization; and soon the "Execution Outline for Carrying out Total War during the Period of National General Mobili-

zation" was drawn up. To meet the needs of conducting defensive operation, the execution outline is to carry out total war by using the positive result of general mobilization preparedness, to connect the military with the political circles by means of taking "operation zones" as the core and having the divisional and regimental control area commands as bridges, and to have the work of mobilization connected with that of garrison and public safety, so as to constitute "warfare surface" and achieve the goal of conducting the total war under wartime military orders. Meanwhile, to pursue the work, the "Report Meeting of All-people Joint Operation of the Taiwan Area" was reorganized and renamed as "Coordination Report Meeting of General Mobilization of the Taiwan Area."



Dr. Chen Li-An, Minister of National Defense, inspecting the reservists on a mobilization recall.

The "Synthesis Operation Office of General Mobilization" of the MND is, through the channel of military administration, responsible for the work of staff operation in directing the total war; while the "Synthesis Operation Section of Military Mobilization" is, through the military commanding channel, responsible for coordinating military mobilization, building up and applying the warfare surface, as well as regulating and conducting the total war. On October 18, 1984, the "Stipulation for Implementing the Coordination Report Meeting for General Mobilization in the Taiwan-Penghu Area" was concluded. Accordingly, on the foundation laid by the previous "all-people joint operation," the TGGH reorganized the whole framework in this respect and set up a five-level report meeting system: Taiwan-Penghu Area, Operation Zone, county (city), basic level (police station), and village (town, district). Remarkable success in strengthening the functions of the report meeting at each level has been achieved ever since.

III. Prospects

Making Defense Organization Law

Article 137 of the ROC Constitution stipulates that "the organization of national defense shall be prescribed by law." In accordance with this stipulation, the Executive Yuan drew up the "Draft of National Defense Organization Law" and an amendment of it respectively in 1952 and 1954, and sent them to the Legislative Yuan for examination and approval. Because no agreement was reached among legislators on several major

issues, the process of legislation has been laid aside ever since. In 1970, the "Organization Law of the MND" was promulgated first; and then, in accordance with the "Organization Law of the MND," there came the "Organization Law of the MND General Staff" in 1978. To these two organizations, the legislation process has thus been completed. As a matter of fact, however, issues of modern national defense can no more be covered thoroughly by the military alone, since the military is but an essential part of the national strategy. Similarly, the MND and the General Staff Headquarters do not stand for the entire defense organization either; the defense organization should contain other upper-level decision making organs. Therefore, to act in the spirit of the Constitution and to conform with the conventions of democracy and the legal system, it is not only proper but also necessary to make a complete defense organization law conforming to our national conditions, and integrate national defense.

Theoretically speaking, the defense organization law should take the Constitution as the direct source of its legislation. As the ROC is in the process of revising the Constitution, and some details involving the legal source are to be reexamined, it is believed that shortly after completion of revising the Constitution, the ROC government will give priority to the work of drafting the defense organization law.

Strengthen the National Security Decision-making Body

Although the military is the foremost strength for guaranteeing national security, a number of other non-military factors can not be neglected. It is essential, therefore, to set up a national

level, inter-department, and pan-military consultative and advisory organ for military decision and defense policy making, so as to cope with the increasingly intricate and complex developments at home and abroad. Almost every Western advanced nation has had such an organ. Our "National Security Council" was originally set up to meet such requirements too, but owing to the fact that the legal source of its position is from an article of the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion," the performance of its function has been considerably affected. It is indeed necessary, henceforce, by keeping abreast with the processes of revising the Constitution and legislation, to bring the defence decision-making body into the upper-level structure of the national defense organization, and to make the most of its function to play the role of thinking and designing national strategy.

Research the Formation of Defense System

Although the Ministry of National Defense of the ROC has been reorganized several times since it was established in 1946, its basic framework has been changed very little. It retains the pattern of military administration and military command systems coordinated with each other. Ever since being brought into practice, the coordination between the two systems has been well-done. Actually, the military administration and the military command should naturally be complementary and supplementary to each other. Poring over the defense systems of verious nations in the world, we found that there is neither absolute monism nor absolute dualism in this respect. Among current scholars, opinions also vary toward the patterns of the

relationship between military administration and military command. After all, however, the pattern of defense system is inevitably subject to that of the whole nation's system. Under current trends of democracy and constitutionalism, therefore, the relations between military administration and military command have become closer than ever. Both of the two should, under the supervision of the people's will, effectively make use of the nation's resources and bring the national strength into full play, so as to fulfill the mission of guaranteeing national security in a variety of situations.

Chapter 3

Military Policy

Under the guidance of national strategy, combined with military strategic concepts, and with military strategic planning as its principal part, the military policy is to design the build-up of national armed strength. Its operational process is: in accordance with rational logic, aiming at strategic situation, and taking into consideration factors such as national defense resources, national defense technology as well as the development of weaponry system; and with "concept of military build-up," "military strength consolidation" and "guidance of combat readiness" as its main contents, formulating the long-term, mid-term and short-term goals of consolidation, so as to ensure the national security through a series of concerted efforts under integrated policy.

I. Concept of Military Build-up

The mission of the ROC Armed Forces is: to realize the Three Principles of the People in obedience to the Constitution, to ensure the independence, liberty and equality of the ROC, and to defend and safeguard the integration of our current territory and sovereignty. Based on this mission, the concept of military build-up was drawn up with the purpose of designing a concrete project for the next ten-year construction period of our Armed

Forces, its main contents including overall strategic concept, reconstruction of spiritual combat capability, and reconstruction of armed forces.

Overall Strategic Concept

Based on the mission, aimed at the enemy's potential threat, weighing up the features of modern war, considering the geographic environment of the Taiwan area, and taking the status of national strength into account, the ROC Armed Forces are to consolidate the defense capability in the air, on the sea and on the ground; positively develop national defense technology, renew weaponry and equipment systems, implement the "elite troop" policy, fulfill the mobilization system, and strengthen the overall and sustaining combat power, so as to ensure the national security by setting up an effective military force strong enough to deter the enemy's invasion.

Reconstruction of Spiritual Combat Capability

As one of the most important factors in affecting the outcome of war, spiritual combat capability has long been an essential part in our military build-up and war preparations. Thus the ROC Armed Forces have long been through various channels of education enlightening the officers and men to recognize the mission of national defense, buttress up the confidence to win, boost their morale, heighten their patriotic fervor, enforce military discipline, set up the habit of thrift and hard work, cultivate a law-abiding attitude, demonstrate the traditional spirit of sacrifice and devotion, so as to enable them to become a crack force with such characteristics as loyalty, solidarity and superb training.

Armed Forces Reconstruction

1. Composition of Military Strength:

The composition of the Armed Force has to depend upon the pattern of war, the features of the war area and the development of science and technology. Thus the defense operation in the Taiwan Area should firstly lay stress on air domination and sea control ; but the ground decisive battle remains the last resort to win the war.

The current composition of the ROC Armed Forces is reasonable all right, it still needs consecutive review and improvement though. Military investment shall go into the navy and the air force first, so as to strengthen the operations capability in the air and on the sea. The developing directions of the three services are :

- a. Army : With building up an "armored, automatic, electronic and three-dimensional" army as its goal, the ROC Army is to consecutively rearrange the ratios of its various branches, promote the logistics system to an extent that would contribute to the practice of mobile warfare thinking, and continuously strengthen the battlefield management, coast defense and tri-service joint training, so as to give full play to combined combat strength.
- b. Navy : With developing an offshore three-dimensional navy as its goal, the ROC Navy is to enhance its capabilities in air-defense, anti-submarine, surface and mine operations. It will also complete the renewal of its main combat force, enlarge its strength

in submarine-to-submarine warfare and anti-submarine torpedo operation, expand its ship-borne and shore-based anti-submarine helicopter force, so as to strengthen its overall capability in sea-control, anti-submarine and anti-blockade operations. While the Marine Corps, on the other hand, is to stride forward towards the goal of being "modernized and mechanized" by way of enhancing its capability in air-defense and anti-tank operations.

- c. Air Force : With setting up a tactical air force as its major goal, the ROC Air Force, in addition to procuring high-performance combat aircraft, will strengthen its air-domination missiles as well as its capability of air-defense warning and air control, so as to ensure the safety of our territorial air space with its capabilities in all-weather antisubmarine, mining, night attack and transportation.

2. Weaponry and Armaments Demand:

To establish a self-reliant national defense, the procurement of weaponry and armaments should be through the way of self-development in principle. Thus, in accordance with the requirements for military build-up and war preparations, domestic and foreign specialists, the military, as well as government and civilian industries have been working together to manufacture weapons, military equipment and supplies. To expedite the renewal of weapons and equipment, the work of collecting domestic and foreign business information will henceforth be strengthened. With the goal of producing internationally

first-class conventional weapons as well as developing advanced weapon systems, the production of self-made weaponry is mainly through cooperation, introducing foreign advanced technology, so as to cut short the process of research and manufacture. In addition, each of the three services should extensively make effective use of various simulators so as to save the cost of training and extend the life of equipment. Meantime, they should positively develop automatic C³I system as well as electronic warfare equipment. The major items to be developed in the three services are:

- a. Army : Strive for procuring anti-aircraft missiles and antitank weapons first, so as to strengthen the army's air defense and antitank capabilities and to ensure its freedom of action ; and then, positively beef up R&D of medium tanks and armored ammunition transport vehicles, purchase armed helicopters, and develop river crossing equipment, so as to enhance mobile operation capabilities and create favorable opportunities. In addition, to have the enemy's situation well in hand, the army should continuously strengthen its electronic warfare capability through research and manufacture of observation and coast defense facilities ; and to conduct ground operations, it will develop its artillery fire control system and improve its NBC protecting capabilities.
- b. Navy : Firstly, to complete the renewal of its 2nd-generation main battle force and shore-based missile deployment; and then positively prepare to construct offshore patrol craft, ship-based and shore-based

antisubmarine helicopters, so as to effectively counter the enemy's sea blockade and grasp the superiority in the Taiwan Straits.

- c. Air Force : In accordance with the output of the indigenous defense fighters (IDF), to renew step by step the combat aircraft on hand, and positively research and manufacture the 2nd-generation high-performance combat aircraft, improve the quality of air weapons systems, so as to enhance the capabilities of air defense, air interception, countermeasures, antisubmarine, and close support operations. Meanwhile, to meet the needs of overall air defense, the air force will actively procure electronic warfare and air warning aircraft, renew its ground air defense weapon system, and complete the underground air base construction project.


II. Renovation of Military Strength

The project of military strength renovation has to be drawn up on the basis of military policy and the concept of military build-up, and to take into consideration the overall situation of manpower, material resources and financial capacity. With a five-year period as a phase, the project shall be implemented year by year until reaching the set objective.

The ROC Armed Forces' project of military strength renovation in FY 1992 is actually a continuation of that of the previous year, i.e., keep on implementing the "elite troop" policy, expediting the steps of military modernization, and substantiating the combat capability according to the priority of air defense, maritime defense and ground defense.



Our fighters soaring like falcons in the sky.



Our naval ships at sea in defense of our territorial waters.



The imposing sight of a column our main battle tanks.

Objective of Military Strength

The balance point of two major factors -- the minimum operation requirement of being able to resist the threat, and the amount of available manpower -- shall be the criterion for setting the objective of military strength. Currently, the ROC Armed Forces have some 470 thousand-odd personnel, which is just enough to engage in a defense operation. In view of the ever changing situation, however, two measures are to be implemented in parallel: to lower the objective of military strength on the one hand, and to expedite military modernization on the other.

Objective of Renovation

Along with the implementation of the "elite troop" policy and without changing the organic structure of the Armed Forces, to substantiate the capabilities of air, naval and ground operations; to keep on strengthening the NBC protecting capabilities, the automation of the C³I and armaments, the underground construction of oil and ammunition facilities, and the construction works for improving soldiers' living conditions. Renovation objectives of various services are:

1. Army:
 - a. To form 22 divisions, 2 airborne brigades, 6 armored brigades, 2 tank groups, as well as 1 missile base command and 1 army aviation command.
 - b. To complete the replacement work for armored and air defense troops, and to establish a combat helicopter troop.

2. Navy:

- a. To form 2 destroyer fleets, 2 marine divisions, 1 frigate fleet, 1 amphibious fleet, 1 mining fleet, 1 service fleet, 1 submarine combat force, 1 anti-submarine helicopter group, 1 Hai-feng combat group, 1 Hai-chiao combat group, 1 LVT & LCVP regiment, and 1 observation/communication command.
- b. In accordance with the progress of ship construction, to eliminate old ships and craft year by year, and to expand the size of the Hai-feng combat group.

3. Air Force:

- a. To form 7 combat wings, 1 troop carrier & ASW composite wing, 1 Communications & ATC wing, 1 tactical control wing, 1 weather wing, 1 EC wing, 14 air defense battalions, and 11 garrison battalions.
- b. In accordance with the output of the IDF, to eliminate old fighters, and to strive for procuring new high-performance ones.

4. CSF: To form 5 arsenals, 2 QM factories, 2 survey & mapping factories, and 1 system manufacturing center.

5. TGGH/CCAC: To form 4 divisional control areas (DCA), 21 regimental control areas (RCA), and 1 vocational training regiment.

6. MP: To form 35 MP battalions and 3 armored MP battalions.

III. War Preparation Guidance

To meet the crisis that once the military situation of the Taiwan Straits is changed abruptly, with the peacetime defense circumstances transforming into that of the wartime, the ROC Armed Forces war preparation guidance was designed for directing and guiding what should be done and how to do it in military operations, military mobilization actions, as well as in the field of garrison and public order, so as to ensure national security. Its main points are:

Military Operation Guidance

1. Air Defense:

By making use of effective monitoring equipment and air defense automation facilities to acquire the early warning. The Air Force Operations Center shall appoint and distribute fighters, anti-aircraft missiles and artillery to meet the approaching enemy's aircraft, so as to consolidate the air defense. Meantime, to weaken and/or destroy enemy's sustaining power, it shall also choose opportune moments for taking countermeasures against enemy's critical operation facilities.

2. Maritime Defense:

To meet the potential threat that the enemy will simultaneously attack our naval ships on the sea and blockade our harbors and sea-lanes, the Navy should appoint all its available strength to open more safe channels on the sea and carry out countermeasures against the blockade. Meanwhile, to hold the initiative, it should also strengthen its combat power by means of getting con-

certed actions from air and ground friendly forces, choosing the favorable time and space to intercept the invading enemy on the sea.

3. Ground Defense:

The foremost means is counter-landing. First of all, by way of air blockade and maritime interception, try to destroy at least a part of enemy's regular landing force on the sea, making them lose their capability for landing operation in a state of chaos and confusion. Should the enemy's landing craft still be able to get into our offshore waters, a joint action of ground attack and an anti-landing-wave firing will destroy them before landing. If and when the enemy have already landed on the shore and/or have had their airborne force cooperated with them, the ground defense should be, in accordance with the guiding principle of "air prior to ground," carried out by means of joint operation of the three services, either mopping up or repelling them. In order to increase the odds to win, research work should focus on the countermeasures against enemy's irregular warfare as well as on the methods for making use of special outfits.

4. Garrison Warfare:

Based on the guidance of "taking proper precaution, and removing the source of trouble in advance," to make use of the strength of the entire people, ensure internal security, improve the work of reservist management and training, establish an all-people defense warfare system suitable for both peacetime and wartime, fulfill the work

of implementing wartime mobilization and all-people's total war, and bring the sustaining combat capability into full play so as to support military operations.

5. Political Warfare:

Based on the guiding principle of "strengthening our own force, rallying popular support, and disintegrating the enemy," and taking the cultivation of spiritual combat capability as the first important mission, to buttress up the confidence to win, boost the soldiers' morale, ensure troops' security, win over the masses, and bring the invisible combat capability into full play so as to support military operations.

6. Electronics Warfare:

Extensively collect electronics warfare intelligence, positively develop our electronics warfare capability, make timely use of electronic countermeasures as well as electronic counter-countermeasures, coordinate with special attacking operation for disturbing and destroying enemy's observation and communications systems as well as their missile, naval and air bases, so as to weaken their combat power and, thereby, to bring ours into full play.

Military Mobilization Guidance

1. Mobilization of Troops:

In accordance with the strategic guidance of "combining the offensive and defensive operations into one," and "strategically, sustaining; tactically, quick decision," and

along with the elite-troop policy of "strictly training the standing troops and extensively keeping the reservists," completing the mobilization of combat preparations, so that the wartime requirements can be met by means of rapidly turning the peacetime military posture into that of the wartime, and thus the defense objective of "instant mobilization, instant build-up, and instant operation" can be reached.

2. Mobilization of Military Supplies Industry

In accordance with the current military mobilization objective, to coordinate the administrative institutions of various levels to investigate the productive capabilities of both public and private factories for producing military supplies; to commandeer the qualified ones and have them organized into a productive system of mobilization; to collect and store the productive tools and facilities in advance; to carry out the standardization system of military and civilian commonly used supplies; share the missions of repair and manufacture in peacetime, being able to rapidly meet the wartime production requirements.

PART THREE

DEFENSE RESOURCES

Summary

1. The defense budget is a concrete tool for carrying out defense policy. The ROC defense budget in FY 1992 amounts to NT\$272.19 billion, which accounts for 27.74 percent of total government spending and some 5.39 percent of GNP. Hereafter, on the premise that both national security and the entire social development and welfare be taken into account, efforts are to be made for a more reasonable distribution of the budget in this respect.
2. The 1989-90 averages show that the ROC Armed Forces contain some 485,000 personnel in total. In future, we will keep on practicing the "elite troop" policy, reducing both officers and units, extensively receiving more civilian employees, recruiting more female officers and NCOs, improving the living and working environments, and opening more channels for advanced studies, so as to raise our manpower quality.
3. Defense industry and technological capabilities have become the essential indices for measuring a nation's combat strength. By way of setting up cooperations with the academic and industrial sectors, the MND has been positively trying to raise these levels, and has made efforts to help public and private enterprises produce military supplies so as to establish a self-reliant and self-sufficient defense industry.

4. The Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology is devoted to the research and development of defense weaponry, and is at present working on: Indigenous defense fighters (IDF); Tien-kung (Sky Bow) surface-to-air, Tien-chien (Sky Sword) air-to-air, and Hsiung-feng anti-ship missile systems; a second generation of naval combat ships; and M48H tanks.
5. The purpose of logistics renovation is to build up a sustaining combat capability. Currently, the ROC Armed Forces are energetically making every endeavor to improve and/or strengthen the reconstruction of military bases, logistics management, medical facilities, as well as the living environments.

Chapter 1

Defense Budget


I. Defense Budget and National Security

The national defense budget is one of the most practical and most concrete tools for implementing the national defense policy. Since the national defense policy was made in accordance with military strategy, the drawing-up of the defense budget shall thus be on the basis of the strategic plan. Its scope should not only be able to meet the current needs of combat preparations, but also take account of long-term defense development. From the contents of the budget items one can see the size of the military strength objective, the quality of weaponry systems, the actual situation of military training, the capability of logistics operations, the direction of defense renovation, etc. Without sufficient budget support, none of the above-mentioned elements of combat strength can be practicable, nor can national security be ensured.

The contents of and the ways for drawing up the defense budget are different from country to country. In other words, there isn't any unified standard or pattern which can apply to various types of political systems and different situations among nations in the world. Therefore, to make comparisons according to published statistical data or from the percentages of the defense budget in the GNP and GDP is not only inaccurate but

also meaningless. As a matter of fact, except for a few militaristic and expansionist nations, the amount of a nation's defense budget usually depends on the relative extent of the threats it has to meet. Thus, facing different threats, nations naturally have different requirements. Being in a special predicament during the past several decades, the ROC has kept her defense budget high within the government expenditure year after year. Fortunately, however, during this period as the country steadily develops, the high ratio defense budget didn't affect her high economic growth (see Chart 3-1). It is expected that, from now on, in spite of the continuous growth of national income, the defense budget will be retrenched. At the same time, for the sake of national security, a minimum amount to meet the basic requirements should still be maintained.

Chart 3-1



II. Implementation of PPBS

Along with the fact that modern defense affairs are becoming increasingly complicated and defense expenditures becoming larger and larger, management is apparently much more important than ever. To effectively implement the management in this respect, and through consulting and imitating the American "Planning, Programming & Budgeting System" (PPBS) and taking our national conditions into consideration, the MND started promoting a PPBS of our own. As a combination of three major links, i.e., objective-designing, plan-drawing, and budget-implementing, the PPBS is expected to be the design guiding the plan, with the plan guiding the budget, and with the budget achieving the desired strategic objectives; and thus forming an integrated system with concepts, objectives, steps and plans (see Chart 3-2). With the purpose of making effective use of national resources, the PPBS has to combine national objectives with military strategy, the renovation objective with military strength structure, and resources with distribution. The overall procedure of its operation goes in this way: with the design of military strategic plan as the first step, to predict the pattern of a future war in which the ROC Armed Forces will possibly be engaged, and to point out the overall strategic concept; then, based on the "Plan for Military Strength Renovation," to draw up a concrete objective of such a renovation; and then, based on the administrative projects prescribed in the "Five-Year Administrative Program," and in accordance with the administrative outline of the first fiscal year, to draw up the annual defense budget. Under the guidance of such a system, a series of analyses and evaluation aiming at the current enemy's threats

shall be made before drawing up any "War Preparation Plan" to cope with contingencies. This procedure, in other words, can be used as a basis for mapping out an "operational plan" on the one hand, and for drawing up a "wartime administrative plan" on the other. Ever since it was adopted by the ROC Armed Forces, the PPBS has undergone a number of reviews and revisions, and has become an effective standard for our defense management.

III. Making Use of the FY 1992 Budget


Basis of Drawing-up the Budget

Following the spirit of the PPBS, and based on the overall strategic concept and military policy, the drawing-up of our defense budget has to take long-term planning and the entire development into consideration, to be in accordance with the annual administrative outline of the particular year in the Five-Year Administrative Program, and to abide by what had been approved by the Executive Yuan. The procedure of its drawing-up can be diagrammed as follows:


Contents of Budget

1. The ROC defense budget for FY 1992 is NT\$272,192 million, or 27.74 percent of the Central Government budget (4.07 percent less than that of the previous year which took up 31.81 percent); accounting for 5.39 percent of the GNP (0.21 percent less than that of FY 1991). In comparison with other nations in the world and reviewing the evolution of our defense budget in the past ten years, we found:

Chart 3—2 Organizational Sketch of PPBS




- Notes :
- (1) With wartime plan serving as the basis;
 - (2) Administrative plan serves as the center;
 - (3) Plans are implemented in compliance with annual budget.



- a. Compared with major nations in the world:
According to the statistics in the American publication "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989, " in terms of the GNP percentage, the ROC ranks 34th in its defense outlay, and 14th in its ratio in the government budget. It ranks 19th if the sum total of the defense budget is considered.
- b. Evolution of the defense budget in past ten years:
 - (1) The defense budget has been decreasing for the past ten years. In FY 1983, it took up 57.15 percent of the central government budget, but has gone down to 27.74 percent in FY 1992. (Chart 3-3)
 - (2) The disparity between the growth rate of the defense budget and that of the central government budget has been increasingly widened during the past ten years. The growth rate of the defense budget in FY 1992 is only 3.42 percent, while that of the central government is 18.62, showing a more reasonable ratio than previous years. (Chart 3-4)
 - (3) The ratio of the defense budget to the GNP has also been decreasing for the past ten years, from 9.19 percent in 1983 down to 5.39 percent in 1992. (Chart 3-5)


Chart 3-3 Percentage of Defense Budget vs. Total Government Budget (1983—1992)



FY	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Percentage	57.15	54.68	53.06	51.89	50.80	49.21	47.42	35.21	31.81	27.74


- Notes :
1. Expenditures on ex-servicemen's pensions is included before FY 1989.
 2. The expenditures on annual adjustment of pay and allowances is prepared wholly by the Executive Yuan every year.

Chart 3-4 Growth Rate of Budget under MND's Supervision vs. that of Total Government Budget (1983-1992)



FY	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Growth rate of defense budget	13.31	-5.32	8.61	12.11	1.11	8.72	15.07	10.62	7.88	3.42
Growth rate of total budget	2.92	-1.04	11.92	14.65	3.26	12.24	19.42	23.35	19.41	18.62

**Chart 3-5 Budget under MND's Supervision percentage of GNP
(1983—1992)**



FY	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Percentage	9.19	7.70	7.67	7.85	6.80	6.76	7.10	5.82	5.60	5.39

Notes : 1. Expenditures on ex-servicemen's pensions are included before FY 1989.

2. The expenditures on annual adjustment of pay and allowances are prepared wholly by the Executive Yuan every year.

2. Analysis of FY 1992 Defense Budget

Although the pattern of today's war is a competition among highly sophisticated weapons, the men who use these weapons remain the real factor dominating the war. Right after the Gulf War, some futurologists advanced the "Third Wave War, " emphasizing that such a new form of war is professional- knowledge oriented, and that soldiers must be well educated, must have very strong motives as well as high IQs. Therefore, to keep the military strength of the ROC Armed Forces at a certain level, considerable amounts of expenditures are definitely

needed for training professional personnel and troops of high-quality and high-willingness, so as to give full play to those highly advanced weaponry systems as well as those strategies and tactics of high sophistication. To reach such a goal, a certain amount of personnel upkeep expenditure has to be brought into our defense budget. In addition, owing to the fact that modern war has become more and more hi-tech oriented, the procurement of more advanced and sophisticated weapons calls for immediate attention. High-performance combat aircraft, warships, and battle tanks are all in need of investing large amounts of outlay for R&D, manufacture and purchasing. And on the other hand, cultivating qualified personnel to use and to properly maintain these weapons also needs a considerable investment in education and training. In this respect, we have indeed made strenuous efforts.

The process of military planning and implementation involves a great deal of circumspection and long-term programing; thus, to effectively carry out the military planning and to ensure national security, there must be a stable military budget to back them up. The defense budget of FY 1992 has been drawn up in accordance with such a recognition. It can be briefly described as follows:

- a. According to the nature of expenditures (excluding the budget of the MND itself), the defense budget can be classified into three major structures: Military investment, operations maintenance, and personnel upkeep. (see Table 3-1 and Chart 3-6)

- (1) Military investment: Some NT\$107,599 million,

or 41.03 percent of the defense budget as a whole.

- (2) Operations maintenance: Some NT\$54,419 million, or 20.75 percent of the entire amount.
 - (3) Personnel upkeep: Some NT\$100,237 million, or 38.22 percent of the total.
 - (4) Statistics of the above three major structures in the past ten years (see Chart 3-7).
- b. The FY 1992 budget classified on the basis of organic parts (see Table 3-2).
 - c. The portion administered by the MND in the FY 1992 defense budget (see Table 3-3).


Table 3-1 Defense Budget Structure in Terms of Amount & Ratio, FY 1992

Unit : NT\$1,000.00

Category	Unit	Army	Navy	Air Force	Combined Service Force	Garrison Forces	Joint Staff & Directly Subordinate Units	Total	As Percent of Defense Budget
	Operation Plans								
Military Investment	Equipment	17,437,201	25,472,608	26,414,785	45,534	131,222	2,476,526	71,977,876	27.45
	Military Facilities	453,780	498,140	3,166,430	21,310			4,139,660	1.58
	Scientific Research						11,096,150	11,096,150	4.23
	Installations for Scientific Research						817,700	817,700	0.31
	Military Educational Establishment	128,880	66,680	216,330	53,270	13,040	231,670	709,870	0.27
	Construction Projects & Installations	4,135,290	1,403,010	3,721,590	1,775,830	327,414	3,175,520	14,538,654	5.54
	Non-business Circulating Fund						4,319,897	4,319,897	1.65
	Total in Military Investment	22,155,151	27,440,438	33,519,135	1,895,944	471,676	22,117,463	107,599,807	41.03
Operations Maintenance	Military Administration	819,534	213,302	220,889	101,533	47,349	623,712	2,026,319	0.77
	Political Warfare	322,288	96,194	87,396	21,434	42,692	791,648	1,361,652	0.52
	Intelligence Gathering	19,132	24,656	43,298	54,947	260,630	6,863,327	7,265,990	2.77
	Operational Training	674,599	303,054	530,215	57,040	99,359	603,318	2,267,585	0.87
	Mobilization	118,605	10,770	6,548	1,338	649	487,403	625,313	0.24
	Supplies, Maintenance	10,674,315	9,713,585	10,079,211	350,794	415,313	2,032,754	33,265,972	12.68
	Service Support	793,467	110,374	155,950	854,714	41,881	3,815,594	5,771,980	2.20
	First Reserve Fund						800,000	800,000	0.31
	Military Education	138,471	43,142	48,537	10,840	3,898	790,102	1,034,990	0.39
	Total in Operations Maintenance	13,560,411	10,515,077	11,172,044	1,452,640	911,771	16,807,858	54,419,801	20.75
Personnel Upkeep	Military Personnel	9,598,059	1,312,521	925,979	80,434,230	154,854	9,817	92,435,460	35.25
	Insurance & Comforting the Bereaved			5,498	5,585,642			5,591,140	2.13
	Dependents Maintenance				2,210,830			2,210,830	0.84
	Total in Personnel Upkeep	9,598,059	1,312,521	931,477	88,230,702	154,854	9,817	100,237,430	38.22


Note : Figures listed in the table do not contain pay adjustment funds prepared as a whole by the Executive Yuan.

Chart 3—6 Defense Budget Structure FY 1992



Note: "Personnel Upkeep" does not contain pay adjustment funds prepared as a whole by the Executive Yuan.

Chart 3—7 Statistical Chart of Defense Budget Structure



**Table 3-2 FY 1992 Defense Budget Classified by
Services & Units**

Services & Units	FY 1992 Budget (Unit : NT\$)	Percent	Remarks
Army	45,313,621,000	17.27%	Including tri-service material goods of staple & non-staple food, components & parts of general purpose equipment and supplies, ect.
Navy	39,268,036,000	14.97%	
Air Force	45,622,656,000	17.39%	
Combined Service Forces	91,579,286,000	34.91%	Including tri-service officers & men's pay, dependents maintenance and insurance as well as fees for comforting the bereaved, etc.
Garrison Forces	1,538,301,000	0.59%	
MND'S Directly Subordinate Units	25,885,001,000	9.87%	Including Scientific Research & Facilities (Chungshan Institute of Science & Technology) as well as mobilization expenditures of Military Intelligence Bureau & Taiwan Corps Control Areaa Command, etc.
Headquarters, MND	59,001,000	0.02%	
MND Joint Staff Units	13,050,137,000	4.98%	Including barracks reconstruction expenditures, the first reserve fund, funds used for assisting dependents of military personnel with rebuilding their residence or used as loans for officers & men to buy new houses or for dependent's medical care by military hospitals' attached clinics, or for military prison operations, etc.
	262,316,039,000	100%	

Note : Figures listed in the table do not contain pay adjustment funds prepared as a whole by the Executive Yuan.



Table 3-3 FY 1992 Defense Budget Classified by Affairs

Category of Affairs	Amount of Budget (NT\$)	As Percent of Central Government Total Budget (NT\$ 981 billion 219 million & 108 thousand)
Administration Expense	59,001,000	2222%
National Defense Expense	238,321,321,000	24.29%
Scientific Development Expense	11,913,850,000	1.21%
Social Security Expense	8,787,837,000	0.90%
Pensions & funds for relief of the family of the deceased	1,023,200,000	0.10%
Other Expenses	2,210,830,000	0.23%
Total	262,316,039,000	26.74%

Note: Figures shown in the table do not contain pay adjustment funds prepared as a whole by the Executive Yuan.

IV. Defense Budget Prospects

Principles of Drawing-up the Budget

The defense budget is a concrete tool for ensuring national security. With different national objectives, facing different kinds of threats and holding different defense resources, nations of the world naturally have their own ways and philosophies of drawing up defense budgets. Nevertheless, they share the common consideration that constantly maintaining a nation's basic security shall be the first premise; otherwise, every effort would be meaningless. In spite of facing the Chicom's threats, the ROC still gives consideration to the economic development and social

welfare when drawing up her defense budget, striving for a rational balance. The fact that the growth rate of the defense budget has been far behind that of the entire national budget in recent years is actually an expression of such a recognition. If few changes take place upon the factors influencing national security in the foreseeable future, our defense budget will still be drawn up in accordance with these principles and by giving consideration to our financial resources. A forecast survey of the defense budget in the next five years (see Table 3-4).

Structure of the Budget

According to its purpose, the defense budget can be divided into three major items: personnel upkeep, operations maintenance, and military investment. Each of the three is concerned with the structure of military strength, the capability of combat preparations, the sustaining combat power, as well as the process of military modernization. Both the relative ratios and changes among the three would directly influence the dynamic phenomenon of the defense forces. Although in the past there were a few restrictions and regulations on the distribution of those three items in the defense budget, the actual adjustments still have to be altered from time to time. For example, while the outlay of personnel upkeep should be reduced along with the decrease of officers and men, it has to be increased in accordance with the raise of soldiers' salaries; while the expenditures for operations maintenance should be reduced owing to the elimination of old and out-dated equipment, it can be increased along with the arrival of highly expensive and sophisticated equipment. Satisfying these two requirements makes the interrelations be

tween military investment and defense budget become much more complicated and unpredictable. By and large, the distribution of the defense budget has long been in accordance with the spirit of the PPBS, conducted in a stable manner. On the one hand, it should be on the basis of being able to ensure the continuation of defense construction; while on the other hand, it has to give consideration to the long-term balanced development in the future. Thus, in addition to keeping the rational strength structure, we still have to maintain maximum combat readiness, sufficient sustaining combat capability and a high level of military modernization, so as to cope with all the challenges to our national security.

Decision-making and Implementation

In view of the fact that the defense budget occupies an essential portion of the national budget as a whole, the MND from now on will guide the work of decision-making and implementation in an even more circumspect and responsible manner. On the one hand, under the premise of not jeopardizing national security, it will make known as many items of the defense budget as possible to the public; and on the other hand, it will keep on improving the techniques of budgeting and simplifying the formalities of budgeting management, so as to have the defense budget acquiring the consensus and support of the entire people.

Meanwhile, we shall cautiously bring in such military investment items in great demand but being uncertainly procured right away, and strictly supervise the progress of quality control over military construction, so as to have the entire work of budgeting closely coordinated with its implementation, and to bring the function of the defense budget into full play.

Table 3-4 Forecast of Defense Budget Development, FY 1993-97

Percentage of amount FY		1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Category						
GNP	Rate of increase %	7.12	7.12	7.12	7.12	7.12
	Amount	54.549	58.433	62.593	67.050	71.824
Defense Budget	Total	As Percentage of GNP %	5.19	5.19	5.19	5.19
		Amount	2,833	3,034	3,250	3,482
		Percentage	100	100	100	100
	Personnel Upkeep	Amount	1,002.37	1,073.74	1,150.19	1,232.08
		As Percentage of Defense Budget %	35.38	35.38	35.38	35.38
	Operations Maintenance	Amount	550.00	589.16	631.11	676.04
		As Percentage of Defense Budget %	19.41	19.41	19.41	19.41
	Military Investment	Amount	1,280.63	1,369.66	1,467.18	1,571.65
		As Percentage of Defense Budget %	45.21	45.21	45.21	45.21

- Notes : 1. The GNP of FY 1992 was estimated at NT\$5,092,300 million.
The annual GNPs of FY 1993~1997 were estimated on the basis that the real economic growth of FY 1992 was estimated at 7.12%.
2. The FY 1992 Defense Budget was temporarily set by the Executive Yuan at NT\$264,492,630,000, which is 5.19% of GNP. However, the pay adjustment expenditure of officers & men is to be reviewed as a whole by the Executive Yuan. Therefore, the annual defense budgets, FY 1993~1997, were conservatively predicted as 5.19% of each fiscal year's GNP as per the figures in the table.

Chapter 2

Defense Manpower

I. Manpower Resources

The population is one of the essential elements constituting national power. The amount, structure, and quality of the population are all closely related to the nation's security and development. The defense manpower resources refer to those people who can directly take part in and/or give support to the work of national defense. In planning the resources, consideration should be taken in accordance with national objectives, threats to security, strategic concepts, operational guidance, etc.; at the same time, the nation's economic development should also be taken into account. Thus, by means of economically distributing and appropriately making use of the nation's manpower resources, we can on the one hand constantly maintain a minimum force of active service personnel in peacetime; and on the other hand, enforce and enlarge these forces by way of sufficient mobilization in wartime, so as to achieve our operational mission and ensure our national security. The current manpower situation of the ROC in the Taiwan Area can be described as follows:

Military Manpower

1. Military personnel: Some 470 thousand.
2. Conscripts:

There were some 150,000 conscripts available in 1991. It is estimated that there will be an annual average of some 144,000 conscripts available from 1991 to 1995, and some 164,000 annually from 1996 to 2001. (see Table 3-5)

Table 3-5 Predicted No. of Draftable Males Liable for Military Service (born during 1971—1981) in the Taiwan Area, 1991—2001

Year	Year of Birth	Registered No. of Male Births in the year	Predicted No. of 19-year-old Males	No. of Those Having Been in Military or Police Service Before Conscription	No. of Those Rated as Class A or B in Physical Check for Conscription (81.583%)	Predicted No. of Draftable Male Persons Allowed to Defer Draft During the Specific Year (30.878%)	No. of Those Conscribed in the Specific Year Without Deferment	Supplementary Conscripts (88.283%)	Draftable Males for the Year
1991	1971	196,938	190,456	14,000	155,379	47,977	107,402	42,326	149,728
1992	1972	188,312	182,414	14,000	148,818	45,952	102,866	40,540	143,406
1993	1973	189,565	183,709	14,000	149,875	46,278	103,597	40,827	144,424
1994	1974	183,850	178,328	14,000	145,485	44,922	100,563	39,631	140,194
1995	1975	184,087	179,081	14,000	146,099	45,112	100,987	39,799	140,786
1996	1976	218,659	213,286	14,000	174,005	53,729	120,276	47,401	167,677
1997	1977	202,659	197,766	14,000	161,343	49,819	111,524	43,951	155,475
1998	1978	213,155	208,303	14,000	169,939	52,473	117,466	46,293	163,759
1999	1989	218,163	212,170	14,000	173,094	53,477	119,647	47,152	166,799
2000	1980	212,399	206,757	14,000	168,678	52,084	116,594	45,950	162,544
2001	1981	214,321	209,001	14,000	170,509	52,649	117,860	46,448	164,308

Note : The Actual No. of the draftable males in 1991 is 3,116 more than the predicted No. listed in the table.

3. Reservists registered: Some 3 million 600 thousand.
4. National guards trained: Some 280 thousand.
5. Some 4 million 300 thousand in total.

Potential Military Manpower (data as of July 1, 1991)

1. Population (including Kinmem and Matsu): 20, 376, 000 (10,589,678 males, and 9,786,322 females).
2. Population over 15 years of age: 14,612,000 (7, 564, 000 males, and 7,048,000 females).
3. Population in economic activities (between ages of 15 and 64), or the employed population: 9,974,000 (6,205,000 males, and 3,769,000 females) or 49.15 percent of total population. (see Table 3-6)
4. Subtracting the number of those in active service and those registered reservists from the males in the above-mentioned employed personnel, some 1.9 million remain; and adding those 3.769 million females to them, some 5.61 million is the total. Should appropriate planning, training and management be performed with these people in advance, it will definitely be helpful in meeting the wartime manpower requirements.

As to the amount of military manpower in active service, quite a few factors have to be taken into consideration, such as national objectives, the political system, diplomatic ties, collective security treaties, the nation's geopolitical location, systems of military service and mobilization, combat capabilities of armed forces, manpower resources, national resources, defense expenditures, etc.; but the key point is still the intensity of the enemy's threats to our national security.

Table 3-6 Reckoning of Taiwan's Population & Vital Changes in Population

Item Year	Population (Unit: 1,000 Persons)	Growth rate of Population (%)	Change in Population (Unit: 1,000 Persons)			Rate of Change in Population (%)			Average Fertility (%)
			Birth	Death	Natural Increase	Birth	Death	Natural Increase	
1985	19,135	1.4	344	92	252	18.0	4.8	13.2	1.885
1986	19,356	1.2	308	95	213	15.9	4.9	11.2	1.080
1987	19,606	1.2	329	99	230	16.8	5.0	11.7	1.731
1988	19,820	1.1	316	101	215	15.9	5.1	10.9	1.654
1989	20,019	1.0	302	103	200	15.1	5.1	10.0	1.577
1990	20,201	0.9	288	105	183	14.3	5.2	9.1	1.500
1991	20,376	0.9	283	107	175	13.9	5.3	8.6	1.520
1992	20,511	0.9	283	109	174	13.9	5.4	8.5	1.540
1993	20,726	0.9	289	113	175	13.9	5.5	8.5	1.560
1994	20,900	0.8	291	116	175	13.9	5.5	8.4	1.580
1995	21,075	0.8	294	119	175	13.9	5.6	8.3	1.600
1996	21,248	0.8	295	120	175	13.9	5.7	8.2	1.600
1997	21,422	0.8	295	120	174	13.8	5.6	8.1	1.600
1998	21,597	0.8	295	120	175	13.7	5.5	8.1	1.600
1999	21,744	0.8	295	118	178	13.6	5.4	8.2	1.600
2000	21,954	0.8	296	115	181	13.5	5.2	8.3	1.600

Sources : 1. Statistics of Population in the Taiwan & Fukien Area promulgated by Ministry of the Interior in 1985.

2. Understated Statistical Data of Population from 1986 to 2000 reckoned by Council for Economic Planning & Development.

Table 3-7 Statistics Analysis of World's Standing Armies & Military Personnel as Percent of Population

Country	Population	Military Personnel	Percentage	Remarks
U.S.	250,348,800	2,029,600	0.81	No. in bracket indicates that civilian personnel is counted
U.S.S.R.	290,527,200	3,400,000	1.17	
U.K.	56,670,800	300,100	0.52	
France	56,655,800	453,100	0.79	
W. Germany	76,877,400	476,300	0.61	
Japan	124,096,000	246,400	0.19	
Chinese Mainland	1,132,072,600	3,030,000 (4,700,000)	0.26 (0.42)	No. in brackets indicates that as armed police & militia are counted
N. Korea	23,275,600	1,111,000	4.77	
S. Korea	44,338,200	750,000	1.67	
Iraq	19,854,600	382,500	1.92	
Israel	4,822,000	141,000	2.92	
Kuwait	2,097,800	8,200	0.39	
Singapore	2,719,200	55,500	2.04	
R.O.C.	21,009,000	370,000	1.76	

Sources : The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991 ~ 1992 (London : IISS, 1991)

At present, we are still facing a threat from the Chicoms. To ensure the security of the bastion for national revival in the Taiwan area, therefore, we must constantly maintain a state of combat readiness. Currently, the ratio of military population to the total population is about 2.3 percent. In considering the developing trends of the nation, the changing situation in the population structure and the principle of the elite-troop policy, this ratio is going to be lowered in the years ahead.

II. Manpower Structure

The structure of military manpower can be expressed in several different ways, such as: quality, or educational background, of the officers and men; ratios of officers to NCOs and enlisted men, of standing (voluntary) service to conscripts, and of active service personnel to civilian employees; as well as the relative ratio of those directly to those indirectly involved in military activities.

The 1989-1990 averages show that the ROC Armed Forces, including civilian employees, contain some 485,000 personnel in total. Among them some 156,000 or 32.1 percent of the total military population are conscripts, and some 329,000 or 67.9 percent of the total are on a voluntary service basis. The ratio of those having received junior-college level or higher education to total military population is 27.92 percent; those with senior high and/or vocational high school education to the total is 48.79 percent; and those with junior high and/or elementary schools, 23.29 percent. In terms of the military professional education, some 82.92 percent of the conscripts have received various kinds

of training from short-term military professional courses. As for the officers in volunteer service, in addition to various kinds of cadet-cultivating education, there are quite a few channels and opportunities for them to receive advanced training and/or to pursue higher academic degrees.

Officers

Somewhat like a pagoda or a pyramid in shape, a military organization usually disposes its personnel by putting emphasis on "quantity" at the basic level and on "quality" at the upper level. Our national armed forces, based on the principle of "consolidating the basic level, confirming the middle level, and condensing the upper level," have rationally formulated the structural ratio of officer replenishment, allocating a 15 percent portion of the total to the long-service-term (regular class) officers to the upper level as leading cadres, 45 percent to the mid-service-term (training school) officers as the main force of middle- and basic-level leadership, and the remaining 40 percent to the mid- and short-service-term reserve officers (25 percent on voluntary basis, 15 percent on compulsory basis) to meet the needs for replenishment at the basic level.

Technological development in modern weaponry has led to the large requirement of various skilled and technical personnel, thus the ratio of officers to soldiers tends to be lowered. Generally speaking, that ratio at present is kept around 1 : 6 in most countries in the world; e.g., being 1 : 6.02 in the United States, and 1 : 4.98 in Japan. While our objective has been set at 1 : 5, in reality it is around 1 : 4 owing to structural changes in recent years. It will be improved step by step.



Cadets of our Military Academy in formation.

NCOs

In the early days after the National Armed Forces moved to Taiwan from the mainland, a great number of long-service-term NCOs and enlisted men did constitute a considerable portion of the military. During that period, therefore, the organic ratio of NCOs to the population of their respective armed service had once been as high as: 60 percent in the Army, 70 percent in the Navy and 65 percent in the Air Force. Later on, however, not only were those senior NCOs retired in succession, but also the effect of recruiting new NCOs has long been unsatisfactory. Thus the organic ratio that had once been taken for granted has become somewhat awkward and can no longer meet practical requirements. After an all-around inspection, the MND eventually modified the previous ratio of the standing-service NCOs to: 16 percent in the Army, 30 percent in the Navy and 58 percent

in the Air Force.

In addition to revising and reformulating the organic structure vis-a-vis NCOs in the military, it is also imperative to set up the objectives of cultivating and training new NCOs to replenish the positions of master sergeants and/or sergeant majors. Efforts have been made in extensively selecting and recruiting 3- year-service-term (4-year in Navy & Air Force) leading NCOs. Meantime, to solve the problem of lack of personnel, various troops and units of the Armed Forces also replenish their own NCOs by way of on-the-spot selecting and on-the-job training. Currently, the practice of 3- and 4-year-service-term leading NCOs' recruiting can meet as high as 84 percent of the annual requirement, having effectively solved the said problem. This practice will continue in the years ahead.



NCO students in basic training.

III. Military Education

Military education of the ROC Armed Forces can be traced back to the Army Officers School as early as 1906, or six years before the founding of the Republic. Later on, going with the changing trend of the times, aiming at the requirements of army building and combat readiness, and consulting various patterns of education at home and abroad, it was changed and improved again and again. At present, our military education can be classified into three parts: that of officers, NCOs and preparatory school. The officers education, on the one hand, falls into three levels -- basic level, intermediate level, and advanced level; while on the other hand, follows two develop lines, i. e. , the "all-round line" and the "professional line." The preparatory education is actually a sort of high-school education, with a certain amount of military and PE courses added for cultivating an officer's temperament. Mainly for cultivating more specialist and skilled NCOs, the NCOs education is divided into two educational phases: basic and intermediate. The education at each of these educational levels is a combination of philosophy, applied science, and military science; and all these constitute an integrated system of education.

The essential idea of our military education is to set up the military thinking of self-strengthening and self-reliance, and to form a comprehensive system of education consisting of philosophy, applied science, and military science. Aiming at the changes in the enemy's situation, giving consideration to the developing trends of war, and combined with the demands of modern national defense, all the courses offered in various academies and schools are designed in accordance with educa-

tional objectives as well as educational standards. Based on the content of education, various kinds of teaching methods have been drawn up, so as to shape various focal points; and all those vertically arranged courses are linked up with those horizontally divided, so as to maintain the integration of the system as a whole. Furthermore, to raise our cadres' quality and to cultivate the qualified personnel needed in our long-term, mid-term and short-term development, efforts have been made in all-round reviewing and selecting officers to study abroad.

Today, almost all of our officer-cadres have completed their basic officer's education which equals the level of college and/or university. In addition, during the past ten years, as many as 3,051 officers have obtained either masters or Ph.Ds; 6,711 officers have completed their advanced military education (either at command and general staff level, or at strategic level). All the commanders or chiefs at and above the division level, and some 40 percent of those at the brigade level, have received strategic education; some 62 percent of the commanders or chiefs at the battalion level have completed their command and general staff education. As for the NCOs, some 16.52 percent of them are college graduates; and as many as 76.56 percent have received an education at either a senior high or vocational senior high school level. (see Table 3-8)

IV. Manpower Management

The purpose of manpower management is to bring the limited manpower resources into full play by making use of economic and effective methods of management, so as to meet both peacetime and the wartime requirements.

**Table 3-8 Statistics of ROC Military Officers Having
Received Higher Education During 1981 – 1990**

Category No. FY	Strategic Education	Command & Staff Education	Masters Program	Ph.D Program	Total
1981	105	757	84	2	948
1982	114	748	155	42	1,059
1983	64	328	179	64	635
1984		369	222	67	658
1985	129	259	201	83	672
1986	129	382	292	92	895
1987	136	666	362	116	1,280
1988	113	400	276	126	915
1989	115	887	234	86	1,322
1990	147	863	283	85	1,378
Total	1,052	5,659	2,288	763	9,762

Selection, Training and Appointment of Cadres

Cadres with outstanding professional abilities and consummate skills are one of the most important factors deciding the strength of our national defense. The selection, training and appointment of defense cadres has been fulfilled in accordance with such a recognition.

1. Assignment: In accordance with the policy of lowering the age of cadres and based on the principle of cultivating

cadres by way of choosing the best, we have gradually lowered the average ages of the candidates for important military appointments. As of 1990, the average ages of those who were appointed to important military posts, such as commanders or chiefs, of: a brigade-level unit have been lowered from the age of 47.3 (in 1981) to 41.2; a division-level unit, from 54.3 to 47.17 years old; and a corps-level unit, from 56.7 to 52 -- all of these averages have been gradually reaching the expected objectives: 50 years old for a corps-level, 45 for a division-level and 40 for a brigade-level commander.

2. Promotion: In order to coordinate with the practice of lowering the age of cadres and to take account of the principle of keeping all the cadres bright and strong, the average ages of middle and high ranking officers have also been going down year after year. An analysis of the average ages of those being promoted to the ranks of full colonel and major general during the past ten years (1981-1990) is shown in Table 3-10, in which we find that the average age of promotion to full colonel has been lowered from 49.03 in 1981 to 39.15 in 1990; and that of major general, from 51.3 to 47.12 in the same period.
3. Training: Officers' specialties are mostly obtained from highly professional training. Officers of the National Armed Forces have to complete their intermediate and advanced training and education of various phases along with their career development and promotion. The entire process from planning, selection to examination is in accordance with the practical requirements of the armed

forces and the principle of combining selection with employment. At present, for example, those majors and lieutenant colonels with outstanding merits and achievements are usually recommended to take the entrance examination of the regular class of the Command and General Staff College, and are the candidates for battalion commanders, brigade commanders, or section chiefs in division headquarters; and those colonels and major generals who have received education at command and general staff level and have got some relevant experience are recommended to take the examination for receiving advanced education at the strategic level.

System of Military Service

Our military service system is based on Article 20 of the Constitution that "the people shall have the duty of performing military service in accordance with the law." To meet the requirements of national defense, and giving consideration to the economic development and the principle of equal liabilities, the Military Service Law was drawn up to implement military service affairs. In our military service system, officers and NCOs are mainly in voluntary service while the enlisted men, compulsory service. In other words, it is a system of combining voluntary service with compulsory service, or a system of combining standing service with reserve service, for the purpose of "maintaining less armed forces in peacetime, while having more in wartime." The current Military Service Law has classified the military service into three parts, i.e., officers service, NCOs service and enlisted-men service:

Table 3-9 Statistics on Major Military Occupations in Terms of Average Ages

Category	Year	Appointment							Average Ages					
		Commanders				Aides or Staff	Instructors	Total	Corps Level	Army Level	Divisional Level	Brigadier Level	Aides or Staff	Instructors
		Corps Level	Army Level	Divisional Level	Regimental Level									
Number Transferring in each year (1981-91)	1981	4	8	31	167	71	13	294	60.2	56.7	54.3	47.3	50.8	52.8
	1982	3	8	32	168	42	9	262	59.4	55.9	53	45.2	50.6	52.4
	1983	4	7	27	158	48	16	260	58.2	55.6	52.3	43.2	50.5	51.8
	1984	3	10	25	170	44	10	272	57.1	55	51.7	41.2	50.3	51.6
	1985	5	8	32	173	50	11	289	57.3	54.7	50.6	40.1	49.9	50.2
	1986	4	11	49	147	101	16	328	57.3	54.5	49.9	40.8	49.2	50.2
	1987	3	8	33	162	93	20	319	56	54.3	47.5	40.6	48.9	50.5
	1988	8	13	34	149	116	32	354	56.1	52.3	48.1	40.5	48.6	49.4
	1989	3	11	40	125	96	29	304	57.0	53.0	48.2	40.5	48.7	50.2
	1990	6	11	64	152	126	29	388	56.5	52.0	47.17	41.2	46.54	47.8
	1991	3	10	40	130	101	32	316	57.0	52.13	48.0	41.76	46.63	47.9

Table 3-10 Statistical Analysis of High Ranking Officers Promotions (above Full Colonel) in Terms of Average Ages During 1981 – 1991

Categories Year		Number					Average Ages			Promotion Rates			Remarks
		Lt. Gen.	Major Gen.	Full Col.	Lt Col & Major	Total	Lt. Gen.	Major Gen.	Full Col.	Lt. Gen.	Major Gen.	Full Col.	
Number of Officers Gaining Promotion Each Year	1981	24	84	791	2180	3169	55.13	51.30	49.03	48.98%	44.68%	80%	
	1982	22	105	834	3934	4768	54.50	51.69	47.69	47.83%	45.06%	80%	
	1983	27	94	833	2553	3386	55.48	50.96	45.82	50.94%	50.54%	80%	
	1984	27	108	919	5938	6857	54.82	51.60	43.76	49.09%	54.55%	80%	
	1985	24	128	929	6725	7806	54.83	50.88	42.61	47.06%	64.00%	80%	
	1986	28	109	961	4749	5847	55.14	50.79	40.60	51.85%	71.71%	80%	
	1987	25	93	840	4720	5660	55.44	48.66	40.07	44.64%	66.03%	80%	
	1988	21	113	852	5321	6307	54.57	48.92	39.43	46.66%	65.32%	75%	
	1989	30	125	717	5466	6338	55.56	48.02	39.67	46.87%	64.43%	70%	
	1990	25	114	725	5127	5991	53.64	47.12	39.15	43.85%	60.32%	70%	
	1991	29	114	658	5096	5897	54.07	47.03	40.33	47.54%	68.26%	70%	

Note :
$$\frac{\text{no. of the promoted}}{\text{no. of taking slots}} = \text{Promotion Rate}$$

1. Officers service: There are standing officers and reserve officers. Every standing officer shall be, from the day of being appointed, on active service for a fixed number of years according to his (or her) rank, and shall be discharged from active duty after completing his (or her) term of service and be transferred to the reserve service until retirement. The reserve officers shall be called up to the active service according to military demands.
2. NCOs Service: Except without having the maximum number of active-service years, regulations of NCOs service are same as that of officers.
3. Enlisted-men service: The enlisted men can be divided into regulars, replacements, and national guards.
 - a. Regulars: Youngsters 19 years of age and with grade A or B in health checkup shall be conscripted in the next year; and those who were just 18 years old but were, for some reason, willing to join the army in advance are allowed to do so by way of application. After completing the two-year term of service, they shall be discharged and transferred to the reserve service.
 - b. Replacements: Recruits with grade A or B in health checkup but from impoverished families may apply for designation as replacements, which would give them reserve status after a three-month training period.
 - c. Militia reserves: Mainly those with grade C health condition, who shall be organized by local governments and receive some basic military training for future use.

All the above mentioned enlisted personnel (regulars, replacements, and militia reserves) shall be exempted from military service duty at the age of 45.

Organization and Training of the Reservists

1. Organization: The reservists shall be organized into two types of troops, i. e., "Armed Forces Mobilization Troops," and "Control Area Reservist Troops."
2. Way of Organizing:
 - a. Armed Forces Mobilization Troops: Those important personnel already brought into the annual military mobilization plan shall be divided into different code areas and brought into the organization of various control areas reservist troops.
 - b. Control Area Reservist Troops: With "the Regiment Control Areas as centers, towns and villages as jurisdictions, and household registers as basis, " to organize all those reservists registered in accordance with the law into "reservist battlions. "

Armed Forces Mobilization

1. Mobilization Policy:

Under the principle of accumulating strength in peacetime and expanding it in wartime, and in accordance with the Mobilization Law and the operational requirements of the armed forces, to draw up the "Annual Armed Forces Mobilization Plan;" and by classifying and organizing them into full-strength mobilization, unit expansion mobilization, and combat replacement, to at-

tain the goal of "mobilizing immediately, and fighting immediately."

2. Ways of Mobilization:

- a. Full-strength Unit Mobilization: All of the regular armed forces, reservist forces as well as the combat service support elements shall hold a certain amount of vacancies in peacetime, while in wartime fill them with reservists.
- b. Unit Expansion Mobilization: In accordance with the operational missions of various services and the expected availability of equipment in wartime, to select reservists as cadres and bring them into the regular armed forces so as to organize more combat units.
- c. Combat Replacement: Anticipate the possible combat losses in war and complete the replacement plan in advance; and replace them echelon by echelon in wartime.

3. Mobilization Preparations:

- a. Implement the Annual Mobilization Program: The annual mobilization program of the National Armed Forces has been drawn up according to the relevant laws and regulations of mobilization and in accordance with the requirements of the Armed Forces, the main purposes of which are: to combine it with the missions of combat readiness, to increase the combat capability of the mobilization forces, and to have the reservists cultivating a habit of responding to recall-orders immediately. In addition, based on the

annually issued "Guiding Outline of Reservists Recall, " the reservists are subject to receive the "recall training and exercises" so as to strengthen war preparedness capability of mobilization.

- b. Enhance the mobilization cadres' quality: In order to strengthen mobilization cadres' training, enhance their quality, and to raise the efficiency of mobilization, cadres in the Control Area forces and the local mobilization cadres are subject to professional training. And it has been made a rule that mobilization cadres at various levels should stay on the same position for at least two years so as to accumulate experience and to bring the working efficiency into full play.
- c. Strengthen mobilization management: To have effective management, an overall data processing system on reservists management has been completed. Through this system both the quantity and the quality of the work of reservists management, mobilization planning, and personnel transfer have been greatly improved.
- d. Effects of general mobilization work: To strengthen the war preparedness of mobilization, heighten the mobilization vigilance, test and verify the suitability of the organization of report committees at various levels, and drill the command and staff personnel's abilities in emergency mobilization operations, a series of maneuvers and exercises have been carried out in the last year with a 98 percent record high average report-for-duty ratio.



Reservists reporting for mobilization recall.



Vehicles being mobilized for combat.

V. Prospects

Readjust the Military Organizations and Lower the Objective of Military Strength

During the past ten years, the National Armed Forces has been reduced by as many as 50 thousand-odd personnel and as many as 617 units. By doing so, the organizational structure of military strength has thus become more rational. Nevertheless, ratios of personnel vacancies in combat units being still too high may affect the performance of the armed forces to some extent.

To cope with the possible changes in the nationwide manpower structure and to meet the requirements of national development as a whole, measures have to be taken. In addition to strengthening the efficiency of weapons and equipment, and raising the quality of manpower, we are to appropriately readjust the military organizations, refine the quality of staff in high command, dissolve and/or merge command elements, renovate the medical service system, and cut down those ineffectual units, so as to have the objective of military strength lowered, the ratio of replenishment raised, and the overall combat capability more consolidated.

Correct the Ratio of Officers to Men

Currently, the ratio of officers to men in the ROC Armed Forces is around 1 : 4, with the enlisted men's portion being comparatively low. To correct this deviation, efforts are to be made to reduce the number of official positions in addition to simplifying the organic structures of the high-level commands and cutting down on ineffectual units. Meanwhile, to cope with

the increasing demands of technical and professional personnel in the modern armed forces, the scope of employing civilians is to be enlarged.

Improve Military Education and Working Environment

After several decades of positive endeavors, the National Armed Forces have set up a comprehensive system of laws and regulations to operate the entire process of "recruiting, training, employment and retirement." Along with the structural transformation of the society as a whole, however, the traditional values have also been forced to change. As a result, the source of new cadets to the military academies has gradually shrunk. Facing current requirements as well as future development, the MND has been making every effort to draw up a series of plans to try to raise the military personnel's social status, improve their living and working environments, readjust their salaries and terms of service, review the policy of retirement, revise the policy of relief and consolation, reform the system of military education, and so on and so forth, so as to encourage and attract more and more youths with lofty ideals willing to enrol themselves in the army, to make the excellent ones stay longer, and to raise the quality of military cadres. Cooperative ties between military schools and relevant local universities and/or colleges shall be strengthened, and the opportunities for military personnel to pursue advanced studies and academic degrees shall be increased in part by trying to bring advanced military education into the national educational system.

Make Use of Female Manpower Resources

Occupying half of the population in human society, female manpower has increasingly been used throughout the world. In the United States, for example, roles played by female personnel are seen at almost every level in their armed forces, some 220 thousand—odd or more than 10 percent of the U. S. active service personnel as a whole. In contrast, the female military personnel occupies only a tiny part of the armed forces population in our country. To replenish the positions of mid- and basic-level cadres as well as professional personnel in various military institutions, however, programs for recruiting more female officers and NCOs have been carried out since last year (1991).



Our female officers in the tri-services.



Chapter 3

Defense Industry and Technological Development

I. Defense Technology and National Security

War in today's world is almost completely permeated and governed by technology. Technological capability has already become one of the essential indices of combat effectiveness, because it not only is the foundation of weaponry R&D and ordnance production, but also directly affects the trends of strategic and tactical thinking, thereby dominating the outcome of war. From observing the Gulf War, we have a better understanding of the crucial role that defense technology plays on the battle field.

In addition to huge investments, R&D of national defense technology requires the right conditions. It is usually in direct proportion to the degree of a nation's industrialization; i.e., the more a nation is industrialized, the more technological achievements she can get. Indeed, there are some autocratic and/or totalitarian states who, regardless of the consequences, spare no effort in carrying out weaponry R&D; such an act is admittedly not to be taken as an example, but it is true that high technology is by no means the big powers' exclusive domain. In other words, comparatively small nations may also develop

some special weaponry systems of their own, and thereby strengthen their deterrent capacity.




Premier Hau Pei-tsun inspecting an exhibition of defense technology.

II. Defense Industry and Technological Capability Assessment

Whether a society is prosperous and its people are living in abundance depends upon economic development; whether a nation's economy has stable growth lies in the mightiness of its defense power. A nation's defense power, its overall economic strength and its industrial technology are closely interrelated. Defense industry and national industry actually complement each other. Although considerable progress has been made in our industry during the past ten years, it has actually been confined to components/parts machining and light industries. The R&D

for improving our conventional weaponry system remains to be strengthened. To raise the standard of domestic industrial technology and thus establish a self-reliant defense industry system, the MND has long been making good use of the national defense industrial development fund; assisting those public and private enterprises to cultivate qualified technical personnel and purchase facilities; bringing in more advanced science and technology; and developing more sophisticated production, so as to meet the demands of national defense and to strike the roots of defense industry into civilian society. In addition, to strengthen cooperation between academic and industrial circles, the MND has issued the "Defense Science and Technology Development Plan" and, jointly with several cabinet-level institutions such as the National Science Council, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, set up the Executive Committee for the Development of Defense Science and Technology (ECDDST). With its two sub-divisions, i.e., the "Academic Cooperation Coordination Division" and the "Industry Cooperation Coordination Division," the ECDDST makes use of academic circles to deal with defense technology R&D on the one hand, and has the industrial circles participate in the work of developing and manufacturing weaponry and armaments on the other. Meantime, in accordance with the current transformation of economic development, efforts have been made to actively give guidance to those public and private enterprises to enhance their capabilities in producing weaponry and armaments. From now on, the objective of national defense technology R&D will remain the same: "All those critical technology items should take roots in the domestic soil; and stress should be laid on the R&D of multipurpose weaponry systems."



The assembly line of our IDFs.

III. Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, and R&D of Our Main Weaponry Systems

Missions and Achievements of R&D

1. Mission and Organization:

Established in July 1969, the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology at present contains some 6,300 science and technology personnel, and some 8,500 technical personnel, with its essential missions including the R&D and design of defense science and technology, as well as the manufacture and production of research and development results.



Weapon system developed by the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST).

The institute is divided into four major research divisions: aeronautics, missiles and rockets, electronics, and chemistry. In addition, the institute has as many as six centers for: systems development, systems maintenance, quality assurance, materials R&D, aeronautic development, and missile manufacturing. To meet the requirements of R&D missions, each R&D unit has been organized into matrix patterns, i.e., in addition to the fixed organic function units (such as research divisions, R/D centers), the institute has established the task-oriented project units (such as An-hsiang, Tien-kung, and Hsiung-

feng projects offices). In the function units there are Directors (of Research Divisions or Research Centers) in charge of the science and technology R&D of their respective fields; while in those project units there are Chairmen of the Projects who are responsible for the R&D program management and system integration.

2. Capabilities of R&D:


- a. In aeronautics: Able to undertake the tasks of designing, analysis, simulating, assembling, ground test, and trial-flight test of aircraft and aero-engines.
- b. In rockets and missiles: Able to undertake the tasks of designing, research, manufacture, assembling, testing, and trial firing of big-caliber/long-range rockets and various types of tactical missiles.
- c. In electronics: Able to research and manufacture radars (including air surveillance radar, various types of reconnaissance, illuminator, and tracking radars), gun fire control systems, various types of electronics warfare equipment, various types of military communication equipment, electronics components, various types of electro-optical equipment, under water detectors/sensors, underwater weapons, etc.
- d. In chemistry: Able to research and manufacture various kinds of propellants; high performance explosive and special warheads; weaponry and equipment's detection proofing, corrosion proofing and damp proofing agents; various types of chemical protection equipments; various kinds of incendiary, smoke screen and fire-retardant agents, etc.
- e. In materials: Able to research and manufacture vari-

ous kinds of special military batteries (including sea water activated battery, Ag-Zn battery, thermo battery, and Al- Li battery); composite materials, superalloy materials, ceramic materials, electro-optical materials and components, etc.

- f. In quality assurance: Having built up capacities of EMI test, environmental test, automatic test, special materials quality assurance, instrument calibration and repair, etc.
 - g. In system simulation and integration engineering: Having built up a number of missile system simulation test facilities as well as capacities of system software development; and being able to integrate and develop the ship combat systems.
 - h. In overall logistic support: Having built up capacities of aircraft, missile, and electronic warfare systems; logistic engineering and logistic support.
3. Achievements of R&D:
- a. Those having been produced and deployed: Such as Kung-feng 4 and Kung-feng 6A rockets, Hsiung-feng I and II missiles, artillery fire control system, ship sonar system, ship electronic warfare system, Tzu-chiang trainer aircraft, etc.
 - b. Those in, or to be in, production: Ching-kuo Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF), Tien-kung I and II missiles, Tien-chien I missiles, etc.
 - c. Those in development: Tien-chien II missiles, Ta-cheng Naval Automatic C³I System, Armed Forces electronic warfare equipment, systematic integration of Navy's second generation FPGs, etc.



The Tien-chien I (Sky Sword I) air-to-air missile.



A Hsiung Feng II missile being launched from a ship.



Our Kung-feng (Worker Bee) 6A 126mm MRLs.

Main Weapon Systems R&D and Prospects

On the principle of "long-term planning and overall development," based on our strategic concept aiming at enemy capabilities, and in accordance with a fixed procedure of decision making and operation, the ROC Armed Forces set the requirements of weapons and equipment (see Chart 3-8). When foreign purchasing is needed, a regular operating procedure of purchasing flow process can be followed (see Chart 3-9).

1. Status Quo of Main Weaponry and Equipment R&D

a. IDF research and manufacture:

Four IDF prototypes (3 single-seat, 1 two-seat) have rolled out; engines for flight tests and electrical equipment have also been completed and are now undergoing integrated flight verification tests. Plans for producing 10 pre-production versions have already begun; and their delivery is scheduled to begin on April 1, 1992, and to be completed in December 1993. The first production version fighter is to be delivered on January 1, 1994; and the production of as many as 250 IDFs is to be completed by the end of December 1999. In spite of a recent accident to the No. 2 prototype in a test flight, the whole project will continue as usual without being affected.

b. Tien-kung missile system:

The first set of Tien-kung (Sky Bow) surface-to-air missiles was delivered to the Army in August 1989 for one year of testing and training. Currently, this weapons system is undergoing precision testing. Preparations for mass production are already underway, and the system is scheduled to enter service in 1994.

Chart 3-8 ROC Weaponry Development & Acquisition Process






Chart 3-9 ROC Weapon & Equipment Procurement Process






Ching-kuo Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs) in flight formation.



Our Tien-kung (Sky Bow) surface-to-air missile system.

c. Tien-chien missiles:

- (1) The Tien-chien I (Sky Sword I) low-altitude surface-to-air missile system had its full operational missile R&D trial fire successfully done by the end of 1987, and started its reliability testing on January 1, 1988. So far it has completed as many as 1,400 hours mounted flight tests and multiple airborne firing tests. The work of production preparedness is to begin right after the entire process of flight testing and verification.



One of our Tien-chien I missiles in its verification test.

- (2) The Tien-chien II missile system has completed quite a few firing tests and is now undergoing flight and verification tests.

d. Hsiung-feng missiles:

- (1) The Hsiung-feng I missile system has already entered service on Navy's destroyers and missile craft, and has completed coast-based deployment.
- (2) The first set of Hsiung-feng II, a longer-range anti-ship missile system was deployed in June 1991 and has been in combat readiness ever since; and its airborne version is currently in the developmental stage.

e. Construction of the second generation ships:

- (1) FPG-2 (patrol frigate, guided missile): Designed mainly for anti-submarine warfare, the FPG-2 is also able to carry out anti-air and sea-surface operations which would be helpful in countering an enemy blockade operation. As many as 8 FPG-2s are to be constructed in ten years. Construction of the first one started in the shipyard of China Ship Cooperation on January 7, 1990, and is to be delivered in May 1993. Afterwards, one FPG-2 will be delivered every 11 months; in other words, the construction of all eight FPG-2s will be completed by October 1999.
- (2) PCEG (patrol craft escort, guided missile): An agreement for cooperatively constructing PCEGs has been reached between the ROC Navy and a European shipyard, and is already in progress.




"Cheng-kung," one of our PFG-2 frigates.

f. Cooperative production of M48H tanks: The M48H tank was officially named "Yung-hu" (Brave Tiger) tank, and has entered service. The production of as many as 450 Yung-hu tanks is to be completed by April 1993.

2. Concepts of Developing Main Weaponry and Equipment

The basic concept is to develop low-cost but high-effect weapon systems on the one hand, and to enhance the defense and deterrent operation capabilities on the other. Based on the principle of long-term planning and overall development, the work of manufacturing main weaponry systems is aimed at the enemy's threat, the patterns of future war, and the trends of weaponry development. In accordance with the concepts of army building and the

plans of military renovation, the demands of weapons and equipment should be made on the principles of giving consideration to the balance of attacking, protection and mobilization capabilities; and of "one equipment, multi-purposes," and "one system being utilized by three services of the armed forces." All these are to be carried out gradually by means of technology transfer, technical co-operation, performance reform, and self-reliant R&D.



Our "Yung-hu" (Brave Tiger) M48H main battle tanks.


Chapter 4

Logistics and Outfitting

I. Rebuilding and Strengthening of Military Bases

In accordance with the requirements of overall national defense readiness, measures have been taken to continuously strengthen the work of renovating the facilities in major military bases both on Taiwan and on off-shore islands, enhance protective capability, and put emphasis upon the extension projects of Naval and Air Force bases along the eastern coast of Taiwan, so as to increase the strategic depth and maneuvering flexibility.

In view of the fact that, as an island longitudinally long and narrow in shape, Taiwan is confined by limited space latitudinally and doesn't have enough strategic depth in wartime, she has to strive for more depth of defense, so as to preserve her effective strength and to withstand the enemy's sustained attacks. After a long period of painstaking efforts, the ROC Armed Forces have, on the one hand, rebuilt and/or strengthened military bases on the off-shore islands such as Shang-yi Airfield of Kinmen and Tungsha (the Pratas) airfield, landing piers on Matsu and Tungyin islands, first-line positions, and deployed anti-air and sea-control weapons so as to expand our time and space of early warning by means of having enemy's bases



The Nike Hercules SAMs.



A F-5E fighter standing by in its shelter.

5. Accessories: Based on the renewal situation of various weapons and equipment, appropriately revising the reserve levels, and weeding out old reserve accessories, so as to ensure good quality on the one hand, and to lighten the burden of the stockpile on the other. In addition, at the same time when purchasing weapons and equipment, conclude long-term supplying accessories agreements with the manufacturers, so as to not worry about running out of supplies.

III. Upgrading Medical Facilities

To improve the medical treatment system and regulate the medical treatment organization, measures have been taken to set up systems of local joint medical treatment responsibility by way of having the General Hospital as the center and bringing all the military hospitals at various levels into the overall medical treatment system of the ROC Armed Forces. Meantime, aiming at the missions, characteristics, and developing objectives of different hospitals, reorganize them into specific departments, replenish their facilities year by year, strengthen their teaching and R&D functions, raise their working efficiency, and improve their qualities of medical treatment.

To meet the needs of combat readiness, a plan has been drawn up to move the National Defense Medical College and the Tri-Service General Hospital to the Neihu district in suburbs Taipei and, thereby establish the "National Defense Medical Center" by combining them with the "Aviation, Space and Seabed Medical Center," so as to give the supreme medical unit of the ROC Armed Forces the functions of medical operations,

teaching/training, and research/development at the same time. At present, the entire project, with its architectural design drawn up, is under construction and will be completed by the end of 1995. In addition, the building renovation (or reconstruction) and the medical facilities renewal in as many as seven fourth-grade and fifth-grade field hospitals are now under way.

IV. Improving Living Conditions of Officers and Men

Along with the current trends of economic prosperity in our society, the ROC Armed Forces deem it necessary to take care and improve the living quality of officers and men, keep them in good health, inspire their morale, enhance their spirit of solidarity and, thereby, strengthen their invisible combat capability as a whole. Thus, measures have been taken as follows:

In food: to raise the amount of subsidiary foodstuffs year by year; set up subsidiary food supply stations all around, so as to get rid of middleman's exploitation and bring economic efficacy into full play; strengthen cooks' training; improve kitchen facilities; and raise the quality of dietetic hygiene.

In clothing: to raise the clothing expenditure and uniform allowance year by year in addition to demanding officers and men to be neatly dressed; and improve the quality of their clothing and uniforms.

In shelter: Toward those old military districts and their worn-out installations, and in an attempt to complete an overall renewal of the barracks, the MND started reconstruction long ago. Meanwhile, to improve the living conditions of officers

and men, and to enliven their bodies and minds, measures have been taken to improve the recreation and athletic facilities in the military districts such as gymnasiums, sports grounds, swimming pools, basketball courts, tennis courts, baseball fields, audio-video centers, etc. Under an annual budget of as much as NT\$1,300 million, ten military districts have been selected as experimental units to take the lead in implementing these projects.

In Transportation: Along with the reconstruction and/or renovation of airfields and landing piers on off-shore islands, more modern transportation aircraft and transport ships have joined the air and shipping traffic lines so as to increase the quantity of transportation on the one hand, and to cut short the time of supply operation on the other. To lighten the burden of military transportation, both the air and shipping lines between Taiwan and Kinmen have been opened to civil airlines and shipping companies. To relieve officers and men of travel fatigue, railway and highway transit services have been regulated at both Keelung and Kaohsiung harbors. In addition, quotas of railway, highway and airplane free tickets and passes for military personnel have been increased; and most of the worn-out office buses have been replaced with those rented from privately-operated bus companies so as to retrench the expenses of drivers, fuel and maintenance.

V. Strengthening Management of Military Properties

The ROC Armed Forces at present possess some 34,000 hectares of military land, as many as 49-thousand-odd houses/

buildings, and 21-thousand-odd structures. To set up accurate property registration data, to safeguard the rights and interests of state-owned property, and in accordance with the "Plan for Overall Checking Up of National Assets" issued by the Executive Yuan, the Armed Forces was required to complete the check-up operation of as many as 80-thousand pieces of state-owned but military-held lands within a two-year period from July 1, 1990, to June 30, 1992. Those privately-owned lands having been leased, borrowed or occupied for military use are in principle to be given back; in cases where there are necessary for combat readiness, they can hardly be given back to their owners, and further coordination is to be made by either leasing or purchasing piece by piece, so as to safeguard the land-owners' rights and interests. As to those military-owned lands occupied by civilians, on the other hand, reasonable solutions are to be worked out case by case through coordination. An overall computerized management system has been established for handling the numerous pieces of military-assets; furthermore, area network systems linked with the land administration units of local governments for even more accurate and practical management are to be set up soon.

VI. Carrying out Environmental Protection Programs

The work of environmental protection has been listed by the ROC Armed Forces as one of its most important administrative items. In accordance with the acts and regulations concerning environmental protection, and considering the overall requirements of the Armed Forces, a three-level plan, i.e., the

level of guidance, design, and execution, was drawn up in 1989. Aiming at six different kinds of major pollutant sources -- arsenals, military hospitals, barracks compounds, airfields, harbor areas, and waste gases -- protection measures have been taken by way of entrusting the qualified EP consultants with the tasks. Ever since the item was brought into the government budget, an amount of NT\$2,222-million-odd has been invested so far. As many as 35 sewage disposal facilities for military hospitals and arsenals have been constructed. Meantime, the project of converting the water-heating facilities to natural gas for as many as 316 kitchens and bathhouses in 171 barracks areas is to be completed by the end of 1993. In addition, the Air Force General Headquarters was instructed to entrust Chung-Hsing Consultant Service with the task of noise control in areas around the airfields, so as to minimize its impact upon the people in the vicinity. Short films of EP education are periodically shown on TV programs designed for officers and men.

PART FOUR
STATUS OF DEFENSE AND
COMBAT READINESS

Summary

1. Consisting of some 312,000 officers and men in total, the ground forces (including military police corps) of the ROC are to build up a three-dimensional, armored, and automated modern Army with "independent brigades" as the main combat units.
2. Consisting of some 68,000 officers and men, the naval forces (including marine corps) are currently putting the stress on the construction of the second generation combat ships (FPG-2s), and are making efforts at achieving the goals of installing missiles on all of their combat craft, setting up three-dimensional antisubmarine capability as well as automatic command/control system.
3. Consisting of some 68,000 officers and men, the ROC Air Force is now positively carrying out mass production of the IDFs, and is trying to purchase more high performance combat aircraft. Meanwhile, the Air Force continues to strengthen its capabilities in airlift, air defense, operational control, and early warning.
4. Garrison operation is an effective means adopted to cope with "indirect threats." In accordance with its own authority and entrusted by the Ministry of the Interior, the MND charges the Taiwan Garrison Command with the relevant tasks.

5. Henceforth, our combat readiness outfitting will still put the stress on: carrying out solid maneuvers and training, striving for more strategic depth, promoting capabilities of rapid reaction, conserving our combat strength, and setting up a self-reliant deterrent force for national defense.

Chapter 1

Alerting Surveillance and Intelligence Collecting

I. Ensuring the Security of Territorial Air and Waters

Being surrounded by the sea and located at a pivotal position in the island chain arc off the eastern coast of the Asian Continent, Taiwan naturally has its peripheral territorial air and waters as the first line of defense. To ensure the security of the Taiwan area, the ROC Armed Forces have long been performing the mission of peacetime alert and surveillance, so as to have the situation under control at all times. At present, in addition to implementing the 24-hour all-weather surveillance through intelligence collection agencies and equipment at various levels, they are keeping close watch over the activities of all the aircraft and ships passing by and/or through the area.

For years, we have usually been able to find unidentified objects passing through or getting into our territorial air and/or waters in time and take appropriate reactions and countermeasures such as close surveillance, warning, or expelling. Recently, however, this water area has increasingly been intruded into and harassed by fishing boats from both the Chicoms' side and other nations, thus causing us a great deal of nuisance and annoyance. From now on, therefore, in addition

to expanding the reconnaissance troops, the MND is to strengthen their capabilities of reconnaissance and surveillance by means of renewing the equipment needed and coordinating with other government institutions concerned, so as to bring the integral function into full play and ensure the security of our territorial air and waters.



A part of our reconnaissance radar system.


II. Monitoring the Chicoms Troop Movements

The focal point of our military intelligence work at present is to monitor and grasp the Chicoms troop movements for the purpose of early warning, so as to adopt effective military countermeasures:

Establishing the Overall Reconnaissance System

Taiwan is separated from the Chinese mainland by the Taiwan

Table 4-1 Organization of ROC Military Units in Charge of Monitoring Territorial Sea & Air



Straits, which are about 140 nautical miles at their widest point and only 72 nautical miles at their narrowest. It takes only 5 to 10 minutes for the enemy's combat aircraft from the other side of the Straits to enter our air, and about 2 to 4 hours for their combat ships to reach us. To ensure the security of the Taiwan area, therefore, it is necessary to set up a close and tight all-weather reconnaissance system along the coastline of the island and its periphery, and to complete an integrated reconnaissance network of short-, mid- and long-term intelligence collection, so that the Chicoms troop movements will continue to be under our surveillance.

Strengthening the Intelligence Collection Capability

Facing the development of the military situation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, and aiming at the requirements of military build-up and war preparation, the ROC Armed Forces are, on the one hand, making full use of all the organic intelligence collection institutions; and on the other hand, making efforts to renew step by step their surveillance equipment such as radar sets and electronic reconnaissance instruments, and to set up additional reconnaissance stations throughout the area, so as to keep well-informed on the Chicoms' troop movements. Meanwhile, toward changes in the Chicoms' internal situation, measures have been taken to open up more high-level channels of intelligence collection, putting stress on collecting the strategic intelligence about the possibility of the Chicoms' military invasion upon Taiwan. In addition, considering national security and social stability, intelligence information collected from mainland stowaways and smugglers has long been taken seriously and handed over to the domestic authorities concerned.



Our ground surveillants on duty.



Ready to scramble in an emergency.

Chapter 2

Ground Forces

The ground forces are mainly those of the Army and Armed Forces Police. As the decisive service of ground operations, the Army's structure is divided into combat troops, combat support troops and service support troops, according to the mission. Each of the three is functionally organized within itself, and has interrelations with the other two, thus forming an operational system engaged in ground operations under the command of the Army GHQ. The Armed Forces Police on the one hand is mainly in charge of military police affairs; and on the other hand, as a law enforcement body, it plays the role of judicial police throughout the country to maintain public security.

I. Status of Strength

Strength Objective

In accordance with the principle of land defense, the ground forces have the mission of being able to check and wipe out the enemy's landing forces as their major objective. By implementing overall planning and regulating priorities, they are to attain the strength objective of combat readiness step by step, enhance mobility and striking power, strengthen the ca-

pability of field air defense, renovate the field fortifications, and substantiate the strength of military police and garrison troops, so as to increase the land defense effectiveness and protect national security.

Total Force: 312,000-odd troops.

Organization:

Under the direction of the Army GHQ and Armed Forces Police Command, the ground forces have been organized into the units of command, service, and education; as well as a number of combat troops, which have been equipped mainly with: M48H tanks; M-109 and M-110 self-propelled artillery; M113, V-150, and CM-21 armored personnel carriers; UH-1H helicopters; the Kung-feng 6A rocket system; TOW-type anti-tank guided weapons; Chaparral SP, HAWK, Tien-kung (Sky Bow), Nike Hercules SAMs, etc. They are organized as follows:

1. Army Troops
 - a. 3 armies;
 - b. Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu (Pescadore Islands), Hualien-Taitung Defense HQs; and Airborne Special Operations HQ.
 - c. Tungyin Island Command, and Chukuang Island Command.
 - d. 2 mechanized infantry divisions;
 - e. 13 heavy infantry divisions;
 - f. 7 light infantry divisions;
 - g. 6 armored brigades;
 - h. 2 tank groups;

- i. 2 airborne brigades;
 - j. 2 aviation groups; and
 - k. 2 air defense missile groups.
2. Armed Forces Police
- a. 5 military police commands;
 - b. 1 MP Training Center.

II. Evolution in the Last Decade

During the past ten years, the ROC ground forces have been engaged in simplifying the structure and solidifying combat capability; and have been making efforts to meet the requirements of building up an armored, automated, and three-dimensional modern Army. In the period from 1983 to 1986, they cut down as many as 5 light infantry divisions; purchased M-109 and M-110 self-propelled artillery to replace part of the towed artillery; established 2 mechanized divisions, 2 Kung-feng 6 rocket battalions, 1 B-234 helicopter team, and reorganized 1 chemical smoke screen battalion. In 1987, the military police corps was expanded by as many as 30 companies, and all 3 armies' MP battalions were also enlarged to a certain extent. In 1989, the corps-level command was eliminated from the structure, and the Hualien-Taitung Defense HQ was established to strengthen the defense capability of that area. In sum, we reduced our forces by 56,132 army personnel in the period as a whole. As for weapons and equipment: the Tien-kung SAM system was completed and delivered to the Army in 1989; and M48H tanks and Chaparral SAMs were brought into the Army in 1990.



A BV-234 helicopter.



The Chaparral antiaircraft missiles.

III. Outlook

To build up an armored, automated and 3-dimensional Army is still the goal of development for the ground forces. Based on the main principle of mobile operation, they are to simplify the command structure, strengthen the firepower and mobility, set up more "independent brigades" step by step and eventually make them the main combat units of our Army, expand the size of the Army aviation force, and renovate the logistics system so as to meet the requirements of a future war. In weapons and equipment: continue manufacturing and purchasing various types of armored vehicles, promoting the performance of tanks on hand, strengthening the capabilities of antitank and anti-antitank warfare, producing self-propelled ammunition carriers, simplifying the types of wheeled vehicles, and purchasing new-model helicopters, so as to increase the firepower of the ground defense operations. In addition, the newly developed Tien-kung missiles are to be on active service and to replace those of the Hercules types; and additional low- and mid-altitude air-defense missiles are to be delivered to field troops at various levels.

Chapter 3

Naval Forces

Surrounded by the sea and with its coastline totaling more than one thousand kilometers, the Taiwan area is obliged to devote much attention to the effective control and use of its peripheral waters. As the major force of coastal defense, the ROC Navy shoulders the basic task of conducting surface warfare in the area, and is expected to take part in joint operations together with the Army and Air Force for safeguarding our coastal frontier.

I. Status of Strength

Strength Objective

In accordance with the principle of maritime defense, naval forces have the mission of ensuring sea control and the safety of sea lanes in the Taiwan Straits as their major objective. Naval forces are to continuously renew their observation/communication systems, accomplish the automation of command and control, strengthen the ships' electronic warfare capability, replenish the weaponry system on destroyers, rebuild the mine-sweeping and mine-laying boats, manufacture new-model torpedos, augment the nearshore defence force, prepare to construct

the second generation of new combat ships, and purchase more new submarines as well as land-based antisubmarine aircraft, so as to strengthen the capability of maritime defense. As for the Marine Corps, they are to reach the goals of: mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and automated command and communication systems, so as to build up an amphibious assault force of great mobility and strong striking power.

Total Force: 68,000-odd troops (including some 31,000 marines).

Organization:

Organization of the naval forces can be divided into two parts, i.e., operation forces and ground organs. Under the unified direction of the Navy GHQ, they constitute an integrated system.

1. Naval Combatant Forces:

- a. Fleets: Consisting of DDGs, PFs, PECs, LSTs, MSCs, SSs, and various types of service craft, as well as naval aviation force (500-MD and S-70-M1 helicopters, etc.); they contain:

DD/FF troops: in charge of air defense, antisubmarine, shore bombardment, escort, as well as offshore water reconnaissance/patrol tasks.

Including:

2 destroyer fleets;

1 frigate fleet.

Amphibious troops: 1 amphibious fleet, mainly for amphibious warfare.

Submarine troops: 1 submarine group.

Mine troops: capable of mine-laying and mine-sweeping;

including:

1 mine vessel fleet;

1 mine-sweeper/layer fleet.

Speedboat troops: 1 Hai-chiao group, for offshore patrol.

Aviation troops: 1 helicopter group, being composed of anti-submarine helicopters.

Logistic troops: including:

1 service fleet;

1 rescue group.

b. Shore-based Missile Troops: Composed of Hsiung-feng missile groups, they are mainly for sea-control operations together with the naval fleets, and for supporting anti-landing warfare.

c. Marine Corps: Composed of combat, combat support and service support troops, they are capable of carrying out amphibious warfare and inland operations. They include:

2 marine divisions;

1 landing tank regiment;

1 operational service regiment.

2. Navy's Ground Organs

The Navy's Ground Organs is a general term for all those organic units in the Navy's ground bases which include area command units, education and training units, administration and logistic management units, service

support units, and naval professional units; namely, the Naval Academy, 3 naval area commands, 5 naval base commands, 1 naval logistics command, 5 shipyards, 1 fleet training command, as well as several training centers and schools. Their common mission is to support the fleets and marine corps in wartime.

II. Evolution in the Last Decade

Through foreign purchasing and self-production, the ROC naval forces have during the past ten years spared no effort to carry out R&D programs on missile craft, PFG-2s, submarines, and various types of weapon systems. The first self-produced missile craft group was organized and entered the service in 1983. Shortly after that, they procured two NI mod Zwaardvis submarines and one ammunition/fuel supply ship, established the offshore patrol group and the shore-based missile groups. Meanwhile, under a series of projects, i.e., Wu-chin 1, 2, and 3, the main combat ships have successively had their hulls and engine components overhauled as well as their weapon systems renewed, thus they can as expected take charge of filling in the gaps of combat power which might have existed before the FPG-2s could enter the service. Construction of the first FPG-2 officially started in early 1990 and has been going on smoothly. Along with the newly purchased anti-submarine helicopters (S-70C-M1) entering the service, capabilities for carrying out anti-submarine warfare in the Straits can hopefully be strengthened. To bring the functions of their weapons into full play and to sparingly use manpower and material resources, the naval forces have adopted different kinds of training aid instruments, and

have built up capabilities for maintaining and repairing new and advanced weapons and equipment. The Marine Corps have accomplished the automation of gunnery and replenishment of light weapons; have upgraded the performance of tanks, renewed the power and mobility of amphibious vehicles, and purchased more low-altitude missiles. To meet the manpower requirements resulting from the renewal of weaponry systems, the Navy has: carried out a series of simplification projects in the amphibious forces and the Marine Corps from 1983 to 1985; sealed up and preserved as many as seven LSTs in 1984-1990; reduced the organic personnel and cut down the equipment on ten PF/PCEs in 1988-1990; and eliminated one fuel ship in 1991. While having cut back as many as 3,010 personnel during the past ten years, the Navy has become a more effective and more solid combat force.


III. Overlook

For future development, the ROC Navy will continue to build up the second generation of its main combat force, to equip all its combat ships with missiles, to acquire 3-D anti-submarine warfare capability, and to automate its command/control system. The current DD fleet will gradually be replaced by the newly procured PFG-2 missile frigates and PCEG missile patrol craft. In addition, the Navy is to: renovate and expand its submarine force and missile craft force; set up an S-70C-M1 shore-based anti-submarine helicopter force; deploy more shore-based antiship missiles; renew the ship-based long-range antiship missiles; develop advanced sensory mines for strengthening

the capability of mine warfare; consolidate the strength of its service fleet; re-equip the observation and communication systems; complete the network of C³I system; build up a sea-control operation center for strengthening its overall capabilities of sea-control operations; expand the size of, and increase the logistic facilities in, the eastern-coast bases for bringing the sustaining power into full play. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps are to: procure more shoulder weapons and Chaparral SAMs for strengthening field air defense; carry out gunnery automation; renew the landing equipment such as LVT-P5s for strengthening amphibious mobility.



A S-70C-M1 anti-submarine helicopter.



A model of our second generation missile frigates (FPG-2s).

Chapter 4

Air Force

High speed modern aircraft have transformed warfare into three-dimensions, making the space of national defense expand drastically; thus, "without air defense, national defense is impossible." In terms of the geographic situation of the Taiwan area, the importance of air defense looks particularly remarkable. As the main strength of air defense, the ROC Air Force shoulders the basic task of conducting air operation and air defense operation in the area, and is expected to take part in joint operations with the Army and the Navy for safeguarding our territorial airspace.

I. Status of Strength

Strength Objective

In accordance with the principles of air defense, the air force has taken the mission of safeguarding the territorial airspace of the Taiwan area as their major objective of combat readiness. The Air force is preparing to: procure high-performance combat aircraft and AWACS aircraft; manufacture the IDFs, eliminate the outdated O-1 aircraft; simplify air transport units; renovate B- 1900s, B-727s and C-130s; strengthen the air defense auto-

mation systems; deploy the 3D fixed and mobile radar sets; and continuously strengthen aircraft-missile-artillery joint operations capability.

Total Force : 68,000-odd troops, including flight and ground personnel.

Organization:

Organization of the air force can be divided into two systems, i.e., operational system and logistic support system. Under the direction of the Air Force GHQ, they fight to defend the territorial airspace.

1. Operational System:

As the center of the Air Force operational system, the Operation Command takes charge of controlling and commanding all the operational wings (their main aircraft including: F-104 and F-5E fighters; C-130 and C-119 transports; AT-3 trainers; S-70C helicopters, etc.), air defense artillery, as well as the Army's missile units, so as to conduct aircraft-missile-artillery joint operations.

- a. 7 Tactical Combat Aircraft Wings, and 1 independent squadron;
- b. 1 Transport/antisubmarine Wing (containing 1 transport and 1 antisubmarine group);
- c. 1 Tactical Control Wing (containing: air tactical control center, air control report center, air control report stations, air report stations);
- d. 1 Air-defense Artillery Guards Command (containing 4 commands, 14 air-defense artillery

battalions, and 11 guards battalions);

e. 1 Communication & ATC Wing; and

f. 1 Weather Wing.

2. Logistic Support System:

The Air Force Logistics Command is in charge of professional logistics affairs, and is to direct and supervise the operations of all professional logistics units. It contains: 1 Logistics Command Center, 3 Logistics Support Divisions, 1 Fuel Group, Keelung Transport Station, and Kaohsiung Transport Station. Meanwhile, it has a number of logistics divisions and/or sections attached to various Air Force units for carrying out logistics support affairs. In addition, under every Combat Aircraft Wing there is a Base Service Support Group.

II. Evolution in the Last Decade

In accordance with the retrenchment policy, the Air Force had taken a series of measures during the past ten years: handed the Aeronautic Development Center over to the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology in 1983; eliminated the Air Defense School, 1 engineer Wing, 7 air defense artillery battalions, and 2 air transport squadrons; eliminated the Air Force Training Command and its Recruit Training Center in 1985; and simplified air defense artillery troops on off-shore islands in 1987. Meanwhile, most of the officers and men from those units eliminated were transferred to basic-level combat troop units. A new Combat Aircraft Wing was established in

1982; one C-130 squadron was renovated in 1986; one combat aircraft squadron was reorgnized into the Tactical Training Center for researching tactics of air operations in 1988; and in the same year, the Weaponry System Center was set up for integrating and strengthening the capabilities in procurement, maintenance and replenishment. In 1991, the Eastern Taiwan Command and the Air Defense Artillery Guards Command were established respectively. In the period as a whole, as many as 3,045 officers and men were cut back.

Being old and outdated, a number of the aircraft and weapons in our Air Force can hardly match the conditions of today's air operations. Thus, in addition to vigorously developing and producing the IDFs to replace old combat aircraft, the Air Force has taken measures to renovate their F-5Es on the one hand, and to purchase more F-104s on the other. Meanwhile, the antisubmarine performance of S-2Es has also been improved. After a long period of great effort, the IDF has been successively developed; manufacture of Tien-kung and Tien-chien missiles has been going on smoothly; the new 35mm rapid-firing guns have been acquired, and distribution and deployment of the radar sets have also been readjusted. Hence, the overall air defense capability has been strengthened remarkably.


III. Outlook

For the future development, the ROC Air Force will keep on reinforcing its combat power, improving its early warning system and strengthening its operational-control capability. It will vigorously carry out mass production of the IDFs; procure more

high performance combat aircraft to replace outdated models; keep on eliminating the old C-119s along with the procurement of the new C-130Hs; renovate its air-to-air and air-to-surface missile systems; strengthen its ground air defense system by deploying 35mm rapid-firing guns, Tien-kung SAMs and Chaparral SAMs so as to effectively obtain an integral body of aircraft-missile-artillery joint operations. Meantime, the Air Force is going to procure both AWACS and EW aircraft, new 3D radar sets, and EW equipment; build up an EW Wing; develop the automation of C³I system for promoting its capabilities of early warning and operational control; reinforce the resistance of its aircraft shields along the western coast of the island; expand the air base, and substantiate the capacity of logistic support in eastern Taiwan; and continuously carry out the construction work of the "Chia-shan" project in the area, so as to consolidate the sustaining power and preserve decisive strength.



The "Ching-kuo" IDF is already in mass production.



Our 35mm twin AA rapid guns.

Chapter 5

Garrison and Security

In the scheme of national security, garrison warfare was designed as an effective means to cope with "indirect threats." Almost all of the countries in the world have set up special agencies to carry out such a task. In our country, the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of the Interior jointly take charge of it. To combine the capabilities of the military, military police, police, and civil defense together and bring them into full play, and entrusted by the Ministry of the Interior (National Police Administration), the MND instructed the TGGH to distribute the tasks to different authorities through the "Report Meeting of Public Security" at all levels.

I. Maintaining Social Stability

A stable society is not only the foundation of national development, but also a safeguard to deter external aggression. Thus, maintaining social stability and protecting the national security are actually two sides of the same coin. To assist the police administration authorities in maintaining social order, the TGGH should take preventive measures through coordinating all the units concerned; and all the military police troops around the country should also, according to law, take strong measures

against crime, and give support to the local police stations in dealing with various special cases for investigation. Key points of their current work are:

To Safeguard the Central Administration

To safeguard major government institutions and organizations, foreign embassies and legations, communication and traffic facilities, as well as water and electricity supply, the TGGH (concurrently the Area Garrison Command of Taipei) has been charged to safeguard the security of the said objects by means of keeping alert, guarding, inspection, surveillance, patrol, etc. In addition, they have to, through coordinating all the units concerned in the garrison area, carry out joint investigations and arrests from time to time.

To Arrest and Prosecute Gangsters

Taking advantage of their organized gangs, hoodlums, rascals and local ruffians are the malignant tumours of a society. The TGGH under the current laws and regulations is responsible for prosecuting gangsters periodically in coordination with all the institutions concerned, so as to prevent them from disrupting social order and harming the public interest.

To Check Illegal Weapons and Ammunition

Ever since the ROC Government lifted the Emergency Decree in July 1987, smuggling of firearms and ammunition has become increasingly rampant, and social order and stability have thus been seriously threatened. Entrusted by the Ministry of Finance, the MND has instructed the TGGH to strengthen the work of

guarding the coast and off-shore patrol and, jointly with other institutions concerned, set up special-case groups to carry out investigations and arrests aimed at such key points as airports, seaports, fishing harbors, shipbreaking shops, scrap-iron storehouses, container yards, etc. By so doing, crimes of smuggling have been effectively intimidated, which is greatly beneficial to the maintenance of social tranquility.

II. Strengthening the Garrison in Mountainous Regions

Covering an area of 16,372 square kilometers or about 44% of the size of Taiwan as a whole, the mountainous lands on the island has been divided into as many as 29 administrative "countryside areas" spreading over 12 counties (or *hsien*).

Owing to their topographic features, the mountainous regions are prone to be taken as shelters by the lawless elements and become blind spots of public security. According to the "National Security Law," garrison and control of the mountainous regions shall be planned out by the MND (instructing the TGGH) jointly with the Ministry of the Interior, and carried out by the local police institutions. Focal points of the work at present are:

To Implement the Control of Comings and Goings

Local police administrative units have set up checkpoints at every entrance and passageway to the restricted areas to examine the comings and goings of people as well as vehicles. For the convenience of those people who are just touring and/or mountain climbing, however, application procedures and

administrative formalities have been either relaxed or simplified gradually in recent years.

To Carry out Thorough Checks in Mountainous Regions

In order to arrest and eliminate those lawless elements hiding in mountain areas, the TGGH has long been -- in coordination with the military, military police, police administrative units, civil defense units, as well as aboriginal voluntary police -- occasionally carrying out overall checkups in the mountainous regions.

To Strengthen Training of Aboriginal Voluntary Police

Male and unmarried female aboriginal youths between 16 and 38 of age (excluding students, teachers, government employees, people's representatives and handicapped persons) have been organized into groups and teams of "mountain area voluntary police" by the Taiwan Provincial Police Administration and have undergone various kinds of service training courses. They can give assistance to the work of maintaining public order and emergency rescuing in peacetime, and carry out military service duties in wartime.

III. Tightening Coastal Defense

Coastal defense is the first line of national defense. To safeguard the coastal areas and territorial waters and to cope with the enemy's infiltration and surprise assaults from the sea, the ROC Armed Forces have assigned specific troops to take charge of the coastal defense garrison as well as naval/air joint

patrol and reconnaissance. Meanwhile, entrusted by the Ministries of Finance and the Interior, these troops also give support to the work of container checkups and fishing harbor security surveys. In addition, as a coordinator, the TGGH has had task units from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Military Police organized into the Joint Force for Arresting Smugglers under the command of the Ministry of Finance to constitute a three-dimensional coastal defense garrison deployment. Focal points of their current work are:

To Tighten Air/Naval Patrol and Reconnaissance

The Armed Forces have been continuously giving support to customs authorities to carry out off-shore patrol and reconnaissance and, at the same time, constitute the "maritime surveillance screen" by taking concerted action to link the shore-based observation/communication system with the forces of air/ naval joint exercises, off-shore islands supply operations, fishing boats protection (Table 4-2), and rescuing. In addition, they constantly have a part of air/naval mobile forces on hand to carry out interception and repulsion missions.

To Implement Coastline Garrison

To effectively coordinate the military, military police, police administration and civil defense units in carrying out the tasks of coastline garrison (including harbor checkups), the TGGH has on the one hand set up garrison stations and/or liaison offices along the important sections of the coastline and at the major seaports (fishing harbors) throughout the island for comprehensive coordination; and on the other hand, invited all

the units concerned to organize a "joint supervision section" for carrying out overall supervision and checkups over maritime patrol vessels, coastline garrison posts, and harbor police stations.

**Tabl 4-2 Statistics of ROC Fishery-Protection Forces
(July 1, 1990—June 30, 1991)**

Year/Month	Ship (Ship-time)	Remarks
1990. 7	974	
1990. 8	679	
1990. 9	800	
1990. 10	535	
1990. 11	777	
1990. 12	689	
1991. 1	816	
1991. 2	724	
1991. 3	789	
1991. 4	373	
1991. 5	937	
1991. 6	761	
Total	8,854	

To Improve Countermeasures

In an apparently organized way, the mainland fishing boats often illegally intrude into our territorial waters. Pretending to be smugglers or illegal workers, they actually attempt to pry into the strength of our coastal defense, preparing the way for their military invasion upon Taiwan. The ROC Armed Forces, therefore, have kept on taking countermeasures, either driving them away or arresting them. On the other hand, the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan has entrusted the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to negotiate with the Chicom authorities concerned to strengthen the work of fighting crime, so as to restrain the mainland fishing boats as well as our fishermen from illegal behavior.

Chapter 6

War Preparations

I. Rectifying Operation Maneuvers and Training

The outcome of a war depends on combat strength; and the effectiveness of combat strength depends on military training. After a long period of preparedness without being at war, to keep up their combat effectiveness the ROC Armed Forces have annually carried out various exercises of operational readiness, maneuvers and training. Stress has been laid on:

1. Extensively reviewing the means of defense operation:
The essence of the confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is very unique and quite different from that of any other country in the world. Should the Chicoms invade us, they will doubtlessly resort to such means as infiltration, disintegration, sabotage and subversion; and thus political, economic, social and psychological warfare will apparently be involved. In their maneuvers and training, therefore, the ROC Armed Forces must take all these factors into consideration in advance.
2. Positively promoting the simulated exercise and training system: As a thickly populated island with over crowded

traffic, Taiwan has very limited open spaces for a large body of troops to carry out maneuvers and training. Especially along with the coming of increasingly sophisticated and expensive modern advanced weapons, it is indeed necessary for us to positively promote the simulated exercise and training system to save fuel and money, minimize the depletion of equipment, and avoid the influence of bad weather.

3. Strengthening the electronic warfare capability: Encouraged by high-tech development, electronic warfare has become one of the most effective means to dominate today's battle field; and the accomplishments made in the Gulf War last year have clearly proved this. In this respect, the ROC Armed Forces have drawn out an overall long-term plan to positively strengthen their electronic warfare capability.

II. Striving for Strategic Depth

As a long and narrow island and with only the Taiwan Straits lying between it and the mainland, Taiwan has limited depth for large-scale operations, thus effecting the use and effectiveness of combat strength. To overcome such a weakness, the following measures have been strengthened successively:

1. Strengthening the long-range early-warning system and using more advanced high-tech electronic equipment, so as to boarden the scope of alert, effectively control the enemy troop movements, and lengthen the time for early warning and reaction.

2. Deploy air-control and sea-control missiles on the off-shore islands so as to acquire more operational depth forward, to have direct surveillance and control over Chicom troop movements along the southeastern coast of the mainland, and strengthen our air and naval defense capabilities.
3. Actively renovating the air and naval bases as well as the logistic support facilities along the eastern coastline of Taiwan and striving for operational depth in the rear, so as to preserve air and naval combat strength for decisive battles in the future.

III. Promoting Rapid Reaction

The term "low-intensity conflict" means "a kind of military conflict between two nations or colonies struggling with each other, its intensity being lower than that of the conventional war but higher than that of normal or peaceful competition."

Since a "low-intensity conflict," whether internal or external, may constitute a serious threat and/or damage to a nation's politics, economy, popular sentiments, morale, and defense security, it has become a critical variable influencing regional stability and security among nations. In terms of our current environment, such a conflict may occur over disputes about the sovereignty over the isles and waters, or about the distribution of natural resources in the nearby areas. To effectively deal with such incidents, the ROC Armed Forces have taken measures to strengthen their capabilities as follows:

1. Set up small-scale, high mobility forces able to conduct

operations independently;

2. Set up tri-service joint combat forces with air and naval assault capability; and
3. Develop the ability to make rapid reactions at all times and keep a constant, high degree of combat readiness.

IV. Preserving Decisive Combat Capability

Decisive combat is the key to victory in military operations. It must be carried out by concentrating the most powerful combat strength. Should the enemy make an invasion upon us, they will doubtlessly resort to the means of surprise, assault, storm, blockade, etc., to weaken and destroy our combat strength. To cope with such actions, we have taken measures as follows:

1. Underground shelters: Moving the major weapons and equipment as well as logistic support facilities into underground shelters constructed around military bases or on tactical positions, so as to preserve the combat strength under the ground and bring it into play on the ground or in the air.
2. Strong points: In accordance with the concept and guidance of defense operations, dispose effective military forces and weapons at various key terrains, so as to make them being able to tenaciously defend their own positions on the one hand, and to break up and make flank attacks upon the invading enemy forces on the other.
3. Dispersion: To avoid becoming the targets of the enemy's air attacks, the deployment of the armed forces has been

appropriately dispersed, and their mobility has also been strengthened, so as to be able to concentrate the strike forces as rapidly as possible.

V. Establishing Deterrent Force

The purpose of building up the national defense armed forces is to ensure national security. Only by having security can national independence and freedom as well as the people's lives and property be safeguarded. For a country, however, the cost of establishing its armed forces is extremely high. Most countries in the world, therefore, build up their defense forces of deterrence and keep them well trained in accordance with their potential enemy's situation, their own national strength, economic efficiency, and the principle of flexibility.

Combat strength, or the strength for conducting military operations, is composed of visible elements (material strength) and invisible elements (spiritual strength), and is usually a multiple of the two. So far as the current situation in the Taiwan area is concerned, since the Chicoms are still carrying out their "modernization of national defense" and have no intention of renouncing the use of force in resolving the "Taiwan problem," their menace to our society has not been lessened along with the world trend toward detente. In the meantime, in terms of defense resources, there is indeed a great disparity between the two sides of the Straits; it seems meaningless therefore to emphasize the size of the armed forces. What we should actually do is to accurately review and calculate our national strength and strategic resources, steadily drill the standing forces, and

extensively store up the reserve forces, so as to make sure of having air-control and naval-control capabilities over the Straits area, and to effectively deter the enemy from invading us.

VI. Sustaining War Preparedness

To the work of war preparations there is no end. Back in the years before diplomatic relations between the United States and the ROC were terminated, the situation had been that, being restrained by the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, the direction of our military build up and war preparations had long been yielding to U.S. defense interests in the Western Pacific as a whole, and thus we could hardly insist on having our own way. After U.S. troops withdrew from Taiwan in 1979, however, we had to work hard for our own military build up and have already laid the foundations of modernization. Nonetheless, before the second generation of weaponry systems can officially enter into the services, there might still be some flaws and weaknesses. We should therefore face the facts, actively carry out the existing projects, and win a consensus from our countrymen so as to sustain the work of war preparations.

PART FIVE
PEOPLE AND NATIONAL
DEFENSE

Summary

1. Only by gaining support and cooperation from the whole people can the national defense be effective. Almost every country in the world has clearly stipulated in its Constitution and/or laws the citizens' rights and duties in regards to national defense.
2. As a part of the whole society or a social type, the army inevitably faces quite a few problems which are closely related with the outside world. Only by having more and more rational interaction and mutual understanding between the army and the outside society, can a consensus be obtained and the problems be solved. With sincere willingness, the MND has taken appropriate measures through various channels of communication, hoping to reach this goal.
3. When time and opportunity are available after the work of war preparations, the ROC Armed Forces, with the intention of cherishing the people, enthusiastically participate in different kinds of social services, as well as major economic construction throughout the country. Meanwhile, in synchronization with national festivities, they hold various kinds of displays, exhibitions, and military parades for promoting army-people relations.



Chapter 1

People and National Defense of Other Countries

The people's will is one of the major components of a nation's defense capability. Therefore, only by gaining positive support and cooperation from the whole people can the national defense be effective. Almost every country in the world has clearly stipulated in its Constitution and/or laws the citizens rights and duties to the national defense, so as to lay a foundation of good relations and cooperation between the two. In this chapter, several democratic countries, communist countries and the so-called neutral countries will be cited as examples to illustrate the relevant aspects of the relations between people and national defense.

I. Democratic States in the Free World

Although in democratic countries personal liberty is highly protected and respected, there are stipulations in their Constitutions and/or basic laws expressing what the people, as citizens, should specifically do to safeguard the state system. Meanwhile, in order to implement control and supervision over the armed forces, all these countries on the one hand appoint civil officials as the heads of their defense organizations to take

charge of all the administrative affairs of the army; and on the other hand, have parliaments examine and approve the defense budgets.

United States

In the Preamble of the U.S. Constitution it reads: "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Instead of carrying out continuous military conscription, the United States adopted the voluntary military service system in 1973. However, the conscription system was resumed in 1980, and has proceeded together with the voluntary one ever since. As to the reserve service, there are reserve corps composed of volunteers and military personnel discharged from active service, and the reserve forces of each state government. These personnel also participate with the active service in training, and their cadres are organized into wartime mobilization forces in advance. In the Army, for example, they can replenish as much as half of the total wartime strength. Meanwhile, to enhance the civil airplanes' capability for military transportation in an emergency, a reserve civil air fleet system has been formulated. To those high-school and college level students who are willing to join the army later, scholarship programs and military training courses are extensively offered.

United Kingdom

In 1961, the British government abolished the conscription system and adopted a voluntary one instead. As to the reserve service, in addition to including those with experience of military service, there is also a reserve service system for recruiting volunteers without such an experience. The voluntary reservists on the one hand keep on doing their normal civilian work, while on the other hand, they either receive military training on weekends or take part in a 15-day period of camp and field training during the summer. In the Army, the strength of this reserve force is about 1.6 times that of the regular troops. Besides, if and when Great Britain proper or any of its dependent domains were in an emergency of faced with serious threats, or invaded, the Queen has the power to commandeer various kinds of ships and boats.

France

Article 34 of the French Constitution stipulates that "for the sake of national defense, physical and property burdens shall be imposed upon the people." Based on this stipulation, a provision was written in its "State Service Law" that all those male citizens between 18 and 50 years of age, in a specific period of time, are liable for military and civil defense services and, after completing these services and before being at a specific age, shall be liable for reserve services. Hence, almost half of the total strength of its wartime Army is reservists. When in general mobilization, the government has the power to make requisitions for personnel, properties and labor service throughout the country; and the power to control and distribute energy resources, raw materials, industrial products and supplies as well.

Germany

A German law stipulates that "all the male citizens at the age of 18 and over shall be liable for service in the border guards or the civil defense labor service;" and that "to those who are liable to the military service but have failed to do so, some other kind of defense-oriented labor shall be prescribed." All those who have completed their 15-month military service shall be listed as reservists till a certain age, receiving peacetime training and participating in mobilization recall exercises. The number of reservists is about twice that of the regular armed forces. Besides, the government shall, under the necessity of national defense, requisition the people for movable property, immovable property, communications, etc.

Japan

Although after World War II Japan was determined never to go to war again, she has never given up her right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Hence, on the principle of civil official control, and by recruiting voluntary personnel, a self-defense corps of moderate scale was established. Were the country in an emergency, the government might take such measures as carrying out civil defense control over, and requisition of, the people, so that a nationwide system of civil defense could be set up. In peacetime, however, the government also pays very close attention to the trends of people's defense consciousness, takes opinion polls concerning the self-defense corps and defense issues once in every three years, hoping to consolidate the strength of national defense on a more extensive and more solid national basis.

South Korea

Article 39 of the South Korean Constitution stipulates that all citizens shall, according to law, bear duties in national defense. Local reserve forces and civil defense corps, amounting to some 13 times the scale of the peacetime military strength, are engaged in those works directly or indirectly related to national defense. Besides, in their "Draft and Dispatch Law," there is also a provision stipulating that the wartime government may requisition lands, materials, and various kinds of facilities from the people. In addition to the members of the civil defense corps who have to participate in civil defense training, most ordinary citizens should also take part in this activity. The 15th day in every month has been fixed as the "Civil Defense Day," on which a nationwide air defense drill and NBC warfare training are implemented.

II. Chicoms and Other Communist States

All those socialist regimes as well as those communist states are of the opinion that the state represents the will and interests of its people, and thus considering that the national defense is a lofty duty that the entire people should perform.

Chicoms

Article 55 of the Chicoms' Constitution stipulates: "It is the sacred obligation of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend the motherland and resist aggression. It is the honourable duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to

perform military service and join the militia in accordance with the law." The Chicoms' military service law stipulates that all male citizens between 18 and 22 years of age are liable for conscription in the active services, i.e., in the People's Liberation Army and the armed police force. The normal term of service: 3 years in the Army and the armed police; and 4 years in the Navy and the Air Force. After completing the service term, one may prolong his service for another 1-2 years when the army needs him and he himself wishes to. Although no military service law expressly provides, female citizens may also be conscripted when the need arises.

In addition to being on active service, the Chicoms' military service law stipulates that citizens' duties shall also include: joining the militia, being registered as reservists, military training for high-school and college level students, etc.

The law also stipulates that male citizens between 18 and 35 years of age and having completed their active service shall be registered as the reservists. There are two categories: The first category includes members of the primary militia, enlisted men under the age of 28 discharged from active service, and technical personnel of various professions; while the second category: the ordinary militiamen, and the reservists between 29 and 35 years of age.

Soviet Union

Article 31 of the Soviet Constitution stipulates that "the defense of the socialist motherland is the foremost function of the state and the cause of the entire people. For the purpose of defending the socialist products, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people,

the state sovereignty and the territorial integrity, the Red Army shall be created, and the duty of military service be stipulated." In accordance with this stipulation, all male citizens in the Soviet Union between 18 and 26 years of age are liable for military service. Those who have completed active service shall be organized into a reserve service force, a huge body, till the age of 50. Besides, elementary military training is also imposed upon those high-school students over 15 and those over 17 working either in the state enterprises or on collective farms.

North Korea

Article 72 of the North Korean Constitution stipulates: "To safeguard the motherland is the highest duty and honor for citizens. Every citizen has to safeguard the motherland and serve in the army in accordance with the law." In addition to its huge numbers of regular and reserve troops, North Korea also organizes quite a few paramilitary troops such as the "Labor and Farmer Red Guards," the "Red Youths Guards," etc. Almost the entire nation is in arms.

III. Neutral States

To independently safeguard themselves, almost all the neutral states in the world have made relevant laws for setting up large scale mobilization capabilities and laying the solid foundations of civil defense, so as to meet national defense requirements.

Switzerland

Article 18 of the Swiss Constitution stipulates: "The people shall have the duty of performing military service," and shall devote themselves to the establishment of a defense posture by taking various measures. In principle, the Swiss government imposes a certain period of military service upon all male citizens between 20 and 50 of age. Those who are eligible for military service shall at first receive a 17-week period of basic training before being organized into troops as a formality; and from then onward till the age of 50, each one of them shall receive at least 32 weeks of military training. The main forces are able to complete mobilization with 8 hours; while for the entire troops, 48 hours. Besides, for the military cause in wartime, everyone shall have the duty to provide the state with his or her movable and immovable properties. Booklets and/or handbooks concerning civil defense issues published by the judicial and police administrative authorities are sent to every individual family.

Sweden

The Swedish "Compulsory Military Service Law" stipulates that all male citizens between 18 and 47 years of age have the duty of performing military service. After having received 7.5-month to 15-month basic training, an ordinary draftee shall take part in as many as 5 combat exercises during several successive years thereafter. While in peacetime maintaining a standing army of some 70,000 troops, the Swedish government is able to mobilize as many as 800,000 armed personnel. Besides, to meet the defense requirements in case of emergency, the government may, in accordance with a number of relevant laws and regulations, requisition the people for various kinds of materials and

facilities. In the meantime, propaganda handbooks concerning the wartime norms of action and the like are sent to every individual family throughout the country by civil defense organizations.

Finland

Article 75 of the Finnish Constitution stipulates: "All Finnish citizens shall have the duty of participating in, or giving support to, the work of safeguarding the motherland." In accordance with the U.N. peace treaty of 1947, Finland has long been restricted to maintaining a peacetime army of less than 42,000 troops. In wartime, therefore, it would rely mainly on reserves. Following the year they reach the age of 20, all male citizens have to receive 8-month to 11-month military service training and, after completing this, to be listed as reservists till the age of 50. The maximum mobilization capability is about 700,000 troops. When in wartime, the government may also, in accordance with the law, make requisitions for all the materials needed and control all social activities.

Chapter 2

Social Foundation of National Defense

I. Rights and Duties of Military Service

Article 20 of our Constitution stipulates: "The people shall have the duty of performing military service in accordance with the law." Article 1 of our Military Conscription Law states: "Male persons of the ROC shall be liable for military service in accordance with the law." Thus male citizens who have reached the age of 19 and passed the physical examination shall, in the next year, respond to the call for two-year active service in the army; and shall be listed as reservists after completing the term till the age of 45. For the service of enlisted men, in addition to the regular service, there are replacement service and national-guard service, being conscripted and receiving training in accordance with law. Besides, university/college male students have to receive military training for 5 weeks during their summer and winter vacations, which may later on offset part of their regular service term.

Upon entering the army, one shall at first take an oath of loyalty to the Republic of China, to observe the laws and decrees of the army, and abide by security regulations. During enlistment, one can enjoy all the rights and treatment of a serviceman; and his family members are also eligible to receive

various kinds of favorable treatment.

II. Building up the People's Consciousness of Defense

The entire people's defense has become one of the basic concepts of modern national defense; and the most effective way to build up such a consciousness is to promote "mutual understanding." Paying much attention to this, the MND frequently publishes major measures of defense policy to the public through the mass media, hoping to receive more recognition and support from the people. Examples of concrete practices are as follows:

1. Issuing the "National Defense Report": For the first time in ROC history, the MND issued its Report to the public. To let the people throughout the country know, or at least get a general idea of, what the MND has been doing and why, and to make them understand and support all the necessary measures taken for ensuring national security, the contents of the Report are aimed at the current military situation, the threats to national security, the defense policy, defense budget and defense resources, as well as the status of national defense. While it is indefinite that the "National Defense Report" shall be issued periodically from now on, necessary revisions and/or supplements are likely to be made, say, every year.
2. Periodically carrying out public opinion polls of various social strata on issues concerning national defense: The ever-progressing methods and skills employed in today's opinion polls have made their results more accurate and

more reliable than they used to be. The Japanese government, for example, conducts such polls among young citizens throughout the country once every three years, inquiring about their impressions of, and suggestions toward, the national defense policy; and then take the statistical results as a main reference in revising the defense administration. Such an action has been proved to be helpful in heightening people's consciousness of national defense. The MND has set about researching the details of this approach and, at the same time, is actively taking measures to promote mutual understanding, expecting to effectively heighten the whole people's consciousness of national defense.

III. Interaction between the Military and Society

As a social community with all its members coming from civilian society, the army can never exist by itself alone and be isolated from other communities. Thus all problems emerging from the army are by no means isolated phenomena and are, rather, closely related to the outside society. In other words, only by creating a certain kind of rational interaction and coordination can a constructive consensus be set up, and the problems be solved. The following are the major problems we are faced with and the measures taken to cope with them:

1. Discipline: Along with an increasingly pluralistic society and unceasing changes in traditional values, the makeup of our troops has become more and more complicated. Every year, for example, we recruit more than 6,000

- enlisted men who have previous criminal records, thus forming a heavy burden to the work of discipline in the army. Since the basic requirement of ensuring solidarity, purity and security in the army must not be changed, we are going to continuously strengthen the law and discipline education of our officers and men, improve the methods of instructing and restraining, and implement the work of psychological consultation and guidance toward those stubborn and intractable elements, hoping that they can someday become useful members of society.
2. Disputes over land ownership: The origin of the land disputes is mainly that, back in the early stage right after the Armed Forces moved to Taiwan from the Mainland, the process of obtaining for military use many civilian lands was quite obscure due to lack of complete laws and regulations on the one hand, and the fact that almost none of the landowners paid attention to those worthless properties on the other. In recent years, however, along with the economic takeoff and the increasingly urgent demands for land, disputes have inevitably emerged. Our current management policy for military lands is: On the principle of making proper and reasonable reallocation and transfer of the military bases and public lands, to minimize the purchase of and, unless it's absolutely necessary, not to make any requisition of, civilian lands. As to those civilian lands which have already been occupied by military installations without being in accordance with the legal process, measures should be taken to give them back to their original owners; but in cases where the

lands are really needed and can hardly be given back because of military missions, trying to purchase them piece by piece should be the first choice; and if some of the landowners are reluctant to sell, signing a lease through the legal process should be done instead. Similarly, to those military lands occupied by civilians, measures should also be taken to get them back in accordance with the laws and regulations concerned, expecting that the land disputes between the military and civilian sides can sooner or later be solved effectively.

3. Prohibition and/or restrictions on building: In view of the requirements of defense operations, and to maintain the functions of military installations, it has long been necessary, through the legal process, to prohibit and/or restrict buildings in some specific military areas. Measures we have been taking are as follows:
 - a. Forts and fortresses can partly be open to the public for mountain climbing and touring as long as it won't affect the security of military installations.
 - b. In the light of the real situation, to minimize the scope of, or even remove, control over the operational positions.
 - c. To move those factories and warehouses with potential dangers of explosion away from cities and towns.
 - d. Under the principle of security, to remove control over coastal areas as much as possible.
 - e. When affecting the fulfillment of major economic construction, the locations of current military installations are to be changed or even moved away.

So far, the control of as many as 18 military installation districts has been removed; and the scope of the control over another 10, minimized. The scope of coastal area control has been reduced from the 500-meter high-water line to that of 300 meter's, thus cutting down as much as 75 per cent of the previous scope before the Emergency Decree was lifted in July 1987.

4. Noise around airfields: Most of our military airfields are located along the western coast of Taiwan. To cope with the noise problem, the Air Force authorities have drawn up a series of improvement measures, such as: increasing the aircraft's initial climbing angle after taking off, strictly prohibiting the aircraft with supersonic speed from making low-level flights over cities and towns, limiting the time of take-off and landing in mornings and at nights, setting up noise-testing networks, etc.
5. Training fields and shooting ranges: Along with the reconstruction and readjustment of military bases, a series of improvement measures have been, or shall be, taken in this respect, such as: to combine shooting ranges with ordinary training fields, improve the protection facilities of the training fields, strengthen the control over the exits and entrances, increase the safety coefficients, minimize interference which may disrupt the civilian environment, make use of advanced electronic simulators in training, and augment the facilities in the National Military Training Base in Hengchun, Pingtung County.

Aimed at the current problems mentioned above, the MND has been sincerely and enthusiastically making efforts to find proper solutions, but what seems the most important and most urgent is still the consensus of the entire people. Besides, the army also needs the goodwill, concern, and positive encouragement of the outside society, so that a strong and consolidated strength for national defense can be build up on the premise of mutual trust and mutual cooperation between soldiers and civilians.

Chapter 3

Providing Service to the People

The army-people relationship is also an important theme in military build-up and war preparations. Only by having close relationship between the two can the overall combat capability be brought into full play, and the mission of safeguarding national security be fulfilled. Looking back to those days from the 1950s to 1970s, we saw thousands of soldiers and veterans enthusiastically taking part in various disaster-relief and economic construction work such as: relief of the "August 7 Flood" in 1959, construction of the East-West Cross-Island Highway in the late 1950s, and quite a few other major economic construction works. All these achievements and merits have obtained positive affirmation and praise from various circles. Adhering to this tradition, the ROC Armed Forces have long been making every effort to join the work of disaster relief, military engineering support, as well as many other social service activities. Meanwhile, to promote the relationship and mutual understanding between the army and the people, they also hold demonstrations and displays of different kinds.

I. Disaster Relief and Rescue

It seems inevitable that natural and/or man-made disasters

resulting from typhoons, torrential rains, earthquakes, shipwrecks and the like, happen more often than not in the Taiwan area. Hence the ROC Armed Forces have already drawn up different kinds of disaster-relief plans and organized the personnel into teams. To increase the capability of coping with emergencies, these soldiers have received various types of disaster-relief and rescue training. When people suffer natural calamities or serious accidents, military units at different levels send troops and equipment to join the rescue work as early as possible. In addition, they also give assistance to the victims in their post-disaster home rehabilitation.

II. Aiding Local Construction

In response to applications from local governments, the military authorities send engineer troops to support various kinds of construction projects on the principle that such an action won't affect the implementation of their regular missions. In the early stage after moving to Taiwan from the mainland, the Central Government often sent comparatively larger scale military-engineer strength to support different sorts of local construction. In recent years, however, along with rapid economic development, the financial situations of the local governments have been greatly improved, and both the capability and the technology of the privately-owned building contractors, increased. Thus the Armed Forces at present, in addition to providing disaster relief service, only give necessary support to those urgent and highly pressing construction projects, or those which can not be completed by civilian companies, such as: building temporary bridges, dikes and dams; rushing to repair

roads and the like.



A helicopter on a rescue mission.

III. Serving the People


On the principle of not hampering their regular tasks of training and combat readiness, the ROC Armed Forces are also engaged in quite a few significant works for the people, such as: services for dependents of conscripts, social medical services, harvest assistance, etc.

Services for Dependents of Conscripts

The objects to be served in this respect include the family members of conscripts, reserve officers and NCOs, cadets of military academies, and reservists on recall. Essentials of the practice are:

1. On Troops' Side:

As soon as new recruits enter the barracks, their units write to their families, informing them of their sons, or younger brothers, having arrived safe and sound, so as to let them feel at ease. To keep good contact and offer necessary services, the units will also, within 3 months, send the records of these soldiers' living and learning situation as well as their working achievements to each of the local Armed Forces Service Stations in the soldiers' registered household cities or counties respectively. Meantime, the units keep abreast of misfortunes among conscripts' families, and apply to the local military service administrations for necessary help.



Engineers supporting a bridge construction.

2. On FAFA's Side

In response to the applications from military units and/or the dependents of conscripts, Friend of the Armed Forces Association (FAFA) as well as its branches in different counties and cities, i.e., the local Armed Forces Service Stations, will usually offer various kinds of services such as: pay special visits to families, mediate disputes among them, deal with lawsuits for them, etc. So far, more than 25% of the conscripts' families have received such services each year. Thus the expected results of "conscripts feeling at ease in service, and their dependents feeling at ease to entrust their boys to the army" have apparently been obtained.



A helicopter performing an urgent casualty evacuation.

Social Medical Services

To make full use of the available medical facilities and personnel, the ROC Armed Forces, in addition to offering medical services to the active servicemen and their dependents and veterans, also extensively offer social medical services for the purpose of lightening lower-income people's burdens by offering free medical services to those who live in the vicinities of each military base, and to those in remote mountain villages.



Soldiers offering timely help in harvest.


Harvest Assistance

Adhering to the ideal of "army-people being one family," the ROC Armed Forces have long been used to expressing their intention of cherishing and helping the people. Along with the


flourishing development in industrial and commercial enterprises, thousands of rural youths started pouring into the cities in the early 1970s, which resulted in an imbalance of labor supply in the rural areas. In 1973, in view of such circumstances, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, the then Premier, instructed the MND to mobilize and send soldiers annually to those farming areas in need of hands, offering timely help in the harvest. Numerous farmers around the island have enjoyed the benefits of such a benevolent policy.

IV. Demonstrations and Exhibitions

To promote the people's understanding of the actual conditions of our military buildup and combat readiness, as well as the achievements of our national defense construction, the MND holds demonstrations and exhibitions of various kinds every year. In the past decade, among others, 3 National Day Military Parades, inspected by the President personally, have been held in 1981, 1988 and 1991 respectively. Meanwhile, to take concerted action with the state festivals and/or celebrations, quite a few good-will activities have also been sponsored by the MND, including "combat strength demonstrations," "military history exhibitions," "defense technology and ordnance production exhibitions," as well as the activity of "opening the barracks to the public," etc. Those being invited to visit at least one of these demonstrations and exhibitions include: civic leaders, people's representatives, foreign guests, diplomatic envoys of friendly nations, retired generals, overseas Chinese, the common people, reservists, young students, dependents of officers and men, etc., totaling more than five million person-time visitors.



Thousands of compatriots from all walks of life as well as from overseas attending the National Day military parade as spectators.



The ROC Armed Forces, an invincible army for ensuring national security.